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Ms. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Ms. Henna Virkkunen, Ms. Roxana Mînzatu, and Mr. Michael McGrath, European Commissioners
Ladies and Gentlemen, Members of Parliament and Senators of France (...)
Ladies and Gentlemen, Heads of State and Government of the UN member countries

Poitiers, December 12th, 2025

Subject: Platform of proposals ([PJ no 0.4](#)) to help the UN and its member states resolve the complex problems they face; my letters to the UN (...) of 10-7-24 ([PJ no 0](#), EN [PJ no 0.2](#)) and 18-4-25 ([PJ no 0.3](#)), and to the French members of parliament and senators (...) of 23-2-23 ([PJ no 9](#)) and of 7-7-23 ([PJ no. 10](#)); and the war in Ukraine [pdf at: <http://www.pierre-genevier.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UN-EU-ios-poli-EN-12-12-25.pdf>].

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. Further **(1) to my letters** to the French deputies and senators (...) of **23-2-23** ([PJ no 9](#)) and of **7-7-23** ([PJ no 10](#)) [**concerning** (a) pension reform, (b) the unconstitutionality of **the legal aid law (LA)** and the mandatory legal representation by counsel (MLRCs) and the related crime against humanity of persecution, (c) my proposals to improve LA systems worldwide, and (d) the war in Ukraine], and **(2) my letters** to the UN (...) of **10-7-24** ([PJ no 0](#), EN [PJ no 0.2](#)), and of **18-4-25** ([PJ no 0.3](#)) [**concerning** (a) the complaint to the ICC related to the unconstitutional LA law and MLRCs, (b) the UN report on the Governance of Artificial Intelligence (interim, [Governing AI for Humanity, 12-2023](#)), and final, [Governing AI for Humanity 9-2024](#), [Ver-EN](#), and the [Gladstone AI Action Plan report, 2-2024](#) (c) the UN Global Resources Outlook 2024 ([GRO 2024](#)) [report](#), summary, [GRO summary](#) (d) **my platform of proposals of 7-3-25** ([PJ no 0.4](#)) which could be presented as part of the selection process for the new UN Secretary-General in 2026, and (e) the war in Ukraine], **I am writing to you (1) to (a) make** some remarks on the lack of response to my letters and comments on the project proposal to assist the UN (...), **(b) discuss** the proposal to develop a new legal aid (LA) system and the unconstitutionality of LA law in France which motivated the submission of this proposal, and **(c) revisit** the merits of the platform of proposals and, indirectly, of my candidacy for the position of UNSG; **(2) to comment** (a) on the developments of, - and the positions of Ukraine and its allies on -, the conflict in Ukraine since the presentation of the peace plan of my letter of 10-7-24 ([PJ no 0](#), EN [PJ no 0.2](#)), (b) on the **peace plan** presented by Mr. Trump on approximately 21-11-25, and (c) on **the counter-proposals** presented by "Europe"; and **(3) to justify (a) the main proposals** of Mr. Trump's peace plan, and **(b) the suggestions** I present to improve this plan and to supplement my platform of proposals, and which are in the interest of the UN member states.

A. The presentation of the proposal platform and the absence of responses and comments on the proposals does not diminish the merit of the platform.

1) The presentation of the project and the lack of responses and comments on the project despite the serious problems highlighted and the solutions provided to resolve them.

2. General descriptions (and more precise descriptions for some) of the proposals presented are given in (a) the detailed description of the 6 proposals of **7-3-25** in [PJ no. 0.4](#) and (b) my various letters sent to the UN including those of **28-4-25** ([PJ no 0.3](#)) and **10-7-24** ([PJ no 0](#), EN [PJ no 0.2](#)), so I will not go into more detail on this subject here; those who have not read my previous letters will be able to access these letters via the Internet link. And **the objective of the project**, which I presented to members of parliament (from 4 countries: USA, UK, Russia, Japan), universities (Columbia, Yale, LSE, TSE, Oxford, MSU, UoT), government agencies, and potential sponsors, from January to March 2025, then to the UN and other relevant agencies and organizations in April 2025, and finally to 8 presidents of other universities in June 2025, **was to provide a more detailed** description of each proposal to facilitate decision-making for UN member states ... ([PJ no 0.3](#), no. 3) during the selection process for the next UN Secretary-General, which is an appropriate time to make the kind of decision I am proposing. Those contacted from January to March 2025 did not comment on the project proposal, and most did not even respond to my letters/emails; the UN, representatives of UN member countries, and other relevant IOs and organizations, contacted in April, have also not given their views on, or expressed their interest in, the project, **even though the project presents obvious benefits and advantages for the UN Secretariat** and its agencies and other relevant organizations (OHCHR, IMF, ILO, WHO, UNEP, ICANN, ICC.); and finally, the 8 university presidents contacted at the end of June 2025 have also not responded to date.

3. The nature of the project is very specific, of course, and the consequences of its implementation, or at least some of the proposals, are complex (and you are all very busy as well), so it takes time to analyze the project and its consequences in many areas. However, the organizations involved, which would derive many benefits from the project, could have, and could now, at the very least, provide a reasoned perspective (see no 42), if not an expression of interest (particularly given the urgency of addressing some of the problems described, out of a concern for integrity, **to help UN member states**). As for the universities I contacted that did not respond, I regret their silence, of course, but while I should at least try to contact them and solicit their participation, they, on the other hand, had no obligation to respond to this type of project proposal. That being said, the lack of response to my letters does not diminish the validity of the proposals I have made, I think, on the contrary, as we will see it now.

2) Improving LA systems worldwide is **an important** topic for the UN Secretariat, OHCHR, ICC, World Bank (...), and **well known** in view of the studies that have been carried out, among others.

4. The reaction of political leaders and senior officials, judges and relevant national and international bodies to my efforts to denounce the unconstitutionality of legal aid law in France from 1999 to 2025, and the various reports on the subject of legal aid, confirm the merit of the proposal to develop "a" new LA system that can be used by all countries.

(a) The effectiveness of LA systems worldwide is important to achieve several SDGs (16, 1, 5, 8, 10).

5. **The OHCHR** has written a report on legal aid systems worldwide which highlights the importance of having effective legal aid systems globally to achieve SDGs 16, 1, 5, 8, and 10 [[Global study on legal aid UN 2016](#) , [Country profiles](#).]; **the World Bank** has also written on the subject

[[World Bank cost-benefit analysis on LA 2019](#)]; and in France, almost **10 official reports** (mainly parliamentary reports) have been written on this subject [see PJ no 86 to 95], so **this subject is well known to, - and important to -, the UN, the OHCHR, the World Bank (...), the international community, and France**; but, as we shall now see, France has turned a blind eye to the dishonesty of its LA system and to the serious consequences of this problem on society and the international community; and the OHCHR could and should have done more to denounce the dishonesty towards the poor of the legal aid system in France and to seek a comprehensive solution to the problem because for years I have been talking (1) about the problems of legal aid law and the imperfect justice systems in France, in the USA (...), (2) about the injustices of which I have been (and am) a victim in France, in the USA and in France again, and (3) about my proposal to improve legal aid systems, to the UN Secretariat, to the OHCHR, to the ICC, to French politicians (...).

(b) Several administrations and individuals bear responsibility for maintaining dishonest legal aid in France.

6. In 1999, I began to talk about the problems of the LA law in my dismissal proceedings against my former employer, the Department of Essonne (against whom I am still fighting); then, I mentioned it in my applications for political asylum (notably in the USA, **in 2001**) and in my letters to the UN (...) from 1999 to 2010. Then, from my return to France **in 2011**, I spoke about it to French politicians (...), to the relevant senior officials and to IOS officials from 2013 to 2024. For example, I contacted: (1) **Mr. Hollande**, President and his successive governments (... [letter of 17-11-14](#), [letter of 20-1-16](#), ...), (2) **Mr. Macron**, Minister then President and his successive governments ([letter of 17-11-14](#), [letter of 27-6-17](#), ...); (3) the OHCHR (**Mr. Forst, Ms. Bachelet**, [letter of 30-3-19](#)); (4) **Members of Parliament** and Senators (... [letter of 11-6-19](#) , MP Moutchou, a lawyer, was writing a report on the subject at that time, yet she completely ignored the problems I described in her report!); (5) the **President of the Court of Auditors**, who is supposed to ensure, among other things, that public money is used properly, and **the Minister of Justice**, [my letter of 5-4-17](#), **(a) to comment the summary proceedings related to the legal aid law** from the President of the Court of Auditors addressed to the Minister of Justice [in which he expressed concern, among other things, that legal aid spending had increased **by 26% in 2 years** to reach **€453 million** for 2017, but he ignored that this amount represents only **1/5 of what the English spend** for an equivalent population and level of wealth (!), and therefore **about 1/5 of what would have to be spent** at a minimum in France to guarantee the right to a fair trial for the poor (!)], **and (b) to explain** in detail why (i) the legal aid law is unconstitutional and systematically violates the rights of the poor, and (ii) his analysis of the situation was incorrect; but he did nothing, and neither did the Minister of Justice.

