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Mr. Rik Daems, President of the Parliamentary Assembly, and Mmes/MM. the Members of the Assembly
Mr. Miltiadis Varvitsiotis, President of Committee of Ministers, and Mmes/M. the Members of the Committee
Mr. Vladimir Putin, Mr. Sergey Lavrov
Mr. Boris Johnson, Mr. Dominic Raab
Mrs. Angela Merkel, Mr. Heiko Maas
Mrs. Sophie Wilmès, Mr. Philippe Goffin
Mr. Jüri Ratas, Mr. Urmas Reinsalu

Poitiers, July 10th, 2020

Copy: Mrs. and MM. the members of the UN Security Council; Mrs. Dunja Mijatovic, Human rights Commissioner;
Office for democratic institutions and human rights; the prosecutor of the ICC.

Object: Accusations of *crime against humanity* against several French high officials and demand for a vote at the UN Security Council to seize the ICC; second request against France (dated 23-6-20, [Exh. 0.3](#), [Exh. 0.4](#), [Exh. 0.2](#)); letter dated 15-5-20 ([Exh. 0.1](#)) concerning the first request (dated 18-3-20, [Exh. 1](#), [Exh. 2](#), [Exh. 3](#), [Exh. 4](#)); and proposals to improve the legal aid systems (LA) and to maintain international peace and security. [PDF: <http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pace-UNSC-EU-reqno2-EN-18-7-20.pdf>; French version: <http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pace-UNSC-EU-reqno2-FR-10-7-20.pdf>].

Dear Mr. Rik Daems and Mmes/MM. the Members of the Parliamentary Assembly,
Dear Mr. Miltiadis Varvitsiotis and Mmes/MM. the Members of the Committee of Ministers,
Dear Mr. Vladimir Putin and Mr. Sergey Lavrov,
Dear Mr. Boris Johnson and Mr. Dominic Raab,
Dear Mrs. Angela Merkel and Mr. Heiko Maas,
Dear Mrs. Sophie Wilmès and Mr. Philippe Goffin,
Dear Mr. Jüri Ratas and Mr. Urmas Reinsalu,

1. Referring to my 5-15-20 letter ([Exh. 0.1](#)) sent to several instances of the European Council (and therefore to several of you), I take the liberty of writing you **(1) to send you** my second request against France [[Exh. 0.3](#), [Exh. 0.4](#), [Exh. 0.2](#)] describing (a) the violation of art. 17 (among others) and (b) certain problems of the LA law that I had not been able to address in detail in the first request [dated 18-3-20, [Exh. 1](#), [Exh. 2](#), [Exh. 3](#), [Exh. 4](#)], and presenting several proofs of my accusations of *crime against humanity*; and **(2) to ask** Mr. Putin, Mr. Johnson, Mrs. Merkel, Mrs. Wilmès, and Mr. Ratas to **organize** – with the other members of the UN Security Council - **(a) a discussion (i) on my accusations of crime against humanity** linked to the dishonest LA law [, obligations to have a lawyer (OHL), and short delays to file certain pleadings] since 1991, and **(ii) on my proposals to improve the LA systems around the world; and (b) a vote (i) to transfer the situation** described here to the International Criminal Court (ICC) according to art. 13 of the Rome Statute [and Chapter VII of the UN Charter], and **(ii) to make recommendations on this LA subject to the UN member states.**

A The contents of the 2 requests at the ECHR, the proofs of the destruction of poor rights and liberties and of the *crime against humanity*, the large number of victims, and the prejudice's gravity.

1) The description of the grave LA law problems and of the undue advantages they bring, and the proofs of the destruction of poor rights and liberties and of the crime against humanity.

2. My 2 (first) requests against France **(1) describe** in detail the different problems of the LA law (LA) that affect the quality of services rendered to the poor [(a) the insufficient remuneration of lawyers and the conflicts of interest for the lawyers; and (b) the composition and partiality of the legal aid offices (LAO) (reqno 1); then (c) the impossibility (i) to complain against the system, the lawyers (...) for the poor, (ii) to control the work done (and the time spent on the case) by the designated lawyer, and (iii) to have young lawyers be supervised by a more experienced lawyer, (d) the absence of a unique work methodology for the LA lawyers and for the LAO judges, (e) the

impossibility (i) to compute the total and detailed costs of the LA system, (ii) to evaluate the time necessary for a lawyer (and for the LAO) to resolve the different types of cases (and to render a decision for the LAO), (iii) to pay different hourly rates to different lawyers (...), (reqno 2)], **(2) explain** how the LA, the OHL and the short delay to file certain pleadings (a) are used to destroy systematically the poor rights and liberties [France uses the obligation described at art. 6.3 c) and the LA to destroy the poor rights and liberties and therefore violates art. 17], and (b) to give undue advantages to lawyers, judges, prosecutors, politicians (...) (reqno2) ; and **(3) bring** proofs of the criminal responsibilities of certain politicians (presidents, ministers,), lawyers (representatives,), high-level judges, and administrations, and businesses managers (a) in the effort to maintain the LA law (...), (b) in the destruction of poor rights and liberties, and (c) in the *crime against humanity since 1991*.

[2.1 There are several obvious proofs that the LA system violates systematically the poor rights including the admission of lawyers' representatives that the lawyers are not paid enough to defend efficiently the poor in court (see 2014 LA report, [Exh. 17](#), '*le Conseil National des Barreaux reconnaît que les niveaux de rémunérations actuels ne permettent pas, en tout état de cause, d'assurer correctement la défense des personnes concernées*'); and the fact that United Kingdom spends (about **2,5 billions** euros) **5 times what France spends** (about **500 millions**) for its LA system, although its population size and level of wealth are similar to the French ones (!); and the lawyers' remuneration is not the only LA system's problem that affects the quality of services rendered.].

3. The 2nd request dated 23-6-20 describes, among others, the **techniques used** by lawyers and judges (and prosecutors and clerks) to destroy the poor rights and liberties [not only the ones guaranteed at articles 6.1, 13, and 17, but also 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, ..., ([Exh. 0.4, no 1, 18-19](#))]; and it gives examples of the use of these techniques in my different cases and in 2 ECHR legal authorities that put forward, among others, violations of the right to life (art. 2) and the right to freedom (art. 5), in addition to the right to a fair trial (art. 6.1) of course ([Exh. 0.4, no 2-8, 20-25](#)). It explains also how the lawyer-politicians ignore deliberately certain grave LA system problems to maintain **(a) the LA architecture** based on the use of independent lawyers, and **(b) the undue advantages** it brings [see, among others, the bad faith and dishonesty of the 23-7-19 LA parliamentary report ([Exh. 15](#)) written by Mrs Moutchou and Mr. Gosselin at [Exh. 0.4, no 9-17](#), [Exh. 14](#)]; and describes (a) my efforts since 2013 to explain the LA system problems to the presidents, ministers, representatives and senators and the administrations managers concerned (CC, DD, CE,), and (b) their obvious will to close their eyes on these grave problems to continue robbing the poor and maintaining the undue advantages the LA law brings to them ([Exh. 0.4, no 18-29](#)).