*** 6.1 A lawyer at the Council of State (CS) appointed to help me under the legal aid scheme **in 2012** wrote a brief in my case against Pôle Emploi before the CS, the legal aid scheme paid him **380 euros** for his work and, in his brief, he asked for **4500 euros** for the work done; this means that he had **given the State** (and me) **4120 euros** as a gift, **more than 90% of the cost of the mission** (in addition to paying his normal taxes of course), but he did not help me as he helps his normal clients who pay him 4500 euros in fees or more, and he did not resolve the problems I was encountering in this case (including the question of the unconstitutionality of the legal aid scheme). It is mathematically impossible for lawyers to give such gifts to poor clients, and there is no honest reason to force them to do so, therefore the poor are systematically robbed. Again, the low pay for lawyers is not the only problem of legal aid law that affects the quality of service provided to the poor; there are several other serious problems, including the fact that the poor are also being robbed at the legal aid office level (... see [my letter of April 5, 2017](#), [PJ no 0](#), [EN PJ no 0.2](#)). ***

7. I also filed **criminal complaints** in Poitiers in 2014 and 2017 ([PJ no. 0.49](#), [PJ no. 0.50](#)), then a complaint with the National Financial Prosecutor's Office (PNF) in 2017-2018 ([PJ no 0.47](#), [PJ no 0.48](#), [PJ no 0.46](#)), **to denounce (a) the offenses committed** (by the LAO, the appointed lawyers, ...) in connection with the dishonest LA law, and **(b) the corruption system linked to LA law** (using the

articles of the penal code created to fight corruption, CP 432-15, 433-1, 433-2, 434-9, 445-1, 445-2-1 ...; see CPP 705), **but**, in Poitiers, the prosecutor did not respond, and my request for legal aid to present a PACPC was rejected by the LAO that I accused of having committed offenses (!); and the PNF, which was created to fight corruption, did not respond to my complaint (!). And I also offered my services to the Defender of Rights in France (in 2014), to the OHCHR (in 2015), and to the UN Secretariat (2020, 2022) to, among other things, help them develop the new legal aid system that I propose to develop in my platform of proposals. And of course, I contacted the press and the media, who talked about legal aid when lawyers protested about the meager sums paid out by legal aid, but they remained silent when a poor person presented clear evidence of the dishonesty of (a) the legal aid law and (b) the judges who were supposed to rule the legal aid law unconstitutional.

(c) QPC procedures and applications to the ECHR to denounce the unconstitutionality of LA law and MLRCs, frauds by supreme courts, and accusations of crimes against humanity of persecution.

8. I also denounced **(a) the unconstitutionality of legal aid law** before the courts in the context of priority preliminary rulings on constitutionality (QPCs) (2014, 2015, ... 2019) in France and applications to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2016, 2019), and **(b) the fraud committed** by the supreme courts during my QPC proceedings, to Mr. Hollande, the heads of the bar associations, the OHCHR ... (letter of 20-1-16, letter of 30-3-19, ...) from 2016 to 2019, but they did not respond appropriately and did not resolve the problem [in its decision rejecting my QPC on legal aid in 2018, the Court of Cassation, the highest court in the judicial system, claimed that "the question of the unconstitutionality of legal aid is not serious because the objective of the law is to guarantee the 'The right of the poor to an effective remedy'"—I am sure, or rather I hope, that you understand the absurdity and dishonesty of this argument or ground for rejection]. And then I started talking **about the crime against humanity of persecution** in 2020 in my letters to the Council of Europe ([letter of 15-5-20](#)), then to the UN Security Council, the ICC, the European Commission ... from 2020 until 2024, and even 2025 with the letter of 18-4-25 [see letters of 17-1-22 ([PJ no 7](#)), 23-3-22 ([PJ no 8](#)), in 2021, 23-5-21 ([PJ no 3](#), EN [PJ no 3.2](#)), and in 2020, 10-7-20 ([PJ no 5](#), EN [PJ no 5.2](#)), and 23-11-20 ([PJ no 4](#), EN [PJ no 4.2](#)), the letters (/complaints) that I also sent to the UN and to Mr. Macron (directly or indirectly); see also my **letters** to French members of parliament and senators (...) of **23-2-23** ([PJ no 9](#)) and of **7-7-23** ([PJ no. 10](#)) **concerning** (a) pension reform, (b) the unconstitutionality of **the law on legal aid** (LA) and the obligations of the ministry of counsel (MLRCs) and the related crime against humanity of persecution, (c) my proposals to improve LA systems worldwide, and (d) the war in Ukraine]; but again, nothing has been done by France to resolve the problem and to move forward on the proposals I have made [and no comment has been sent even though the senators (...) admitted in [their 2014 report](#) that the LA law does not allow for the effective defense of the poor (...!)]].

(d) The SAPIN II law, which was passed in 2016 to combat corruption, should have encouraged (and been used by) judges to address the problem of legal aid, but this has not been the case.

9. As explained in the letter of 10-7-24, **in 2016** the SAPIN II law was passed to combat corruption and **to protect whistleblowers** (who report facts likely to constitute crimes or misdemeanors or laws contrary to international conventions or unconstitutional); and, **in 2022**, this law was amended to allow victims of reported corruption (crimes and offences ... reported) to also be considered as whistleblowers, **so, in theory**, I should have had the right to benefit from this protection from 2022. I therefore used this new law in the two proceedings (1) against my former employer, the Essonne Department (CG91), and (2) against France Travail (FT, the employment agency, formerly Pôle Emploi, which pays my unemployment benefits) that I mentioned in my letter of July 10, 2024. **However, instead of granting me the protection** of the SAPIN II law and highlighting the dishonest behavior of the two administrations (a) which do not respect **CP 40** (which requires them to report to the public prosecutor any

facts that may constitute crimes and offenses) and (b) which take advantage of the unconstitutional LA law and the related crime against humanity, **the judges** took advantage of the dishonest legal aid law and the dishonesty of my opponents (a) to further harass me and (b) to deny me the right to justice by rejecting the interim relief application at the Adm. Court (AC), the appeal at the AAC, the petition at the CS and the application for review between 2022 and 29-9-25 without addressing the factual and legal arguments of my appeals (no. 9.1), and to date, also rejecting the applications for legal aid in the proceedings against France Travail, FT (see no. 9.2), and in the related appeal proceedings against the CG91 (see no. 9.1).

[9.1 The **interim relief** procedure against the CG91 of 11-12-23 ([PJ no. 37](#)) presents **3 appeals against a retaliatory measure** based on the SAPIN II law with the objective of obtaining the reconstitution of my career from 1993 to the present day (approximately 2 million euros), and it was **not opposed** by the CG91, which establishes **its merits** for the CG91 at least because the SAPIN II law requires the presentation of proof that the disputed treatments are not unfair to the adversary, **but the Admin. Court (AC) ignored this crucial rule** and did not address the questions of law and fact to reject the interim relief with its decision of 22-3-24 ([PJ no. 38](#)); **and the Admin. Appeal Court and the Council of State (CS) subsequently did the same (!)**, see the appeal to the AA Court of 3-4-24 ([PJ no 39](#)) and the decisions of the appeal proceedings (LAO of 3-9-24 (PJ no [40](#)), President of the AA Court of 29-11-24 ([PJ no 41](#)), Chamber President of the AA Court of 11-12-24 ([PJ no 42](#))) dismissing the appeal without addressing the factual and legal issues of the proceedings; and finally, **the appeal** of 24-12-24 to the Council of State ([PJ no 43](#)), and the decisions of the Council of State (LAO of the CS of 8-1-25 ([PJ no 44](#)), President of the Sec. Cont. of 6-3-25 ([PJ no 45](#)), and President of the 3rd Chamber of 2-5-25 ([PJ no 46](#))), **and the application for review (...) of 30-5-25 ([PJ no no. 47](#))**, and the decisions of the LAO of the Council of State of 18-6-25 ([PJ no no. 48](#)), and of the President of the Litigation Section of 19-8-25 ([PJ no no. 49](#)), and the decision of the section President of 9-29-25 ([PJ no no. 0.2](#)), were also rejected in the same manner. And they did this with the assistance **of the legal aid offices** from the AA Court and the Council of State, and **of the lawyers at the Council of State** to whom I wrote several times requesting their assistance (see the requests for lawyer regularization dated June 18, 2025 ([PJ no 31](#)) and September 10, 2025 ([PJ no 33](#)), and my letters to lawyers at the Council of State dated June 26, 2025 ([PJ no 32](#)) and September 17, 2025 ([PJ no 34](#))); the lawyers did not agree to help me (approximately thirty out of one hundred acknowledged receipt of the letter, and about ten replied that they could not help me due to their busy schedules). **In this case**, I also still have two ongoing proceedings, **one at the Admin. Court** (see [PJ no 11](#)), which is based on the facts of the 3 appeals against a retaliatory measure, but presents a new legal approach (new legal argument, the fact that any administrative act obtained by fraud can be withdrawn or repealed at any time); **and one to the AA Court**, which appeals the decision of the Admin. Court **in the main proceeding** ([PJ no. 15](#)); a decision was rendered by the Legal Aid Bureau on September 30, 2025 ([PJ no 0.53](#)) rejecting my application for legal aid, again without addressing the factual and legal issues of my appeal. I filed an appeal of this vague and unlawful decision on **November 21, 2025 ([PJ no 0.54](#))**, which is currently under review. I have also repeatedly asked the CG91 to resolve this matter amicably, given the criminal charges laid against them, most recently on **September 17, 2025 ([PJ no 14.1](#))**, but they refused or did not respond to the last letter.

9.2 And in the proceedings against FT, initiated **on June 10, 2022**, with the aim of obtaining **the €50,000** I had requested in the 2012 proceedings against FT, which were not awarded due to the MLRC and the withdrawal of the lawyer appointed to assist me (see application of June 10, 2022 ([PJ no 49](#)), FT did not respond before November 19, 2024 ([PJ no 50](#))); **and the Admin. Court of Poitiers cheated (1) by refusing** to send to France Travail my memorandum of 1-12-24 ([PJ no. 51](#)) commenting on FT's defense memorandum and presenting new legal arguments (this memorandum of 1-12-24 describes, among other things, the efforts I have made (no. 6-9) to inform the members of parliament and senators, successive governments and the senior officials or ministers concerned, and even the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, of the serious problems of the LA law and the dishonest behavior of the justice system, which refuses to judge honestly my accusations against the LA law and of fraud during my QPCs (...), **and (2) by addressing** none of the factual and legal arguments that I presented in the application and the memorandum of 1-12-24 (see judgment of the Admin. Court of Poitiers of 6-3-25, [PJ no. 48](#)). I filed an appeal to the Court of Cassation on May 2, 2025 ([PJ no 41](#)), a supplement on July 17, 2025 ([PJ no 42](#)), and a legal aid application on April 30, 2025 ([PJ no 43](#)); the Legal Aid Office rejected the legal aid application on June 30, 2025 ([PJ no 44](#)), and the appeal against the rejection of the legal aid application on July 17, 2025 ([PJ no 45](#)) was dismissed by the President of the litigation

Section on September 5, 2025 ([PJ no 46](#)). See also the request for regularization by lawyer dated September 26, 2024 ([PJ no 53](#)), and **my letter** sent to the lawyers at the Council of State **dated 3-10-25** ([PJ no 54](#)); here too, none of the lawyers at the Council of State have been willing to help me to this day. The case has been forwarded to the PAPC rapporteur who must rule on its admissibility because I do not have a lawyer to help me, and the Council of State could do, in this procedure, what it did in my case against the CG91 since the Legal Aid Bureau rejected the application for legal aid and the appeal against the rejection of the application for legal aid **without addressing the legal and factual issues of my appeal**, and, to date, the lawyers have not responded to my request for help sent **on 3-10-25**. **Here too**, I have made several requests for amicable resolution because France Travail is also a victim of the injustices I suffered in Essonne, and if it does not oppose my accusations against the LA law and the dishonest OMAs, it takes advantage of them, which is dishonest, but **France Travail refuses** (a) to resolve the matter amicably and (b) to respect CP 40 which obliges it **to report** to the prosecutor the fact that I have been a victim of offenses by the CG91 in the context of the corruption scandal of which I was a victim from 1993 to 2001 and since 2022 again and the theft of the poor with LA law and dishonest MLRCs (!). I also spoke about my application for the UNSG position and my project proposal that FT (and the French government) could and should evaluate, but they are not responding and are ignoring the documents and proposals I have made, and are indirectly preventing me from working].

(e) **The obvious conflicts of interest of the judges who are judging my proceedings denouncing LA law, the related crime against humanity (...), and of the lawyers who should, - or are appointed to, help me.**

10. Mr. Christophe Chantepy, the **President** of the **Litigation Section** of the Council of State (CS), who rejected my applications for legal aid before the CS (against CG91, [PJ no. 45](#), [PJ no. 49](#), and against FT, [PJ no. 46](#)), is 'the head' of all administrative courts (AC), admin. appeal Courts (AAC), and chambers of the Litigation Section of the CS (among others). In 2007, he participated in the presidential campaign of Ms. Ségolène Royal, ex-wife of Mr. François Hollande (former President); then in 2012, he worked on the presidential campaign of Mr. Hollande, who was elected president, and he became chief of staff to his (first) prime minister, Mr. Ayrault, from 2012 to 2014; so he was in that position when I wrote to the government **in February 2014** to discuss my first (QPC) priority preliminary ruling on constitutionality on LA law, and he participated in maintaining the dishonest legal aid system in that role. And as we saw from 6 to 9.2, **his decisions** on my two cases **protect** (a) **Mr. Hollande** and Mr. Macron (... and himself) who turned a blind eye to the problems of the legal aid law from 2014 onwards, and (b) **the** Socialist leaders of the Essonne General Council (CG91), who were running the Essonne Department during my appeal proceedings against my dismissal from 1999 to 2001, and whom I accuse of having committed fraud to steal the judgment I had obtained regarding my dismissal. From 2011 to 2012, Mr. Chantepy was also (1) the predecessor of Ms. Fombeur, president of the 1st chamber of the CS in 2015 (who participated in the drafting of the 1st report on legal aid in 2001, which already pointed out that legal aid law does not pay lawyers enough to defend the poor effectively, she is currently president of the AAC of Paris), and, today, Mr. Chantepy is (2) the successor of the President of the litigation section in 2015, whom I accuse of having committed fraud with the Constitutional Council and Ms. Fombeur in order not to have to judge my QPC on legal aid law in 2015 **on the merits** (!).

10.1 He therefore has a clear conflict of interest and a clear interest in not recognizing (1) the validity of the arguments establishing (a) the unconstitutionality of the LA (Legal Aid) law and the MLRCs (mandatory legal representation by counsel), (b) the commission of fraud by the leaders of Essonne in 1999-2000 during my legal proceedings, and (c) the commission of fraud by the supreme courts during my QPCs, which I presented in my interim injunction against the CG91 and in the proceeding against FT (nos. 9.1, 9.2), and (2) his own responsibility, and that of his predecessors and successors in his various positions, and that of his socialist friends (President of the Republic and others) in maintaining the dishonest LA law since 1991, and in the injustices of which I was a victim in Essonne from 1993 to 2001 and since 2022. In general, **the Judges of the LAOs** (who

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are also judges of the courts) **and lawyers**, who run the LA system, have **a conflict of interest** when they judge cases denouncing the unconstitutionality of the LA law and the faults committed by the LAOs, the lawyers (...), which is one of the causes of the unconstitutionality of the LA law.

(f) **Conclusion on this section on the unconstitutionality of LA law and the development of a new LA system.**

11. I therefore contacted many administrations and people concerned by the unconstitutionality of legal aid law, to denounce the serious problems of LA law which affect more than 14 million poor people in France (...), **not to trap them**, so they should have (1) pointed out these problems, and (2) denounced (a) the systematic theft from the poor since 1991, and (b) the injustices I have suffered because of dishonest LA law, but, instead, they knowingly committed fraud to continue stealing from the poor and to conceal their responsibility in maintaining the dishonest legal aid law and MLRCs, and they have also been harassing me morally since 2012; and the dishonest law on legal aid and the MLRCs have been maintained and the theft from the poor has continued for **more than 30 years** now [to the benefit of politicians, corrupt administrations, the rich (companies, people...), judges and lawyers]. The result is that **the poverty level in France has never been so high since 1970** (according to an article in Le Monde **dated July 8, 2025**, [PJ no. 0.45](#)), inequality has also increased significantly recently (according to another article dated 11-18-25, [PJ no. 0.44](#)), political corruption is frequently highlighted in the newspapers [(1) Mr. Sarkozy was recently sent to prison and was also sentenced in two other cases, (2) Ms. Le Pen, the leader of the party with the most members of parliament, was also recently sentenced to prison, (3) Mr. Mélenchon, the leader of the second-largest party with the most members of parliament, was reprimanded by the prosecutor for fraudulent travel expenses at the Essonne General Council (CG91), and he was vice-president of the CG91, which committed fraud to steal the judgment I obtained in 1998, ...], and organized and transnational crime is now everywhere, even in small towns. **The behavior** of the administrations and people (politicians, officials, etc.) concerned by the legal aid law **confirms** the validity of the accusations of crimes against humanity and persecution that I presented to you, and of the launch of phase II of the preliminary investigation by the ICC, and **establishes** without a doubt, I think, **the interest in reflecting at the international level** on a new, more efficient and less costly legal aid system that can be used by all countries, to **avoid other countries** spending 30 years learning, fraud and bad faith (to steal from the poor) like those we have experienced in France.

3) The other proposals of the platform are also relevant in view of the various UN reports mentioned here, and the many ongoing conflicts in the world.

12. The platform's other proposals, the creation of 2 new IOs, the search for an alternative to market capitalism and the development of a new pension management system, are also relevant because, among other things, they would help to achieve (1) the transformation that UN experts describe in the GRO 2024 and which is not easy to achieve, and (2) most of the proposals made in the UN report on the governance of AI ([Governing AI for Humanity 9-2024](#)), while generating significant revenues that will allow the UN, its relevant agencies and 'ICANN' to have more resources to carry out their tasks. Finally, as we will see in the next section, the creation of a new International Organization for the modernization of armed forces, the maintenance of international peace and security, disarmament (...), replacing NATO, would help maintain international peace and security and could also simplify the development of a peace plan in Ukraine (no. 33). In conclusion, the merit of the platform of proposals I am presenting to you is multifaceted: (1) the platform makes proposals to strengthen – at a lower cost to the international community – the UN's capacity to solve the problems it has to solve in its three core areas of focus: the maintenance of international peace and security, human rights, and development; (2) It addresses the urgent needs

of the moment by presenting solutions to the problems highlighted (a) in the GRO 2024, (b) in the report on AI governance (...), and (c) by the example of France, which maintained an unconstitutional legal aid system for over 30 years, resulting in a level of poverty unseen since 1970 (no. 4-11), among others; (3) It presents solutions for (a) making better use of AI and the Internet globally, (b) bridging the digital divide, (c) improving justice and pension systems worldwide, and (d) reducing illegal immigration, which is a significant problem for—and in—certain wealthy countries, at a lower cost to member states.

4) Launch of the selection process for the next UNSG and conclusion of Part A.