4. Article 7 of the Rome Statute defining the *crime against humanity* allows, among others, the prosecution of crimes in front of the ICC that put forward '*the Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, ...*'; and, here [in studying the functioning to the LA system, its grave problems, and specific cases, including ECHR legal authorities], we see well that the dishonest LA system is used **(1) to destroy** – systematically – the poor rights and liberties since 1991, including *the right to life, the interdiction of torture* (and degrading treatments), and *of slavery and forced work, and the right to freedom*, among others, and therefore **(2) to persecute an identifiable group**, the poor (**more than 14 millions poor are dependent on the LA law at this time**) *on political ... grounds ... that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law*.

2) The estimate of the number of victims of dishonest LA decisions rejecting legitimate LA requests.

5. As explained in the 2nd request ([Exh. 0.3](#), [Exh. 0.4](#)), it is obvious that the different presidents, ministers, representatives, senators (...) known for a long time **(1)** that the LA system robbed systematically the poor presenting themselves in front of the justice, **(2)** that they gained undue advantages, **(3)** that the number of victims was significant, and **(4)** that the gravity of the crimes committed was unquestionable. The Boucher report on LA in **2001** ([Exh. 22](#)) already mentioned the insufficient lawyer's remuneration problem [as did the following report in 2007 ([Exh. 21](#)), 2011, 2014 among others]; and, according to the 2014 LA report ([Exh. 17, no x-y](#)), we had about **915 000 admissions** to LA in **2012**; the number of cases with one of the parties using LA represented 22 % of all terminated cases [for 2012 about **4 128 000 terminated cases**] so about **900 000**; and about 100 000 LA requests were rejected (or declared obsolete, ..., in 2012) [in comparison, according to the **2001 LA report**, there was in 2000 about 700 000 LA admissions and **80 000 LA requests rejected**; according to the Moutchou 2019 report, **985 000** LA admissions about in 2017 for **80 000** LA requests rejected]. So we can make a rough estimate of the number of the LA system's victims.

6. First, the important number of victims of dishonest LA offices' decisions is due to the fact that *no investigation is done and no decision is based on the merits of the case* [see '*aucune réelle instruction n'est faite, ni aucune décision prise au regard du fond du dossier, alors même que l'article 7 ... dispose que 'l'aide juridictionnelle est accordée à la personne dont l'action n'apparaît pas, manifestement, irrecevable ou dénuée de fondement...*', senators Joissains and Mézard 2014 LA report (Exh. 2, no 2)]; this remark from the senators is not surprising when you know the LA office's composition [that includes at the Court of Cassation (CC) a judge as *President, the Chief clerk, two members of the CC, two civil servants as well as one user of the service*] because all the LA office members do not have the time, and, for some, not the qualification, authority, and partiality necessary to investigate the case and to make an honest legal analysis of the LA request file (Exh. 2, no 2); and not surprising for me because of my personal experience (over a 20 years period). So if we assume that only **1 % of rejected LA requests** every year prevent a poor from presenting a case that describes a grave injustice (violations of art. 2, or 3, 4, 5, 13, ... of the ECHR...), we would have about **800 victims per year**, and therefore since 2000, about **16 000 victims** linked to the LA office's malfunctions.

3) The estimate of the number of victims who were defended inefficiently by their LA lawyers.

7. Second, for the victims linked to the dishonest work or behavior of lawyers during the LA missions, we can estimate the number of victims by looking at the number of terminated cases every year having at least one party using LA, about **900 000** in 2012 (in 2000 we had about 700 000 cases). And if we assume that only **1 %** of these 900 000 (9 000 aff., and of the 700 000 in 2000, 7 000 aff.) finished with a grave injustice for the poor (violation of art. 2, or 3, 4, 5, 6, ... de la convention), we would have about **160 000 victims** since 2000 (70 000 between 2001 and 2010, and 90 000 between 2011 and 2020). I have voluntarily chosen a relatively low percentage, although the lawyers' insufficient remuneration is obvious in most types of proceedings covered by the LA law and judged every year, and although there are several other grave problems that affect the quality of services rendered to the poor [of course for a divorce by mutual consent, the probability of having a serious injustice is very low; moreover, it is one of the rare types of proceedings for which the LA law pays the lawyer enough time to defend the case efficiently (!)].

8. So the estimate based on a relatively low percentage of victims still gives us **176 000 victims** over a **20 years period only** [and therefore not from 1991, the ICC would probably not study the cases before 2002, but the ECHR could still ask France to compensate the victims of the LA law since 1991]. At this number, we should add the number of victims of the OHL, and of the short delays to file certain pleadings (poor or not poor), who chose to defend themselves alone for one reason or another. It is difficult to estimate the number of these victims, but it is still probably significant also. Finally, if we take into consideration the possibility that some of the victims are dead or are afraid of presenting a complaint or for any reason do not want to present a complaint, and decide to divide by two the number of victims, we would still have **88 000 victims over a 20 years period** who deserve justice; a significant number that justifies an investigation from the ICC and the prosecution of the high French officials and others responsible for maintaining the dishonest LA system for so many years [to rob the poor and at the same time to gain some undue advantages].

4) The gravity of the prejudices the victims suffered, and conclusion of this section.

9. To conclude this section, we must note again that the **prejudices** suffered by the poor **are serious** because it does not just amount to financial losses due to violations of art. 6.1 and 13 (due process and right to a day in court), but also to violations (a) of the right to life (art. 2) as in the Saoud affair, (b) of the right to be free from torture (and degrading treatments, art. 3), the right to freedom (art. 5), and of articles 4, 8, among others; so the gravity of the crimes committed by the French officials is obvious and sufficient to transfer the situation to the ICC and to investigate the *crime against humanity* (according to article 7 of the Rome statute). Moreover, given **(1) the large number** (a) of poor having requested LA since 1991 (or even 2000), (b) of rejected LA requests, and (c) of poor victims of negligence and dishonest behavior from the LA offices or from LA lawyers [due to the imperfections (and unconstitutionality) of the LA law, and of OHL ...]; **(2) the fact that the ECHR** (that judges inadmissible about **95% of the requests it receives**) corrects only a very small number injustices committed against the poor in France; and, when it does, it corrects and compensates them only (very) partially (because it only imputes a collective responsibility); and **(3) the vulnerability** of victims; it is difficult to identify the victims from the millions of LA files or from the tens of millions of proceeding documents of the poor using LA, and of presenting the **numerous** cases that constitute grave injustices.

10. In fact, the only efficient way to identify the poor victims is to make a public announcement on the LA problems and the proceeding launched by the ICC, and to ask the poor victims of the LA law since 2000 (or 1991) to come forward and to describe the injustices they were victim of and the grave prejudices they suffered; this is why, among other reasons, (1) the study of *the situation* described here by the Security Council in accordance to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and (2) its transfer to the ICC are so important. Recently the President of Kosovo was accused of *war crime* and *crime against humanity* including a hundred presumed murders (Exh. 25), I believe; and here the statistics and good sense tell us that tens of thousands of (or much more) poor were victims of the dishonest LA law, so even if the poor were not always victim of a violation of the right to life (art. 2), the crimes committed in France are serious and justify an investigation from the ICC and the prosecution of the high officials who are responsible. But before studying the competency of the Security Council to evaluate the *situation* described here, I would like to talk about my proposals to improve LA systems around the world and to explain why the Security Council must study them **at the same time** it studies the *crime against humanity* described here.

[10.1. Recently, Bayer has agreed to compensate 100 000 victims (in the Round up affair, I believe), so this kind of collective injustice with a large number of victims is not rare, and France can compensate the victims of his dishonest LA law since 1991.].

B My proposals to improve the LA systems around the world.

1) The efforts made to maintain the dishonest LA system in France during 30 years and my proposals to help countries avoid similar problems.

11. In addition to describing the LA law's grave problems [affecting the quality of services rendered to the poor, and its indirect high cost for Society], the 2 requests presented to the ECHR [on 18-3-20 Exh. 1, Exh. 2, Exh. 3, Exh. 4, and 23-6-20, Exh. 0.3, Exh. 0.4] put forward the obvious efforts made by politicians, judges (magistrates), lawyers, and other personalities concerned to maintain the corruption system and the systematic destruction of poor rights and liberties [see, among others, the bad faith and dishonesty of the 23-7-19 Report (Exh. 15) written by Mrs. Moutchou and Mr. Gosselin at Exh. 0.4, no 9-17, Exh. 14], it is therefore important that the Security Council (1) analyzes the *situation* in France [the misappropriation of article 6.3 c) to destroy the poor rights and freedom and to give undue advantages to politicians, ...], (2) takes into consideration the possibility that **this situation** (a) reproduces itself in other countries (that would like to put in place a legal aid system ...), and (b) affects gravely (i) our international objectives [including, among others, the eradication of poverty, decreasing inequalities, and building efficient institutions], and (ii) our efforts to maintain international peace and security ; and (3) **recommends a solution to avoid a similar scenario**, meaning encourages countries to use the new LA system (...) I propose to develop.

[11.1 In the US, the public legal aid system is limited to a legal-defense system; but, as explained in my 1-18-15 letter to the UNGA (Exh. 34, no 18), according to a New York Times article (Exh. 35), ACLU filed a complaint against state of New York to denounce the obvious human rights violations linked to the LA system; I cited the article: '**public defenders in New York are so overworked and overmatched that poor essentially receive no legal defense at all...**'; and '**Attorney General Holder who last year declared a crisis in America's legal-defense system for the poor, is supporting (the) class-action lawsuit...**'; '**The New York public-defender system has been "abusing low-and middle- class people in this system since 1965"**'; and '**in 2006 a commission appointed by the state's chief judge, Judith S. Kaye, found that the patchwork system provided "an unconstitutional level" of legal defense.**'; so it is obvious that the richest country in the world (the US) also has serious problems with its LA system, and that this question of the dishonest LA system in France and the proposals I made to improve the LA systems around the world deserve to be studied in details by the UN Security Council.].

12. The proposals I made to improve the LA system around the world [including the development (a) **of a new LA system** more efficient and less costly (based on the creation of a group of specialized-in-the-judgment-of-LA-requests judges, and a group of specialized-in-LA-missions lawyers), (b) **of a classification and codification** of all the types of cases judged every year around the world; and (c) **of 2 global Internet applications** to implement the new LA system everywhere around the world] have for goal (1) to correct all the imperfections of the French LA system, and, of course, (2) to avoid the systematic destruction of poor rights and liberties that I just mentioned in the previous section; so they should be studied in details by the UNSC. I have described the proposals in several previous letters [including some that were addressed to you, see the letters dated 12-7-17 to the UN, the US Congress (...) (Exh. 10, no 61-65), 3-30-19 to the French députés (...) (Exh. 11, no 73-95), 8-16-19 to the OHCHR (Exh. 12), and 2-17-20 to Clemson University President (Exh. 13, no 20-21)], so I will not come back on the proposals here, but I would like to make the links between certain solutions I proposed and the problems I described here.

2) The LA offices' composition is an obvious cause of the LA system inefficiency.

13. (For example and as [Exh. 2, no 2-3](#) mentions it,) In front of the ECHR, France pretended that the **composition of LA offices** [including, at the CC, a magistrate from the Court, its chief clerk, two members of the Court, two civil servants, two lawyers specialized in the highest Courts proceeding, and one user] **guaranteed** the LA offices decisions' **fairness**, although it is exactly the opposite, these LA office members (do not have the time to study the LA requests in details and) are not impartial; on the contrary, some of them have an obvious interest in rejecting the poor LA requests; moreover, a part from the judges, they do not have the necessary competencies and authority to render a decision which addresses sometimes complex technical legal questions. **The LA office's composition** is therefore an obvious cause of the LA system's inefficiency, and even of the entire justice's (and of its **indirect** high costs for Society); only one specialized judge must study the LA request, and, when possible, he must follow the case during the proceedings in front of higher courts to save time and money, and to encourage mediation at each level of proceeding.

14. Of course, we must also improve the LA decisions' quality [because it is a grave problem according to the 2014 LA report (no 6) '*aucune réelle instruction n'est faite, ni aucune décision prise au regard du fond du dossier, alors même que l'article 7 ... dispose que 'l'aide juridictionnelle est accordée à la personne dont l'action n'apparaît pas, manifestement, irrecevable ou dénuée de fondement'*'], among others, in putting in place (a) a unique work methodology for the LA office judges, and (b) strict rules for the motives and quality of LA decisions [see reqno2, [Exh. 0.4, no 15](#)], so we see that the proposal to create a group of specialized-in-LA judged [using a unique work methodology and a global Internet application] is the only solution to eliminate the problems of bias in the LA office and of conflicts of interest, and to improve the quality of services rendered (of the quality of decisions, to encourage mediation at the LA office level,). I would like to give you a precise example to help you understand the problem better. The LA office objective is to determine '*whether the legal action does not appear clearly inadmissible or unfounded*', which, for a victim of a crime or a misdemeanor, means that the judge must ask himself the following questions: (1) are the case facts prescribed, (2) is the public action extinct for one reason or another, (3) can the facts be qualified with a criminal offense, and (4) are the facts clearly inexact, among others; and some of these questions can be technical, complex and difficult to answer.