13. On 25 November 2025, Ms. Baerbock and Mr. Kanu wrote [a letter](#) to launch the selection process for the next UN Secretary-General, specifying that informal discussions between candidates and permanent representatives of countries would be organized before the start, at the end of July 2026, of (and possibly during) the selection of the next SG by the Security Council (UNSC), and that candidates must provide a statement of their objectives and disclose their sources of funding at the time of their nomination. The letter emphasized the importance of regional diversity in the selection of Secretaries-General [Mr. Grossi has already been nominated by Argentina, and Mr. Choquehuanca and Ms. Bachelet and other candidates, primarily from South America (apart from Ms. Amina Mohammed, perhaps), could be nominated soon]. These confirmed or potential candidates are all very experienced and well-versed in the UN, and it is clear that I have not had the same kind of careers as they have, but (1) I have a clear vision of what needs to be done to solve the complex problems the UN faces, (2) I have been working on the problems the UN faces for over 30 years, like these other candidates, and, by identifying and denouncing the problems of the LA law and MLRCs in France (no. 4-11), and, by preparing the platform of proposals I presented to you, (3) I have acquired the skills and experience required for the position [Mr. Mandela became President of South Africa after spending **27 years in prison**, and I have been subjected to reprisals, unfair treatments and moral harassment, and **kept in poverty for 27 years**, after being victim of a corruption scandal and threatened with lifelong problems in 1993, and for having denounced the unconstitutionality of the LA law...], therefore I am ready to assume the responsibilities of the UNSG and to implement my proposals if you deem them relevant.

14. Regarding the regional diversity in the selection of Secretaries-General, I am a French citizen, but given the serious difficulties I encountered in France from 1993 to 2001, which forced me to seek political asylum in the USA from 2001 to 2011, as well as those encountered since my return to France in 2011, I believe it is fair to say that I am now a citizen of the world. And regarding (a) campaign funds and (b) nomination by a UN member state, the European Union and all countries have an interest in seeing my proposals implemented (or at least discussed before the UNGA) and therefore in my being able to defend them before the UN within the framework of the selection process for the next UNSG, therefore, I would like to ask the European Union and all the Presidents and Heads of Government of UN member states who do not plan to nominate a candidate for the position of UN Secretary-General in 2026 to consider nominating me for this post and, if necessary, to contribute to the funding of my campaign so that I can advocate for my proposals, which are in the interest of all countries, not just France. I will return to this subject at no 41-42, but before that, I will discuss again the causes of the conflict in Ukraine (no 15-31) and comment on Mr. Trump's peace plan, along with suggestions for improving it (no 32-40).

B. The evolution of the situation in Ukraine since 10-7-24, the causes of the conflict in Ukraine, and the inconsistent and incorrect positions of Ukraine and its allies.

15. To resolve the conflict in Ukraine and find "a just and lasting peace", it is necessary beforehand to identify **(a) the causes** of the conflict and **the responsibilities** of each party in the emergence of the conflict and in the continuation of the war, and **(b) the profits and advantages** that the countries that financed and supported Ukraine and that illegally sanctioned (without a vote of the Security Council) Russia have derived from it... (and what these countries might derive from it), so I had started to do this in my letter of 10-7-24; and **I would now like to (1) go** into more detail on some of these subjects, **(2) analyze** (a) what has happened in Ukraine since my 2024 letter, and (b) everyone's positions on the conflict, **(3) comment on** Mr. Trump's peace plan and the Europeans' counter-proposals, and **(4) make** suggestions for trying to improve Mr. Trump's peace plan and to supplement my platform of proposals, which are in the interest of all countries.

1) The analysis of the causes of the conflict in Ukraine and the peace plan presented in the letter of 10-7-24.

16. In the letter to the UN (...) dated **10-7-24** ([PJ no 0](#), EN [PJ no 0.2](#)), I first discussed (a) the SAPIN II law to combat corruption, and (b) the crime against humanity of persecution linked to the unconstitutional legal aid law and MLRCs (mandatory legal representation by counsel) in France, and its consequences on my ongoing legal proceedings (nos. 2 to 28); then I discussed (c) my proposals to resolve certain global problems, including those highlighted in the UN reports (i) on AI governance (intermediate, [Governing AI for Humanity, 12-2023](#)), and final, [Governing AI for Humanity 9-2024](#), [Ver-EN](#), and the [Gladstone AI Action Plan report, 2-2024](#)) and (ii) proposing "a transformation towards sustainable consumption and production of resources on a global scale" [Global Resources Outlook ([GRO 2024](#)), summary, [GRO summary](#)] (nos. 30 to 58); and then, I presented, among other things, (d) **an analysis of the causes of the conflict in Ukraine** (nos. 60 to 82), and (b) **a peace plan** to resolve the conflict in Ukraine (nos. 93 to 99). These different topics are linked in several ways, as I explained it and as we shall see it here again.

17. **The peace plan** presented encouraged, among other things, Mr. Zelensky and the Ukrainian government **(1) to take** into account the analysis and arguments presented (in paragraphs 30 to 82), **(2) to reconsider** their position on the conflict in Ukraine, **(3) to admit their share of responsibility in the conflict** and the mistakes Ukraine has made since 2014, **(4) to immediately call on wealthy countries** (a) to end (i) unilateral sanctions against Russia (... , including the freezing or theft of Russian assets), and (ii) deliveries of arms and ammunition to Ukraine, **(5) to call on Russia** to implement a ceasefire in order to prepare for an international conference (i) for peace in Ukraine, **and (ii) to define a new strategy to move the world in the right direction**, and **(6) to commit** to not taking any action (no negotiations, no legal proceedings) and not requesting any votes in the occupied territories (currently) by Russia to try to recover these territories **until** all the houses, buildings, and infrastructure destroyed in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia, and in Russia during the conflict have been rebuilt, and **until** all the victims of the conflict in Ukraine, in the territories occupied by Russia, and in Russia have been compensated for the harm they suffered as a result of the conflict [and until the responsibilities of each party to the conflict have been established]. But Mr. Zelensky and his government **ignored** the analysis in the letter of July 10, 2024, and the peace plan, and instead **invaded** the Kursk region of Russia in early August 2024 (!).

2) The evolution of the situation in Ukraine since my letter of 10-7-24 and Ukraine's refusal to take into account certain international problems that need to be resolved urgently.

(a) Ukraine's invasion of the Kursk region, Russia's recapture of the region, the increased cost of the war (...) and an initiative that has not changed the facts of the problem facing Ukraine.

18. A little over a year and 3 months after my letter of 10-7-24 and this invasion of the Kursk region, Russia has taken back the part of the Kursk region invaded by Ukraine, and Ukraine finds itself in a situation similar to that of July 2024 (it is even possible that Russia has made some progress compared to its positions of July 2024), but of course many Russians and Ukrainians have been killed or wounded, Russian and Ukrainian territories have been devastated (environmental problems have increased), **the cost of the war has increased significantly** and the conflict is even more difficult to resolve now. **Also**, Ukraine has changed absolutely nothing about the fact that Russia is **a nuclear superpower**, (a) which can (i) send a hypersonic ballistic missile (unstoppable) loaded with 3 or 4 nuclear warheads, which could kill between 500,000 and 1 million Ukrainians in an instant [and cause an immediate exile of millions of people to Europe (...)] and (ii) force Ukraine to capitulate; and any hostile response whatsoever from Europe or NATO would be **highly inadvisable** and far too dangerous for Europe and NATO to be considered, I think, in view of (a) Russia's 6,000 nuclear bombs and (b) the fact that the fault committed by Russia is not as obvious as NATO (...) claims or tries to establish it with its economic sanctions not authorized by the Security Council (and as we shall see here).

18.1 Incidentally, I would like to congratulate Mr. Kim Jong Un and the North Korean government for sending troops to help liberate the Kursk region, because, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine and Russia's status as a nuclear superpower, **these troops could be described as "peacekeeping soldiers."** I would also like to congratulate Russia on the development of nuclear-powered missiles, although of course I hope that these missiles (and torpedoes) will never be used on Earth; it is an extraordinary technological feat that shows that Russia could eventually build nuclear-powered rockets or spacecraft, and thus help reduce travel times in space, particularly for going to Mars. The USA has also developed a nuclear-powered rocket or spacecraft to reduce travel time in space, which I believe will be tested soon, so they too deserve congratulations for this advancement. Destroying the Russian economy, without the agreement of the UN Security Council, and thereby hindering the development of cutting-edge technologies that will help the world progress and solve its problems, as Russia has developed in the past, is a serious and inexcusable mistake, I believe.

(b) Ukraine has not commented on the arguments presented in the letter of 10-7-24 on the creation of a new IO to replace NATO (...), and on the urgency of addressing certain serious problems.

19. **Ukraine has also failed to provide evidence or arguments** that contradict: **(1) the fact** that the existence of NATO, which encourages its member countries to increase their defense budgets (contrary to the guidelines of the UN Charter), is a danger to the entire world; **(2) the fact** that it is urgent to create the new International Organization for Peacekeeping (...), which I propose to create; **(3) the fact** that, as advocated by the [GRO 2024](#), we must **act urgently** (and make, among other things, significant changes) to better manage our natural resources at the global level, to protect our environment, and to better combat global warming [' The messages from this report could not be clearer: It is no longer whether a transformation towards global sustainable resource consumption and production is necessary, **but how to urgently make it happen.**']; **' High-income**

countries **use six times more materials per capita** and are responsible **for ten times more climate impacts per capita** than low-income countries. ']; and (4) **the fact** that rich countries are not defending democracy, NATO values, human rights and the Charter by supporting the war in Ukraine as some claim to do [see letter of **10-7-24** ([PJ no. 0](#), EN [PJ no. 0.2](#)) at nos. 60-82]. And as we will see below, Ukraine maintains incorrect positions to justify the continuation of the war to the Ukrainian population and the world (nos. 25-27) and to try to escape its responsibilities in the conflict (nos. 22-24.2).