15. For example, to determine if the facts are prescribed, the judge must analyze the ongoing statute of limitation (including the ones derived from the up-to-date legal authorities), and the nature and specificity of the criminal offenses because some criminal offense are *immediate* [meaning the statute of limitation start running immediately]; and other offenses are *continuous* offense [meaning the statute of limitation does not start running as long as the offense is ongoing]; this is therefore the work of an experienced judge, not of a clerk or of a legal aid user. This analysis work on the admissibility and the merits of the case is critical; and **it must be done as fast and as well as possible** if we want to improve the quality of the LA decisions and of the efficiency of the LA system (overall), and to decrease **as much as possible** the LA system and the overall justice system costs; this is why we must have a unique work methodology, and an advanced computer system to help the judges as much as possible, to be able to compute the time spent on each case, and to control the quality of the work done (when mistakes are done, incorrect decisions taken, or other). If the LA office's work is well done, greater are the chances to resolve the case without having to go in front of the court, and lower are the LA and overall justice systems costs, and greater are the benefits for Society.

3) The LA system's architecture, based on independent lawyers, is an obvious cause of its inefficiency.

16. Second, the LA system architecture based on the use of independent lawyers to do the La missions, is an important cause of the LA and the justice systems inefficiency, and of their high **indirect** costs for Society because it prevents **(1)** the implementation (a) of a common computer system to help the lawyer manage their LA missions, (b) **of a unique work methodology**, and (c) of an evaluation and control system monitoring the lawyers' work; **(2)** the estimate of the time spend by the lawyers on each type of cases; **(3)** the pooling and optimization of the costs; and **(4)** a lawyer's remuneration taking into consideration his experience, competency, and notoriety, and the time spent on the case [in short it prevents us to pay several different rates to different lawyers, the exact number of hour worked, and the lawyers expenses also], among others; and all the countries that want to use independent lawyers to make the LA missions will face the same problems, which can only be resolved efficiently and at the lowest cost, if we use a group of specialized in LA lawyers using the same computer system (...).

17. As explained in reqno1, the use of independent lawyers and of LA office judges who work also for the regular court system (...) creates also serious conflicts of interest and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the poor to criticize the LA system, or the work done by the LA office judges or by the LA lawyers. So, the poor are forced to use the dishonest LA system, and, at the same time, they cannot criticize it, which is also one of the reasons why the system is so inefficient. Again, to create a system based on specialized-in-LA judges and lawyers under the shared responsibility of country's administration and the OHCHR (and to abrogate the obligation to have a lawyer and the short delay) is the only possible solution which will allow the poor (a) to criticize efficiently the LA system and to denounce the eventual injustices they suffer, (b) to improve the system if the cause is systemic (which should be very rare), and (c) to encourage the respect of established rules if the injustice is linked to the lawyer's behavior (...); and the system will also be able to compute the time spent on each case to make it easier to control LA judges and lawyers work's quality.

4) The high cost of justice, the mitigation, the sharing and the minimization of LA system costs, and the imputation of the LA spendings to those who created it.

18. Finally, the LA judges and lawyers' work is a complex intellectual work that takes time and is expensive, so we must give the LA judges and lawyers the amount of time necessary to do there work efficiently while minimizing as much as we can all the other costs, and imputing as much of the LA costs to those who created them for society. The different LA parliamentary reports and the Court of accounts interlocutory proceeding on LA have underlined that *the costs' mitigation mechanisms* (of the LA law) do not work [notably the fact that we almost never obtain the payment of the LA lawyer fee when the poor win in court, mainly because the poor almost never win in court; as we saw it above], this is a serious problem that the new LA system (I propose to develop) will resolve with an improved quality of services rendered (by the LA judges and lawyers, ...). If the LA office decision granting the aid is well motivated and the lawyer is paid according to his experience and to the work he is doing, then the chance that the poor win in court is high as well as the chance to obtain the payment of the lawyer's fee by the loosing party [and we can also impute the LA office cost to the losing party].

19. If the LA office studies seriously the LA requests and encourages mediation, then the probability that we resolve the different cases before they go to court is high, so we decrease the overall cost of justice; and we can impute the LA office's work cost to the *loosing party* (individual, administration, business,) who caused the spending. Finally, if the LA office rejects the LA request with a precisely motivated decision, the probability that the poor goes to court alone is much smaller, so we also decrease the overall cost of justice (and we can even prosecute the poor for abusive LA request when malice is established). Also, it is important to note that the creation of the 2 groups of civil servants specialized in LA [**judges** (and clerks) judging the LA requests and encouraging meditation; and **lawyers** helping the poor in court (...)] will allow us to generate extra resources from the cases in which the prejudice suffered and the requested compensation **are high**, because, in those cases, we could grant the lawyers and LA offices a (small 10% ...) part of the compensation they obtain for the poor.

20. The **solution** presented here [the creation of the 2 groups of civil servants specialized in LA (judges and lawyers), the development of 2 global computers applications to help these 2 groups in their work, and the creation of a classification and codification of all types of cases judged each year around the world], allows us to share some important costs, to minimize other costs, to mitigate the overall LA spending [in resolving all the problem of the actual LA system in France], and even to impute the cost to the loosing party more easily. The Security Council will come to the same conclusion if it studies in details the LA problems, the solutions to resolve them presented in my 2 requests to ECHR (and at [Exh. 14](#)), and the accusations of *crime against humanity* made against some French high officials. And it will also appreciate the other advantages **that such a solution** brings us (a) to maintain international peace and security, (b) *to fight organized and transnational crime and terrorism*, (c) to improve our justice (international and national) information systems and the functioning of justice systems, (d) to decrease unsolicited immigration (diminution of the number of displaced people and of refugees) ... [see my OHCHR 2019 application ([Exh. 12, no 3](#))].

***20.1 Experts from the United kingdom may accept to share their LA system experience with the Security Council members and make comments on the proposals and arguments presented here; and I could also go to New York to bring you some more details (if the US gives me a visa to enter).

C The competence of UN Security Council to address the accusations of *crime against humanity* linked to the French LA system problems, and to make recommendations on the LA subject.

1) The Chapter VII of the UN Charter makes the UN Security Council competent.

21. Article 13 of the Rome Statute de Rome (1) allows the UN Security Council to transfer ‘*a situation*’ (for example when a *crime against humanity* is committed) to the ICC prosecutor when *the internal jurisdictions do not want or cannot* render justice ([Exh.29](#)), as it is the case here; and (2) confirms the UN Security Council power described in the Chapter VII of the UN Charter (‘*action en cas de menace contre la paix, de rupture de la paix and d’acte d’agression*’), that mentions in its art. 39 that ‘*The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.*’ (art. 41 ‘*The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.*’).

22. And *the situation* I described, namely the misappropriation of the obligation to provide a lawyer to the poor accused of having committed a crime or a misdemeanor [described at **art. 6.3 c) of the ECHR ...**] to create a LA system that results in the **systematic** destruction of poor rights and liberties, and brings **undue** advantages to politicians, judges, lawyers (...), constitutes *a threat to the peace*, and allows the UN Security Council to intervene. I will therefore explain as briefly as possible (1) why the *situation* I present here constitutes a threat to peace, (2) why the Security Council must transfer **this situation** to the ICC prosecutor to encourage her to launch an inquiry, (3) why the Security Council must **recommend to the UN Member States** to use (a) the new LA system [based on a group of specialized-in-the-judgment-of-LA-requests judges, and a group of specialized-in-LA-missions lawyers ... (**no 11-19**)], (b) the international classification and codification of the types of cases judges every year around the world, and (c) the 2 global Internet applications that I propose to develop.

2) The link between the respect of human rights and maintaining peace makes the unpunished persecution of millions of poor a threat to peace.

23. The **large scale** corruption system put in place by the French high officials to destroy - systematically – the poor rights and liberties and to bring undue advantages to judges, lawyers, politicians (...) is a threat to peace first because of the obvious (and **recognized by the UN**) links (1) between the respect of human rights and maintaining peace, and (2) between the respect of human rights and the diminution of poverty and of inequalities which also has a positive effect on maintaining peace. These links were recognized by the UN and its member states during the conferences organized by the UNGA in May and June 2014 (among others, **no 23.1**), so to leave unpunished the systematic destruction of tens (in not hundreds) of thousands poor rights and liberties – in the so-called country of human rights (France) - constitutes a threat to peace because, among others, it encourages the other countries (some of which are less rich and less advanced) to rob the poor, to increase poverty and inequalities, and to create situations favorable to the emergence of conflicts.

[**23.1** The April 24-25 2014 UNGA debate summary on the theme ‘*Ensuring stable and peaceful Societies*’ mentioned at no 3 ‘**The link between the three pillars of the UN system, namely : peace and security, development and human rights remains more relevant today than ever before. In this context, a holistic approach should be developed to deal with this nexus . There cannot be peace without development or development without peace.** and at no 5 : ‘... inequalities can persist due to weal rule of law ...’. and at no 9 : ‘**It was stressed that corruption is a threat to both good governance and good institution. Many criminal justice systems fall short of human rights and the whole society, especially vulnerable populations.**’].

24. Then, above, we have established that the only efficient mean we have to resolve the French LA system problems were to put in place a new LA system based on the creation of 2 groups of judges and lawyers specialized in LA, and to develop the 2 global Internet applications, and an international classification and codification of all the types of cases judged every year around the world necessary to implement the new LA system in all the countries that want to use it, so the refusal of the French leaders, high judges, lawyers (and other persons concerned) **(a) to admit** the dishonesty and inefficiency of the French LA system, and **(b) to recognize** the grave problems linked to the composition and partiality of the LA offices and to the insufficient lawyers’ remuneration (...); and their dishonest behaviors and efforts to

prevent the fair judgment of my QPC on the LA law or a fair discussion on the LA actual problems ([Exh. 1](#), [Exh. 2](#), [Exh. 0.4](#)), prevent the improvement of LA systems around the world, and constitute also a threat to peace.

3) *The ignored possibilities of the new LA system to fight organized and transnational crime and terrorism, and to decrease unsolicited immigration, are also a threat to peace.*

25. The proposal to develop a new, more efficient and less costly LA system, allowing us to correct all the French LA system flaws, presents also **significant indirect** advantages that will contribute to maintaining international peace and security. Indeed, the creation of an international classification and codification of all types of cases judged every year around the world, and the development of the 2 global Internet applications necessary to implement the new LA system will allow us (1) to improve our international and national justice information systems, (2) to fight more efficiently **organized and transnational crime and terrorism**, and (3) to decrease (a) the number of displaced persons and refugees (which has risen to a record of **80 millions**, according to UN article, [Exh. 24](#)), and, more generally, (b) unsolicited immigration; and these indirect advantages will significantly contribute to maintaining international peace and security, and justify therefore the competence of the UNSC to study the *situation* described here and the proposals I made.

4) *The persecutions I was victim of, including the refusal to analyze and to take into consideration the proposals I presented since 1997, have also affected the efforts to maintain peace.*

26. (a) The destruction of poor rights and liberties, (b) maintaining the corruption system link to the LA in France since 1991, and (c) the persecutions linked that I was victim of in France, have had grave consequences on the maintenance of international peace and security because of the research work I made, and of the proposals I presented to the international community, and that the high-level French officials have prevented me to defend efficiently.

a) **The 1997 proposal to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data at the worldwide level and the strategy to fight more efficiently poverty and to decrease inequalities it put forward.**

27. The proposal I presented in 1997 in a European program to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data at the world wide level [[Exh. 23.1](#), [Exh. 23.2](#), [Exh. 23.3](#)] **put forward a strategy** to defeat poverty (and to diminish inequalities...) more rapidly and more efficiently that is comparable to the one that the 3 economists who won the Nobel Prize in 2019, have proposed (at about the same time), even if I believe that my approach allows us to help a **much greater number** of persons (at the same time) than the one they presented [letters dated 7-2-20 ([Exh. 13, no 12-19](#)), of 2016 ([Exh. 31.2, no 2-24](#)), of 2005, [Exh. 33, p. 6-8](#)]; so the relentlessness against me (between 1998 and 2001...), including **(a) the refusal to give me a job** (at a French administration or to recommend me for one in an IO) to allow me (*i*) to continue my work on this proposal, and (*ii*) to obtain (almost certainly) the EU financing for my research project (judged useful to international organizations; or simply the refusal to finance the project), and **(b) the justice's cheating and the politicians efforts to rob the 1998 judgment for my illegal dismissal in 1993, and even to make me in debt to the French administration for a large amount of money [[Exh. 0.4, no 22, 39-40](#)]**, **prevented** that my approach be put in place at the UN and had (therefore) grave consequences for the international community (some conflicts, **the grave migratory crisis...**, linked to the inappropriate use of the Internet).

[**27.2** The UN Secretariat responded **twice** (on 2-27-03 [Exh. 41](#), on 9-14-16 [Exh. 42](#)) that only the representative of a member state (Ambassador) can present a proposal in order for it to be studied **formally** by the other UN member states, **so France** has an obvious **responsibility** in the fact that my proposals were never **formally** discussed at the UN.].