20. And **the NATO countries**, which support Ukraine and sanction Russia and the countries that support it or want to buy its oil and gas, also **ignore** the urgent need to act in various areas (including global natural resource management, climate change, strengthening the UN's capacity in various fields, etc.), while taking advantage of the situation described in the GRO 2024 (...) to the detriment of poor and less poor countries, some of them **adopt** inconsistent positions to support Ukraine, sanction Russia and other countries, as we will see in paragraph 21, **and exploit** Russia's invasion of Ukraine for political, economic, and military gain and advantages, whereas the objective of the Russian invasion was (i) to end a conflict that had claimed 13,000 lives, (ii) to highlight, among other things, the serious security problems that Ukraine's accession to NATO would cause [and indirectly or unintentionally, the serious security problems posed by the very existence of NATO in the current international context and in light of recent technological developments or advances in the fields of the Internet and AI]; and (iii) to prevent violence against the pro-Russian population in the Donbas (...) and the eradication of any form of Russian influence in Ukraine and any idea of cooperation between Russia and Europe. **Mr. Trump's initial peace plan is a significant effort** that supports several of these arguments, it seems, as we will see below.

3) The inconsistency of the positions of France, Germany and Canada in the conflict in Iraq and in the conflict in Ukraine and the events of 2014 and behavior of Ukraine (...) which caused the invasion of 2022.

(a) The inconsistency of the positions of France, Germany, and Canada in the conflict in Iraq compared to those taken on the conflict in Ukraine, evidence that these countries sought to take advantage of the war in Ukraine.

21. In a UN article on the UNSC meeting of 24-10-25 ([PJ no. 0.36](#)), it states that “the permanent members of the Council have a particular responsibility to uphold the Charter, including its ‘most fundamental’ rule prohibiting the use of force against the territorial integrity of others, lamenting that it was ‘unfortunately necessary’ to reiterate this principle as a permanent member continues its war of aggression against a neighbor.” [“Germany’s representative likewise stressed that permanent Council members bear a particular responsibility to uphold the Charter, including its ‘most fundamental’ rule prohibiting the use of force against the territorial integrity of others, lamenting that it was ‘unfortunately necessary’ to reiterate this principle as a permanent member continues its war of aggression against a neighbor.”]; and this is true, but a violation of this fundamental rule does not give other countries the right to take advantage of this violation to violate other equally fundamental rules (or this same rule). For example, when countries allow themselves to (a) bypass the UN Security Council to sanction a country (Russia in this case) and (b) threaten other countries to prevent them from providing aid, or (c) punish them if they buy its oil, they are seriously violating the rules of the Charter (and they do so to gain economic, military, and political advantages, which is a misdemeanor or a crime). Furthermore, why did Germany and other countries like France and Canada, which opposed the US invasion of Iraq (based on this same rule), not sanction the US when it invaded Iraq without Security Council authorization (and based on lies

about the existence of weapons of mass destruction), as they allow themselves to do with Russia? Is it because the US is richer, and it's riskier to sanction them (and they would be exposed to retaliatory sanctions)? It is clear that the position of Germany, France, and Canada is neither consistent nor honest (regarding their reaction to the conflict in Iraq), and that the objective of this position is simply to exploit the conflict. The US position before the presentation of Mr. Trump's peace plan (...) was also inconsistent, as they allowed themselves to intervene in Iraq without the agreement of the Security Council, and yet they sanction Russia when it invades Ukraine to end a conflict that has killed 13,000 people... (!).

(b) The events of 2014 and the behavior of Ukraine and some of its allies that became the main causes of the conflict in Ukraine, and the events that confirm this analysis.

22. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 did not happen without reason; there was an ongoing conflict in Ukraine in 2022 that had been going on **since 2014**, and had killed 13,000 people, and whose obvious objective was (a) to kill as many pro-Russian supporters as possible in the Donbas, and, more generally, (b) to annihilate all Russian influence in Ukraine, and any idea of cooperation between Russia and the European Union; therefore, to resolve the conflict in Ukraine, it is important to impartially analyze the factors that led to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. For example, **the Maidan Revolution**, which led some regions of Ukraine to hold elections for autonomy (and to demonstrate their disapproval of the revolution a year before the scheduled election), and which led Ukraine to wage war against a segment of its own population that was simply seeking to have its views respected through elections, **bears a striking resemblance** to several **revolutions** organized and financed by the US in South America to defend economic and political interests at the expense of the well-being of the people in the countries [such as the revolutions in Chile, Argentina, and **Guatemala**, which caused severe suffering to various populations, and why (?), in Guatemala, it was to allow a company to continue buy bananas without the taxes that Mr. Arbenz's government wanted to impose on an American multinational corporation (see the article of December 18, 2018, on this subject Destabilization of Latin America, [PJ no 0.39](#), or link: [The Destabilization of Latin America by the United States - ISD's Blog](#))]. And the techniques of—and the consequences of—the destabilization of Ukraine, then Russia, are identical to those of the South American revolutions: **strangulation of the economy, violence against those who oppose it, and economic, political, and military gains and advantages for the USA** (and in the case of Ukraine, for Europe and more generally for NATO countries). The notable difference with the Maidan revolution is that the USA was not the only country involved (or **interested**); the countries of the European Union have, it seems, actively participated and continue to participate in the destabilization of Russia (rapprochement with Europe was, moreover, the primary cause of the initial uprising).

23. Intellectually and morally, one cannot blame the inhabitants of Donbas (where Mr. Yanukovich was from) and Crimea for demanding the right to vote on regional autonomy after the Maidan supporters (pro-European) overthrew President Yanukovich a year before the scheduled presidential election. Instead of contesting the votes in Crimea and Donbas, the interim government of Ukraine could and should have accepted and even encouraged the votes to avoid violence, and in the case of votes in favor of autonomy for these two regions, to avoid any violence. These two regions represent only a small portion of Ukraine (about 13%, I believe), and a peaceful separation does not preclude future agreements to rejoin Ukraine. It appears that **the refusal** to grant these two regions (and pro-Russian supporters) the possibility of doing **peacefully** what pro-European supporters had allowed themselves to do **violently** in Ukraine stems more from (a) **hatred towards**

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Russia (and pro-Russians), (b) **a desire to destabilize Russia and put an end to any idea of cooperation between Russia and Europe**, and (c) **foreign interference**, than from a democratic impulse and a desire to respect the will of the people for the good of Ukraine [and **as early as 2014**, during the UN vote to invalidate the Crimean referendum of March 27, 2014, some countries (and probably a significant number of countries) suspected a foreign interference behind the Maidan revolution, some have even explicitly stated it (link: <https://press.un.org/fr/2014/ag11493.doc.htm>)]. And everything that followed these events (including the inconsistencies in the positions of Germany, France and Canada mentioned in no. 21) will confirm this.

(c) **The construction of Nord Stream, whose purpose was to strengthen cooperation... between Russia and Europe, has exacerbated the hatred towards Russia of some countries, and its destruction confirms Ukraine's dishonest position.**

24. The construction of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, a symbol of cooperation between Russia and Europe, and more particularly Germany, was very likely **one of the main triggers** of the Maidan revolution because it exacerbated the hatred towards Russia of inhabitants of countries like Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic countries which were "bypassed" (the other gas and oil pipelines pass through Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia), and who saw it as a strengthening of the links between Europe and Russia (very profitable to both). A CNN article from 15-11-25 discusses the destruction of Nord Stream and quotes several comments on the subject that express **hatred towards Russia and jealousy** that **this exceptional infrastructure, beneficial to Europe and Russia,** has caused in some countries. For example: “ **Europe's problem, Ukraine's problem, the problem of Lithuania and Poland, is not that Nord Stream 2 was blown up, but that it was built,**” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk told journalists in early October; **then,** “As far back as 2007, Poland’s then-defense minister Radek Sikorski railed against the proposed Nord Stream 1 pipeline as, **‘the most outrageous attempt by Mr. Putin to divide and damage the EU.’**” (This is a stupid and dishonest comment because Nord Stream’s objective was not to divide and damage the EU; the objective was to derive **mutual benefit** (by simplifying the transport of gas to Europe and reducing its cost) and to strengthen cooperation between Russia and Europe, which is important for both; **then,** “The right place for Nord Stream 2 is at the bottom of the sea, in pieces,” Estonia’s Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said in March; **and finally,** “Europe’s dependency on Russian hydrocarbons has faced opposition from US administrations going back to the White House of George W. Bush.” **That feeling has long been bipartisan : as Republican Senator Ted Cruz told senators in 2019, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, “if completed, would make Europe even more dependent on Russian energy, even more vulnerable to Russian blackmail.”** (This is also an absurd and biased comment because trade is not conducted to engage in blackmail, but in a mutually beneficial relationship, and besides, it is relatively easy to switch suppliers in such a competitive market); see also “**Likewise, the pipelines became totemic of the dependence on cheap Russian hydrocarbons** that critics felt Europe traded for a principled stance on Moscow's aggression in Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008.”; this is yet another absurd idea because **cheap Russian oil and gas** allows for a reduction in (a) energy expenditures by European states and companies, and therefore (b) the cost of living for all inhabitants, and this strengthens the competitiveness of European companies globally and improve the people’s life conditions; and Europe is hardly in a position to speak of a 'principled stance' regarding Russia's actions in Ukraine and Georgia.

24.1 The destruction of Nord Stream (1 and 2) by Ukrainians had no military, political, or financial (short term at least) benefit, for Ukraine (since 2 was not certified and 1 was out of service); it was not necessary to deter Germany and Europe from buying Russian gas, as if Europe did not want to buy Russian gas, the pipeline would be unused. This destruction of Nord Stream (by Ukrainians according to the procedure underway in Germany) was **(1) an expression of hatred** towards Russia (if we cannot benefit from Russian gas sales in Europe, neither can you), and **(2) a desire to eradicate any idea of cooperation** between Russia and Europe, and confirms that Ukraine's position and objectives are dishonest (and not in the interest of Ukrainians or the world, and the corruption allegations against close associates of Mr. Zelensky also confirm this view).