28. The cost of my research project was slightly above the **250 000 euros limit (313 000 euros, because of my salary**; see EU evaluation and project cost at [Exh. 23.2](#)); and the EU Commission had refused to finance the project (and had put it in the **2nd place of the waiting list**, according to what I was told) because I was an individual, and not an organization (international or others, [Exh. 23.2, p. 2](#)); so all that was needed to resolve the 2 EU commission **obstacles** and to (almost certainly) obtain the EU financing was to give me a job (in an international organization or in a French administration), but M. Strauss-Khan asked one of his employees to send me the addresses of the organisms that help finance businesses creation [!, see his stupid and dishonest response ([Exh. 28](#)); M. Chirac had transmitted ([Exh. 27](#)) the letter I had written to him on 4-30-98 ([Exh. 26](#)) to present the project and the unfair EU decision and to ask him for a job]. M. Strauss-Khan, economy minister in 1998, had, it seems, other things in his mind that the interest of France and of the international community (**no 41**); and he also probably tried to protect the

socialist (and other) politicians of the Department of Essonne who committed travel expenses' frauds [few months later, he was himself forced to quit his job after being indicted in a fictitious employment fraud, among other].

29. The international organizations (including the UN) have therefore lost the **possibility** to obtain (a) an experience in the development of global Internet applications, (b) an international classification and codification of all statistical indicators used in all IOs, and (c) the prototype of a computer system to transfer in real-time statistical data, because France (**M. Strauss-Khan** involved in a fictitious employment fraud ...) did not want to give **a job and justice** to a victim of a very advertised corruption scandal (fictitious employment fraud, travel expenses fraud,) having (a) assumed his unemployment duty very seriously and (b) made an important project proposal supported by numerous international experts (!, **no 27-28**) [or eventually did not want to finance the **250 000 euros project cost**, although I had already spent a lot of money and 5 years working part time to make the proposal]. The refusal to give me a job to realize the project (or eventually to finance the project) **is one the main reasons** why the WGIG (put in place by the UN Secretary General) made inappropriate Internet governance proposals in 2005, and why no progress was made at the UN on the Internet governance issue and on the Internet use.

b) The important arguments justifying the creation of a new IO to govern the Internet, and my proposals to improve the LA systems in all countries that would be interested to use a new LA system.

30. Then in 2005 ([Exh. 33, p. 6-8](#)), 2006 ([Exh. 32, p. 4-5](#)) and 2016 ([Exh. 31.2, no 2-24](#)), I presented several **arguments** justifying the creation of a new international organization (linked to the UN) (i) to govern the Internet and (ii) to facilitate the development of global Internet applications (useful to resolve certain specific global problems), that leave no doubt that *the multistakeholder model of Internet governance* is not a good governance model for the Internet, and that the creation of a new IO is the best Internet governance possible [letters dated 23-8-16 ([Exh. 31.2](#)) and 7-12-17 ([Exh. 10, no 73-79](#))]. For example, *the multistakeholder model of Internet governance* does not allow us: **(1)** to compute (and ask for) the appropriate price to own an Internet site [a price that takes into account the use of the resources and the revenues and profits made with the Internet site]; **(2)** to manage the Internet more efficiently (to calculate and minimize the cost of running the Internet,); **(3)** to develop an efficient and useful Internet information system [[Exh. 31.2, no 2-24](#)]; **(4)** to use efficiently the Internet to resolve our global problems (in developing global Internet applications) and to reach our 2015-2030 objectives (SDG); and **(5) to fight** more efficiently Cyber criminality and the promotion of terrorism on the Internet (...); although an international organization dependent of the UN could do all this well and at a lesser cost ([Exh. 10, no 73-79](#), [Exh. 31.2, no 2-24](#)).

31. The fact that the UN did not use the Internet efficiently starting at the beginning of the years 2000s [including the refusal to develop global Internet applications that would have helped us resolve certain common problems and that would have decreased **the digital gap** ('*la fracture numérique*')], is one of the main causes of the worst migratory crisis that we have known during the last 15 years (and that has reached **80 millions of displaced people**, [Exh. 24](#)) and that has had so grave consequences for everyone in Europe (Brexit, ...), and in the world; and necessarily an important cause of some conflicts we had. Many countries wanted to give the Internet governance to the UN (and, therefore, wanted to create a new Internet IO), but they simply did not (or forgot to) present certain important arguments that justified this proposal, including the arguments I presented; and if France had not behaved so badly toward me and had given me a job in 1998, or had allowed me to defend my arguments (on the Internet governance) in 2005 and 2016 (for example in the context of the UNSG selection process), the UN members states and the US Congress would have had – **at least** – the pertinent information to take their decision.

32. The refusal of the French high officials to take into account my proposals to improve the LA system around the world prevented also that these proposals be studied formally by the UN; and, in this case, the links with the corruption in France is even more obvious because the French politicians lie and cheat (a) to avoid that the important arguments justifying the change of LA architecture, and the development of a new LA system based on specialized-in-LA-aid judges and lawyers be discussed honestly and publicly in France; and (b) to maintain the undue advantages and the systematic destruction of poor rights and liberties. The bad faith and the dishonesty that Mrs. Moutchou and Mr. Gosselin have shown in their LA report ([Exh. 15](#)) to avoid discussing the numerous advantages of switching LA architecture ([Exh. 14, Exh. 0.4, no 9-17](#)), and the bad faith and dishonesty of the judges and politicians who refused to take into account my accusations against the dishonest LA system, and my arguments and proposals to improve it (reqno1, reqno2.), confirm this remark, and help maintain the dishonest LA system and reject my proposals.

c) It is important that the Security Council evaluate the well-founded and the import of the proposals I made (in 1997 and 2016) and of the arguments I presented on the Internet governance to estimate the prejudice suffered.

33. [As we have just seen it,] The evaluation of the **gravity** (a) of the *crime against humanity* linked to the dishonest LA system, and (b) of the prejudice it caused to the international community, must include **an evaluation** of the well-founded and the import of the different proposals I made (in 1997 and 2016), and of **the specific arguments** (on the Internet governance,) I presented and that have not been discussed **formally** and publicly (as the arguments justifying the creation of a new Internet IO, or even the search of the *alternative to market capitalism*); because, among others, it will put forward the **billions** of indirect victims of the *crime against humanity* linked to the LA system. The Security Council has also **an interest** to make the evaluation in the context of the analysis of the *situation* presented here because it will have significant and positive consequences on maintaining international peace and security [and because **refusing to use the technologies and the knowledge we have acquired to improve the living conditions of billions of people on earth** constitutes *a crime against humanity*]. The ECHR (and the ICC) does (do) not have the resources and the competencies that the Security Council has to evaluate the well-founded and the import of these **proposals** even though it would be useful to them also to estimate the prejudice suffered and its gravity.

5) The corruption in France and the dishonest behavior of the *Crédit Agricole*.