24.2 The commissioning of Nord Stream 2 would very likely have significantly reduced the revenues of the Russian gas pipeline that passes through Ukraine (1 or 2 billion dollars per year, probably, perhaps more), therefore the US, which opposed the construction of this gas pipeline, and certain people in Ukraine, who supported the Maidan revolution, had a common interest in a destabilization of Ukraine and Russia that would lead to the destruction of Nord Stream and significant reductions in Russian gas sales to Europe; and the obtaining of a position within a Ukrainian company in the gas sector immediately after the Maidan revolution for Mr. Hunter Biden, could be interpreted as a reward (for the foreign interference that led to the Maidan revolution) or a means of establishing direct links between Ukrainian officials and the White House to advance common interests in the energy sector.

4) Some positions on the conflict defended by Ukraine and NATO countries are incorrect, I think, and confirm the desire to take advantage of the conflict (...).

(a) No country can impose peace by force on Russia, a nuclear superpower.

25. Ukraine, the European Union, and other allies of Ukraine often say publicly that **peace must be imposed on Russia by force**. However, regardless of the fact that this kind of solution is not recommended by the UN Charter, which advocates negotiation and diplomacy, and is illegal when not authorized by the UN Security Council, **this position** on the possibility of imposing peace by force **is incorrect** or **a form of manipulation of public opinion**, I think, **because no country in the world** (not even the United States), or even group of countries, **can impose peace by force on Russia** (a nuclear superpower). This so-called desire to impose peace by force is convenient for Ukraine and the Europeans (...) because it **allows (a)** the war to continue, even after Ukraine has been driven out of the Kursk region and seems to be having great difficulty regaining territory, and to continue to profit from it (nos. 28-31); **(b) the ignoring** of the responsibilities of Ukraine, the EU (...) in the emergence and continuation of the conflict; **and (c) to conceal** from the Ukrainian population the fact that the position of Mr. Zelensky and his government (and the one of European countries...) **poses a significant risk to the Ukrainian population**, namely the risk of seeing between 200,000 and 1 million people die in an instant and millions more living for years in a devastated environment contaminated by radiation which leads to very high rates of cancer (and other diseases) (no. 18); **and (d) to prevent** the world from addressing the serious problems which must be solved urgently (such as global warming, better management of the planet's natural resources, excessive immigration in certain

countries) and which benefit some in rich countries.

**** * 25.1** It is important to note that the USA is also a nuclear superpower that could kill 80 to 90% of the Russian population in a few hours (and even some billions of people worldwide also in few hours) if they wanted to; so it's good to have a country capable of deterring them from doing so; and it's important that we **all work together** to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world, including in the US and Russia. Destroying the Russian economy will not encourage Russia to reduce its number of nuclear weapons, nor will it encourage the US to reduce its number of nuclear weapons (!). *******

26. France and Germany fought 3 wars in about 70 years, and the last 2 were called **world wars**; and during the 3rd war, the Germans took **more than 6 years** to torture and kill 6 million Jews in concentration camps, and about 20 million people died in the conflict [Europe was created to end this hatred between Germany and France and war in Europe, and it worked for more than 50 years; then it seems that the **2004 enlargement of Europe** brought us a new hatred, that of Russia; this experience should encourage Europe to stop seeking to enlarge]. Today, Russia could kill 2 billion people, or 80% or more of the population of all NATO countries (**981 million in 2025** according to Copilot), in just one hour (in a Pearl Harbor-style surprise attack), if it wanted to (!), yet since the beginning of the war, **it has lost about 1 million soldiers** (killed or wounded **according to Ukraine**, I believe). Don't you think that this desire to impose peace by force on Russia is not only a form of manipulation, but also absurd in view of what the Germans have done, the revolutions organized by the USA in Latin America, Russia's contribution to the progress the world has made in many areas in the last 70 years such as the conquest of space, and the fact that Russia sought to end a conflict that caused 13,000 deaths and to highlight a serious security problem? Is it not possible that Russia has pointed out (with its invasion of Ukraine and what followed) serious problems at the level of the EU, the USA and Ukraine (...), which deserve to be studied and resolved?

(b) It is not Russia that refuses the ceasefire, it is Ukraine and its allies (...), until the presentation of Mr. Trump's peace plan for the USA) who are presenting knowingly unacceptable conditions.

27. Another mistaken assertion, in my view, is the claim that Ukraine and Europe say Russia refuses the ceasefire, while they themselves demand one **(1) without taking** — or even proposing to take — **prior action to end (a) the illegal sanctions** (not authorized by the UN Security Council) against Russia and the countries that support it or purchase its oil and gas [China has, I think, denounced the recent sanctions against Russia (2 Russian companies in the oil sector) because **they are illegal** without a vote of the UN Security Council ([PJ no. 0.40](#))], **(b) arms deliveries** to Ukraine, and **(c) the provision of intelligence** enabling Ukraine to strike Russia more effectively, and financial support (economic and other) to Ukraine, and **(2) without returning frozen or stolen Russian assets** (to implicitly continue to weaken Russia during the ceasefire, and validate the theory that peace can be imposed by force!). **Economic sanctions** against Russia, not supported (or not approved) by the UN Security Council, **are, in the context of the war in Ukraine,**

acts of war against Russia, just as Russian or Ukrainian bombings are acts of war; and arms deliveries and economic aid to Ukraine are also acts of war.

5) European countries, the USA (...) are taking advantage of the conflict in Ukraine in several ways (militarily, politically and economically) when they sanction Russia (...) and commit the crime of concealing a crime (...).

(a) Countries that sanction Russia (...) are profiting from the war and committing the crime of receiving stolen goods (...) .

28. As explained in my 2021 letter (at least, [PJ no 3 to 42](#), EN [PJ no 3.2](#)), **the economic sanctions and other measures against Russia** (not authorized by the UN Security Council) **are forms of manipulation of the population** (of Ukraine and the world) since they seek to attribute – in the eyes of the Ukrainian population and the world – responsibility for the conflict or the refusal to implement a ceasefire to Russia; and **they are criminal** or unlawful since **their objective is (a) to profit from the so-called crimes** committed by Russia or attributed to Russia, and **(b) to derive economic, political, and military advantages from them**. For example, it is clear that when Russia is prevented from selling its gas and oil to Europe, (1) countries like the USA, Norway, etc., which sell their gas and oil instead of Russia, benefit financially (and economically) from the sanctions imposed on Russia, and (2) the Russian economy is weakened, so the countries that impose sanctions also derive political advantages (...); these countries that sanction Russia are therefore committing **the crime of concealing a crime...** [see explanations in the letter of 23-5-21 ([PJ no 3 to 42](#), EN [PJ no 3.2](#))]. And the sanctions and the key role played by the US in the conflict in Ukraine have also allowed the US to impose tariffs on certain products in Europe, promises of investment in the US, and purchases of American weapons destined for Ukraine and paid for by Europeans, which strengthen the American economy at the expense of the European economy (as the former European Commissioner and former Minister, Mr. Thierry Breton, stated several times on television).

(b) Sanctions against Russia also create an artificial threat which makes it possible to justify military spending to public opinion in Europe and to turn a blind eye to the violation of the rights of the poor and other problems.

29. **Sanctions not authorized** by the Security Council and illegal, and the attempt to destruction (or **strangulation**) of the Russian economy unjustified from Europe (...), which weakens Russia economically, politically and militarily, **creates an artificial threat** (of war with Russia) which allows (a) to justify increases in the defense budgets of EU countries (...), (b) to reduce the gap with the military spending of the USA, China..., (c) to support the arms industry of European countries (and indirectly of the USA as well, which has more advanced weaponry in certain areas), and (d) to turn a blind eye to the systematic violation of the rights of the poor (as is happening in France) and other social and international problems such as the fact that "rich countries use 6 times more materials per capita and have a per capita impact on the climate 10 times greater than that of poor countries" [see the GRO 2024: 'High-income countries **use six times more materials per capita** and are responsible **for ten times more climate impacts per capita** than low-income countries.']. Europe, the USA (**until the presentation of Mr. Trump's peace plan**) and other NATO countries are violating international regulations to take advantage of the conflict in Ukraine in various ways; and this (a) significantly diminishes the validity of their positions and that of Ukraine on the conflict in Ukraine, (b) establishes their responsibility for the conflict and its continuation, and (c) strengthens the validity of Russia's position and its demands to end the war.

(c) The EU also seeks to take advantage of the conflict by recruiting Ukraine into the EU and increasing its political, economic and military weight.

30. Brexit, which resulted in the loss of the United Kingdom to the European Union, has weakened the EU politically, economically, and militarily. The United Kingdom is one of the 10 richest countries in the world, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a nuclear power. Therefore, the loss of the United Kingdom to the EU represents (a) a significant decrease in its economic power (compared to countries like the USA, China, India, etc.), (b) a decrease in its military power, and (c) a decrease in its diplomatic influence in the world. It is possible that Brexit has played a role in hardening the EU's position towards Russia and in the desire to continue the war in an attempt to prevent Ukraine from losing the territories occupied by Russia. The EU does not need Ukraine, and it is a mistake to try to rebuild a "Soviet" Union of Europe (in reverse) and, among other things, to isolate Russia. We have technologies and knowledge that allow us to help Ukraine and many other countries without asking them to join the EU. Ultimately, **the UN's objective is convergence**, not having one country or group of countries dominate the world (from top to bottom). Europe and all countries should use their knowledge and capabilities (and the "new" technologies like AI and the Internet) to achieve this goal: **convergence**.