34. The destruction of poor rights and liberties and the large scale corruption system linked to the LA system and bringing **undue** advantages to politicians (judges, lawyers,) are not an isolated **incident** (or form of corruption); they are part of the tools [including the fictitious employment frauds, the travel expenses frauds, the false invoice frauds,] that politicians have used – abundantly- during the past 30 years (and are still using) to get rich and to obtain undue advantages for them, their relative (...), and high level government positions (with illegal election campaign financing). Of course, the corruption exists in all the countries (not just in France); and since it takes various forms, has different consequences, and is punished more or less severely (**no 34.1**), it is difficult to determine which countries are the most affected by it, and the gravity of the consequences it has on other countries; but, here, the Security Council has a possibility to measure the impact that the corruption in France has on maintaining peace and on the resolution of other grave global problems.

[34.1 In France, recently, a local politician (M. Balkani) was sentenced twice to several years in jail for corruption and tax fraud, and jailed; then after on month or two, or less, he was freed for health reason, and few weeks later we saw him dancing in the street during the music festival, and talk on television to explain that the justice is politicized (... !), so, for him, we can say that justice is lenient; and, on the contrary, the former president of South Korea, **Mme Park Geun-hye**, was sentenced to **25 years in jail** for corruption (among others, she has obtained **\$60 millions** for 2 of here foundations, it seems); South Korea seems more severe.]

a) **The corruption tools frequently used by the French politicians.**

35. This amount (**\$60 millions, in South Korea**) is important, of course; but if you compare it to the about **5 billions dollars** (according to some) (a) distributed by Elf Aquitaine (in the 80s-90s) to corrupt heads of states (...) in Africa, and (b) given to French politicians, it seems, with President Mitterrand's approval, it seems (almost) ridiculous [Mr. Le Floch-Prigent, the former President of Elf Aquitaine who was sentenced in several different Elf legal cases, explained to the police, I believe, that every year he would meet Mr. Mitterrand, and that he was the one who told him to which persons he had to give money; of course Mr. Mitterrand was already dead, so he could not contradict him (and he was never prosecuted), but if it were true, Mrs. Park Geun-hye's fraud seems to be – in comparison – equivalent to an unpaid parking tickets fraud!]; especially, if we note that, independently from the different large scale scandals we had (like the Elf's one), French politicians were frequently prosecuted *for fictitious employment frauds* [one of the Elf legal cases was fictitious employment fraud, it seems], or *for travel expenses frauds* [like the frauds I was victim of in the Department of Essonne (from 1993 to 2001) and that eventually sent to jail the administration President in which name I was fired and threatened to have problems for the rest of my life if I did not agree to be fired without an appropriate (and in relation to the prejudice I suffered in 1993) dismissal compensation, see explanations at [Exh. 0.4 no 2-39-40](#)].

36. On 6-29-20, it is Mr. Fillon [prime minister from 2007 to 2012, and candidate for *the crime against humanity* prosecutions], who was sentenced to 5 years in jail (including **2 years of steady jail**, and his wife to 3 years) for a **fictitious employment fraud** (which started in the 90s also). M. Sarkozy [lawyer, and candidate for *the crime against humanity* prosecutions], is indicted in 5 different ongoing cases (I believe) including a false invoices fraud to increase by 18 millions euros his 2012 presidential campaign budget. And M. Chirac (his predecessor) has avoided prosecution during 12 years because of the presidential immunity, and at the end of his term, he has eventually been sentenced to years of ineligibility when it did not matter anymore [so we had a president during 12 years who,

because of his delinquent behavior, should never have been allowed to run for office!]. Finally, recently it is Mr. Balladur [prime minister between 1993 and 1995, and candidate for *the crime against humanity prosecutions*], who, with his accomplices, was prosecuted for a corruption case linked to arms sales in the 90; several were sentenced to jail, and M. Balladur must be judged by a special court because of his position as prime minister [but at **91 years old**, it is most improbable that he will go to jail and that the sentence will significant!].

37. I am not going to enumerate all the French political scandals during the past 30 years because there are too many, but you should note that in France it becomes very hard to find a presidential candidate (above 30) who is not already implicated or prosecuted in several legal cases [in 2017, Mrs. Le Pen who arrived 2nd at the presidential election was prosecuted in a fictitious employment fraud at the European parliament ; Mr. Fillon who arrived 3rd was also prosecuted for a fictitious employment fraud (**no 36**); Mr. Mélenchon, who arrived 4th had narrowly escaped prosecution for a travel expense fraud ([Exh. 0.4, no 39-40](#)); and Mr. Sarkozy, who was running in the primary, was prosecuted in 5 different cases (...)]. You understand therefore better why, in such a context, the large scale corruption system linked to the LA law [that causes, among others, the destruction of poor rights and liberties, and allows politicians (...) to escape prosecution against poor victims...] is not an **isolated incident**, but one of the various tools that politicians have (frequently) used during the past 30 years to give themselves and to give to their relatives, friends and others, **undue advantages**, so they do not have any mitigating circumstances, and prosecutions at the ICC are useful at the same time for France, for the international community and for maintaining international peace and security.

b) The Crédit Agricole top managers also participated in the *crime against humanity*.

38. I cannot talk about corruption in France without talking about the Crédit Agricole top managers' behavior in the criminal case that is the basis of my ECHR requests [because, among others, it is in this criminal proceeding that I criticized the LA system in 5 different QPCs]. As explained in my reqno2's annex ([Exh. 0.4 no 38](#)), the CA's top managers in 2011 could not have any criminal responsibilities in the early frauds from 1987 to 2010; and they had a legal obligation to investigate my accusations, and, **implicitly**, to obtain my point of view on their investigation and the one from the justice to make up their independent and fair point of view on the case, but instead they remained silent, let their employees (a) send absurd and dishonest responses to my letters, and (b) **destroy or deliberately loose** the loan file, they committed several misdemeanors, and took advantages of the dishonest LA system, judges and prosecutors to (or perhaps try to) escape their criminal responsibility. This is also a grave problem for the Security Council because the maintenance of peace is linked to the respect of certain *competition* rules at the international level; and here we see that these rules have not been respected and that the CA top managers were protected by the justice and French politicians.

39. About 3 or 4 years ago, perhaps less, the Wells Fargo bank was the 10th bank in the world (**in term of assets**), in front of the CA; then the Wells Fargo was prosecuted by the US justice for a false accounts fraud, and all the members of the Board were forced to resign, **I believe**, as well as the main top managers; and the the Crédit Agricole took its place (as 10th bank in the world in term of assets). You therefore understand the French government interest in robbing me of my chance to obtain justice and in covering the delinquent behavior of the CA top managers [especially when we know that on of the CA top managers (equivalent to deputy GM, M. Musca) was Secretary General of President Sarkozy]; prosecutions against the CA top managers would probably lead to the dismissal of some of them, perhaps some loss of assets (...), and of jobs, as it happened at the Wells Fargo (without talking about the individual possible severe sentences). It is therefore important to request an investigation by the ICC for this reason also; and I believe that some the CA top managers should be also prosecuted (**as accomplice** or for the concealment of the *crime against humanity*).