(6) Conclusion on this part concerning the causes of the war in Ukraine.

31. In summary, **the inconsistencies** in the positions of France, Canada and Germany (...) mentioned in nos. 21-24.1, **the positions** of Ukraine, the EU (...) mentioned in nos. 25-27, and **the efforts** made to take advantage of the war mentioned in nos. 28-29, which follow the Maidan revolution similar to the revolutions in Latin America organized by the USA (nos. 22-23 here), **establish** that the war in Ukraine has been artificially maintained by European countries and the USA (**until the presentation of Mr. Trump's peace plan**) and that it is being used to destabilize Russia in order to obtain economic, political and military advantages [such as trying to enlarge Europe and NATO without honest and intelligent reason, nos. 28-30]. Furthermore, this war, which has disastrous consequences for the entire world, is not based on values, on the violation of international regulations, or on the desire to defend democracy as is often claimed (see letter of July 10, 2024, no. 60-82). Mr. Trump's initial peace plan of November 21, 2025, confirms this in a certain way, I think, even if it does not justify some of the positions taken, which are contested by Ukraine and its European allies. Therefore, I will analyze the proposed peace plan (and the counter-proposals) and make suggestions to improve it and ensure that it is in the interest of all UN member states. But before that, I must emphasize that the situation I have just described leads me to elaborate on my platform of proposals; Indeed, in addition **to creating a new IO** for the modernization of armies, disarmament, the maintenance of peace and international security (...), I think that, **in order to put an end to all wars**, we should also develop new legal means to discourage countries, political leaders of countries (...) from taking advantage of wars and/or organizing revolutions to gain economic and political benefits, and give the ICC and perhaps the WTO additional means to investigate and prosecute this kind of new offence.

C. Mr. Trump's proposed peace plan, and suggestions for improving this proposal.

32. To write this part, I used 2 articles from Le Figaro which list Mr. Trump's plan ([PJ no. 0.41](#)), and Europe's counter-proposal ([PJ no. 0.42](#)), I assume that these articles contain correct information (Mr. Trump's amended peace plan is at [PJ no. 0.55](#), EN [PJ no. 0.56](#)).

(1) Comments on Mr. Trump's 28-point peace plan and Europe's counter-proposal.

33. **Point 1** (on the sovereignty of Ukraine) is reasonable. **Points 2, 3 and 16** (on the non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, non-enlargement of NATO, the inclusion of its non-aggression policy in Russian law), the UN Charter (Article 2) prohibits member states from using force against another country, so, since Russia, Ukraine and the EU and NATO countries are members of the UN, it seems redundant to seek to enshrine the non-aggression policy in the national law of these countries; and it might be better to ask Russia, Ukraine and the NATO countries to reaffirm the importance of respecting the UN Charter, and in particular Article 2, paragraph 4; stressing that NATO will not expand further is undoubtedly useful, but **I also propose (at no. 3, [PJ no. 0.56](#))** (a) that, in accordance with Article 11 of the UN Charter, the UNGA should consider the relevance of NATO's existence and the possibility of replacing NATO with the new International Organization for the Modernisation of Armed Forces, Peacekeeping (...) which I propose to create during the first part of 2026 (see also no 17), and (b) that it should deliver its conclusions to the Member States, the Security Council and NATO in early July 2026 ([PJ no. 0.56](#)). **Points 4 and 5** (the dialogue between Russia and NATO, and security guarantees for Ukraine) are important; as for the best security guarantees that Ukraine can obtain, they are those it will obtain by admitting its responsibility in the emergence and continuation of the conflict that began in 2022... [Russia would never have attacked Ukraine without very particular circumstances; it did not dismantle the USSR only to then reconquer its former republics one by one, and attack Europe (!)].

34. **Point 6** (regarding the size of the Ukrainian army: 600,000 soldiers for Mr. Trump's plan and 800,000 for the EU), these two figures are far too high when compared, for example, to the size of the French and German armies, which are under 300,000 soldiers, I believe. It seems that the EU (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) wants to create a **modern-day Maginot Line** to protect itself from Russia by allowing Ukraine to maintain 800,000 troops, this is a serious mistake; the Ukrainian army should be minimal (150,000 soldiers), and Ukraine should focus on its reconstruction and economic development, as Germany and Japan did with exceptional success after World War II. **Points 7 through 10** (concerning Ukraine's non-membership in NATO, the absence of NATO troops in Ukraine, fighter jets in Poland, and US compensation for its security guarantees), it is obvious that Ukraine should not join NATO and that NATO troops should not be present in Ukraine; furthermore, given the discussion about establishing a just and lasting peace, the presence of fighter jets in Poland is unnecessary; in general, **the US should not have to guarantee the security of a country whoever it may be**, other than the USA (unless the USA is mandated by the UN Security Council), and therefore should not be paid for it; the UN Security Council should guarantee the proper implementation of the peace plan and the security of Ukraine (**no. 15, [PJ no. 0.56](#)**). **Point 11** (on Ukraine's accession to Europe), I think it is not a good idea and certainly not an emergency; the EU can help Ukraine (and other countries) without allowing it (them) to join the EU; in view of the arguments presented above, EU enlargement can constitute a risk for the international community,

therefore no country should be able to join the EU without the agreement of a strong majority of UN member states and the UN Security Council.

35. **Point 12** (on the package of measures for the reconstruction of Ukraine) is reasonable, but it is important to provide for **the creation of a commission of independent and international experts** (including, in particular, experts from the ICC and the WTO) that would be tasked with (1) studying and evaluating all the profits and other benefits that have been made and obtained, and that could have been made and obtained, by certain countries through (a) the war (and the Maidan revolution) and (b) economic sanctions against Russia and other countries not authorized by the UN Security Council, (2) determining the special contribution that these countries should pay to the funds to help rebuild Ukraine and compensate the victims, and (3) making proposals to discourage this kind of behavior in the future (proposals for legislation); also, the cost of repairing Nord Stream 1 and 2 (approximately \$2 billion) should be charged to Ukraine if it cannot establish that the identified Ukrainian saboteurs were sponsored by another country. **Point 13** (on the reintegration of Russia into the global economy...), the reintegration of Russia into the global economy is justified, but **all sanctions** against Russia, which are illegal and allow certain countries to profit from the conflict (...), **should end immediately**, I think. **Point 14** (on the use of the \$100 billion of frozen Russian assets,...), it is a mistake to steal the frozen funds from Russia; it is better, in my view, to return them to Russia and ask it to take care of the reconstruction of the territories it occupies and will keep; and the countries that have profited financially or obtained advantages from the conflict (USA, EU, NATO like Norway...) should contribute more significantly to financing the reconstruction of Ukraine (... see no 12 [PJ no. 0.56](#), on the creation of a commission of independent international experts); Europe's counter-proposals on this subject are unrealistic and unfair.

36. **Points 15 and 17** (on the US-Russian working group and the extension of the US-Russian nuclear treaties) are reasonable, but the UN Security Council should guarantee compliance with all the provisions of this agreement (not just the US and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council); and nuclear disarmament treaties should not be discussed solely in the presence of the US and Russia, they concern all countries, even those without nuclear weapons; and more efforts should be made for nuclear disarmament (again, the UN General Assembly should consider these nuclear disarmament issues and make proposals, see points 3 and 17, [PJ no 0.55](#)). **Point 18** (on Ukraine agreeing not to be equipped with nuclear weapons) is reasonable, of course. **Point 19 and 20** (regarding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and educational programs) are reasonable. **Point 21** (regarding the transfer of the five regions occupied by Russia to Russia) **is justified**, but the EU's counter-proposal is incorrect. Ukraine has sought to kill as many pro-Russians as possible in these regions (and it has invaded the Kursk region...), so it should not reclaim these regions if Russia does not want to give them up (Russia granted independence to these territories, so it could do so again). **Points 22 to 28** (on the non-modification by force of the agreement, on the use of the Dnieper, on the creation of a humanitarian committee, on elections in Ukraine, on amnesty, on the legally binding agreement, and the starting point of the ceasefire) are also reasonable, but for **point 27**, the UN Security Council (including the USA of course) should monitor and guarantee the implementation of the peace plan; and for **point 24**, we must not forget the victims of the conflict (and their beneficiaries), who have not been (or could not be) compensated by Ukraine or Russia, and a special fund should be created for this purpose (see no. 12, [PJ no. 0.55](#)).

37. **The allocation to Russia of the regions** (Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea) and parts of regions occupied by Russia (occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, point 21 of the peace plan) **is justified (1)** by the responsibility of Ukraine and its successive governments in (a) the 2014 revolution, and (b) the subsequent conflict against pro-Russian populations who wanted to exercise their right to vote for autonomy in their region; **(2)** by the continuation of the 2022 conflict against Russia (abandonment of negotiations to end the conflict, lies about the possibility of imposing peace on Russia by force, demands for ever more illegal sanctions against Russia from NATO countries, foreign interference to destabilize Russia, strangulation of the Russian economy); **and (3)** by the inconsistency of the positions of certain countries allied with Ukraine (no. 21), the illegal sanctions, and the unconditional support for Ukraine by NATO countries **to exploit the conflict by** destroying the Russian economy and recovering, among other things, the lost sales of Russian gas and oil (nos. 28-30). In the peace plan of July 10, 2024, I proposed, among other things, freezing the front until all responsibilities in the conflict are established, and the elements presented above allow for a more precise establishment of responsibilities in the emergence and continuation of the conflict, and the legitimacy of Russian demands; therefore, the evolution of the peace plan of July 10, 2024 on this point is justified.

38. (a) The immediate lifting of illegal sanctions against Russia, (b) the return of assets frozen to Russia, and (c) the establishment of a commission composed of independent and international experts to determine the greater participation of NATO countries, which have profited financially, politically, and militarily (or obtained advantages...) from the conflict in Ukraine, in the reconstruction of Ukraine, and compensation for victims, should also be part of a just and lasting peace plan. The international community must (1) discourage foreign interference in revolutions and conflicts for the purpose of profiting from them, and economic (and other) sanctions to profit from these revolutions and conflicts, and (2) be able to assess the profits made and advantages obtained (...) by certain countries in conflicts or revolutions resulting from foreign interference in order to compensate the victims. Finally, in the interest of the international community and Ukraine, **it would be reasonable to disarm Ukraine and maintain a minimal army in Ukraine** (150,000 troops). Contrary to what Mr. Zelensky said during his speech at the United Nations in September, we and Ukraine do not need ever more weapons; on the contrary, we need to reduce defense budgets and arms stockpiles (including nuclear weapons). Europe, France, and the USA (NATO and the G7), and Ukraine had and have far more important and urgent things to do than create problems between Russia and its neighbor, Ukraine (...), as they did by facilitating and using the Maidan revolution (and promising EU and NATO membership).

(3) Conclusion on this section devoted to Mr. Trump's peace plan.

39. At the end of the Second World War, countries faced an exceptional situation (concentration camp, mass killing,) and considerable destruction and number of human victims, so they took exceptional measures such as the organization of the Nuremberg trials against the Nazi leaders, the creation of the United Nations and other international organizations, and the development of international conventions on human rights (...). The conflict in Ukraine is not comparable to the Second World War in terms of the number of victims and the extent of the

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destruction of property and infrastructure, but it is still very particular for several reasons. First, it highlights a type of conflicts and violence that has occurred repeatedly since the creation of the UN and despite the existence of the UN, and which I mentioned above, namely the organization of revolutions to obtain political, economic and military advantages and violence against political opponents (see the example on the destabilization of Latin America in no. 23); secondly, this conflict is financed by a group of rich countries that use economic sanctions and therefore their economic power to impose their truth (or point of view) on the rest of the world (that is to say, among other things, by bypassing the UN Security Council, and at least 2 of its permanent members); and finally, there is a serious risk of the use of nuclear weapons if the conflict is not resolved quickly, and serious risks related to the upcoming development of superintelligence and other related advanced technologies, and to environmental and other unresolved global problems that justify concerted action to strengthen the UN in the areas of peacekeeping and the Internet and AI.

40. All these elements which make the conflict in Ukraine exceptional, and the particular situation in which the world finds itself, oblige us to take measures similar to those which were taken at the end of the Second World War such as (1) the creation of a new IO for the maintenance of peace ..., the modernization of the armed forces, disarmament (...), (2) the creation of a new IO to govern AI and the Internet (...), (3) the creation of a commission to study and evaluate the profits and other advantages which have been obtained from the conflict and the economic sanctions which have been imposed because of the Maidan revolution and the subsequent conflict in Donbas as well as the one which began in 2022, and (4) the creation of new legislation and legal tools to discourage countries from taking advantage of revolutions and conflicts of all kinds, and to punish them if they do not respect this legislation. States are on the verge of developing superintelligence and have sent robots to the planet Mars, so we must act more intelligently and work together (1) to better utilize AI (and these superintelligences) and the Internet to solve our urgent national and global problems, including eradicating poverty, environmental protection, global warming, maintaining international peace and security, and combating transnational organized crime and illegal immigration, (2) to help poor and less poor countries by developing global administrative and justice systems that can be used by any country that wishes to use them, and (3) to continue the efforts made for decades to conquer space.

D. Conclusion.

41. The lack of response to my letters and comments on the proposals platform does not diminish the validity and merit of the proposals I presented to you; on the contrary. France's difficulties in admitting the unconstitutionality of its law on legal aid and MLRCs (mandatory legal representation by counsel), and in reforming its legal aid and justice systems over the past 35 years (nos. 2-9), demonstrate the value of having a worldwide approach to this issue of legal aid and, more generally, to the reform of justice systems, if the financial and technical advantages of the solution presented in the proposals platform have not convinced you. The other proposals [creation of a new UN agency to govern the Internet and AI (and the development of the two other global applications: a system to calculate and collect domain name fees, and a new pension management system), creation of a new UN agency for modernizing the armed forces, maintaining international peace and security (...), replacing NATO, which should be dismantled), and the search for an alternative to market capitalization] address (1) the needs highlighted in official UN reports (GRO 2024 and the report on AI governance), (2) the urgent needs related to our unresolved societal problems and the shortcomings of our administrative, justice, and economic and

financial systems, (3) recent technological developments that will bring about profound changes in how we work and analyze problems, and that allow us to pool our resources for the benefit of all, and (4) the need to strengthen the capacities of the UN and its agencies so that they can carry out their vital tasks ever more effectively, therefore they are also indispensable.

42. The relevant international organizations and entities (UN Secretariat, IMF, OHCHR, WHO, ILO, ICANN, UNEP, ICC,) could, between January and the end of March 2026, comment on the technical aspects of the main proposals in the platform of proposals in a 3 to 7 pages document, and give me the opportunity to respond to their remarks, to facilitate the analysis of the platform by UN member states from April to July 2026. Proposals 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the platform of proposals are technical and described in sufficient detail, so OHCHR and the ICC could, for example, comment on the technical aspects (legal and organizational issues) of proposal 3; ICANN, USC, and UMD could perhaps also write a commentary on the technical aspects of proposals 1 and 2; the IMF and the UNDP, with the assistance of the experts who drafted the GRO 2024, could comment on the potential relevance of proposals 1, 2, 5, and 6 for achieving the transformation outlined in the GRO 2024; ILO and WHO could make some comments on proposal no 4; and finally, as I mentioned in paragraph 33, the UNGA could examine the feasibility of proposal 5 concerning the creation of a new International Organization for the modernization of armed forces... to replace NATO (...) during the first six months of 2026, in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter.

43. Finally, one of the objectives of the proposal platform was to help countries end conflicts around the world, including the one in Ukraine, so I returned to the proposed peace plan for Ukraine presented in my letter of 10-7-24, and analyzed what has happened in Ukraine since that 2024 letter, and the proposed peace plan presented by Mr. Trump ([PJ no 0.41](#)) as well as the counter-proposal presented by European countries ([PJ no 0.42](#)), to justify some of Mr. Trump's proposals and to make suggestions which, in my view, are in the interest of all UN member states (see Mr. Trump's amended peace plan in [PJ no 0.55](#), EN [PJ no 0.56](#)). Mr. Trump's peace plan is courageous and very useful, and the US has a crucial role to play in its implementation. However, we must not forget that it is not enough to simply resolve this conflict; we must also ensure that similar conflicts do not arise in the future. To achieve this, we must involve the UN General Assembly and the Security Council (as it currently stands, even if it is not perfect), and strengthen the UN to enable it to prevent the emergence of this type of conflict. We must also encourage all countries to respect the UN Charter and to work with the UN.

44. As explained in paragraphs 13-14, the work I have done over more than 30 years to develop the platform of proposals and the clear vision of what needs to be done to help the UN solve the complex problems it faces I have presented, demonstrate that I have acquired the skills required for this position, even though I do not have a traditional career path like the other nominated or declared candidates, due to the serious injustices I have suffered in France, among other places. Therefore, I take the liberty of asking the European Union and all the Presidents and Heads of Government of UN member states who do not plan to nominate a candidate for the position of UN Secretary-General in 2026 to consider nominating me and, if necessary, to contribute to the funding of my campaign for this position so that I can advocate for my proposals, which are in the interest of all countries, not just France.

45. This letter is addressed to many people whom I will not be able to contact directly, so I would be very grateful if you could forward this letter to all those mentioned in the header whom I have not been able to reach by email. To correct possible misunderstandings, please refer to the initial French version of the letter at the following address: <http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf3-2-21/let-UN-EU-ios-poli-FR-12-12-25.pdf>. I would also like to take this opportunity to wish you all a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year, which I hope will begin with a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Awaiting your reply, I remain, dear ladies and gentlemen, yours sincerely.

Pierre Genevieve

P.S.: If you have any difficulty accessing certain documents attached via internet link, please let me know, and I will send them to you by email.

Attachments.

PJ no 0: Letter of 10-7-24, [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/plainte-art-15-CPI-FR-10-2-21.pdf>].
PJ no 0.2: EN (0.2), [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/plainte-art-15-CPI-EN-10-2-21.pdf>].
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PJ no 0.9: 2nd request for administrative inquiry, Ms. Belloubet, 17-5-19, [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/let-belloubet-de-enq-admi-17-5-19.pdf>].
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PJ no 0.11: Responses from Ms. Moutchou, dated April 8 and 15, 2019, [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/let-Mme-moutchou-2-15-4-19.pdf>].
PJ no 0.12: Letter to Mr. Hollande, ..., the lawyers' representatives, 20-1-16, [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/let-pres-pm-err-mat-QPC-2-20-1-16.pdf>].
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PJ no 0.14: Letter to the Deputies and Senators ..., dated 7-11-17, [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/let-press-politi-7-11-17.pdf>].
PJ no 0.15: Letter to the UN (...) of 8-12-17, [<http://www.pierre-genevieve.eu/npdf2/let-ungsg-unga-usa-uni-8-12-17.pdf>].
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