6) The UN (SG, OHCHR,...) and ECHR silence on this systematic destruction of poor rights and liberties is also a threat to peace that deserves the attention of the Security Council.

40. Before I conclude on this subject of the competency of the Security council, I must mention that the **situation** described here, put also forward, - it seems -, some dysfunction at the UN Secretariat level and perhaps at the ECHR that did not point out the injustices that I denounce here although I gave them the chance to do so several times during the past several years. I have written several times to Mr. Ban Ki-moon between 2013 and 2016, then in 2017 ([Exh. 10](#)) to M. Guterres; and more recently I sent a complaint to Mr. Forst (in the context of his mandate on the situation of human rights defenders) and to Mrs. Bachelet [[Exh. 11](#), see also my OHCHR job application in 2019, [Exh. 12](#)]; and, as explained in my 15-5-20 letter ([Exh. 0.1, no 7-8](#)), I have sent a request at the ECHR denouncing fairly clearly the French LA system problems in 2016 ([Exh. 5](#)) that was judge inadmissible. As you know it, the UN Secretary General talks in the name of the people of the world, and,

in particular, in the name of the most vulnerable among them, and the OHCHR is supposed to protect human rights defenders, so UNSG and the OHCHR should have pointed out the LA problems in France, and this oversight deserves to be studied by the Security Council.

41. France sanctions Russia (with several other European countries), and these sanctions affect the Russian economy and the living conditions of millions its citizens [according to wikipedia, 'the revenues decreased by **10 %** and *poverty has increased*']; it bombs Syria and Libya, among others; all this in the name of great international legal principles, and while it maintained (and maintains) a corruption system to destroy the poor rights and liberties, and it prevented (and prevents) that several proposals, - that could allow us to improve the living conditions of billions of people -, be studied and discussed publicly and **formally** at the UN; and it recommended Mr. Strauss-Kahn for IMF Director General, the only international organization head to be forced to resign after he was arrested for rape in a New York Hotel, it seems or to my knowledge; so apparently, France is much more severe with the other countries politicians (and the poor) than it is with its own politicians.

42. (a) **4 billions people** do not live under the protection of the law [*'an estimated four billion people live outside the protection of the law and those that live at or below the poverty line face institutional, legal and administrative barriers ...'*, background note of the **6th 2014** UN high-level event ']; (b) two (at least) of the richest countries have serious problems with their LA system (France, USA); and (c) **refusing to use the technologies and knowledge** that we have acquired to improve the living conditions of billions of people constitutes a **crime against humanity**; I therefore ask Mr. Putin, Mr. Johnson, Mrs. Merkel, Mrs. Wilmès, and Mr. Ratas to **use** this letter's arguments to ask the other Security Council member states **(1) to organize** (a) a discussion on the **situation** presented here (accusations of *crime against humanity* linked to the maintenance of the dishonest LA system, and the efforts to prevent formal discussion of my proposals at the UN), and **(b) a vote** to transfer *this situation* to ICC, and **(2) to make some recommendations** to improve the LA systems around the world (including encouraging the use of the new La system I propose to develop).

*** **42.1** In response to my 15-5-20 letter ([Exh. 0.1](#)), I received on 5-28-20 a letter from the clerk's office ([Exh. 36](#)) acknowledging the receipt of my 18-3-20 request and giving me its registration number, but the Internet proceeding tracking system at 6-30-20 ([Exh. 40](#)) does not mention the reception of my 4-30-20 observations ([Exh. 3](#), [Exh. 4](#)), and does not give a lot of information. I have also received an acknowledgment of receipt of my letter by the Secretary General cabinet ([Exh. 37](#)), but (according to this email) it seems that they cannot take action on my letter's remarks (or certain of them at least). Finally, concerning my 2nd request of 6-23-20, the post office had forgotten to register my mail on the Internet, so I have asked for the help to the human right commissioner [see my email of 6-25-20, [Exh. 38](#)], so that Strasbourg's post office update the Internet mail tracking system starting in Strasbourg; and it was done, and it seems that the request was delivered on 6-29-20 ([Exh. 39](#)), but, **after 3 weeks**, I still did not receive the paper acknowledgment of receipt of my registered mail; and I do not know if a new request number will be assigned, or if it will be registered under the number of the first request, and on its proceeding tracking system [at this day, it is not the case, [Exh. 40.1](#)].

42.2 I do not think that (a) the analysis of the *situation* presented here by the Security Council and (b) an inquiry by the ICC are incompatible with the study of my 2 requests on the LA subject by ECHR; **on the contrary**, the ICC and ECHR have complementary roles, one (the ECHR) imputes a collective responsibility, and can ask a country to abrogate a law, I believe; and the other, the ICC, imputes criminal individual responsibilities. And as I mentioned it above, the Security Council has (1) **some competencies** and **resources** that the ECHR and the ICC do not have to evaluate the well-founded and the import of my proposals, and (2) **powers** to make **recommendations** to UN member states that the ECHR and the ICC do not have. So I hope that this letter will not affect negatively the ECHR position on my request. I made the best I could to write my 2 requests, and I believe that ECHR could already send these 2 request to France because they address a general problem independent from the problems that I will present in my other requests on the merits of my criminal proceeding, but the ECHR work (or an unmotivated decision like the one of 2016) does not prevent the Security Council to study *the situation* presented here, I believe. ***

D Conclusion.

43. My requests against France dated 18-3-20 and 23-6-20 denouncing (a) the dishonesty (unconstitutionality) of the LA law, (b) the systematic destruction of poor rights and liberties since 1991, (c) the undue advantages that the LA law brings to politicians, judges, lawyers (...), and (d) the efforts made by politicians, judges, lawyers, and managers of administrations and businesses concerned to maintain the dishonest LA system, put forward (1) the commission of a *crime against humanity* by some French high level officials (among others), and (2) **a situation** that constitutes a threat to peace, and that can be transferred to the CPI by the Security Council according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and article 13 of the Rome

Statute (no 2-4, 21-22). Moreover, Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to make recommendations to UN member states to maintain international peace and security, as for example, to recommend the use of the new LA system (...) I propose to develop (no 11-20).

44. Above at no 5-10, I made an estimate of the number of LA problems' victims [88 000 victims since 2000]; and I underlined **(1) that the LA problems** caused the systematic destruction of poor rights and liberties guaranteed by articles 2 (right to life), 3 (rights to be free of torture...), 4 (right to be free of slavery...), 5 (right to freedom), 6, 7, 8, 13, among others (no 9-10), and therefore that the prejudices suffered are serious; **(2) that the victims** (who are vulnerable) cannot defend themselves against such a large scale fraud or organize themselves to sue the persons who are responsible, **(3) that ECHR** (that judges inadmissible about 95% of the requests it receives) corrects only a **very small** number of injustices, and when it does, it compensates only a small part of the prejudice suffered (no 9); and therefore **(4) that the role and intervention** of the Security Council are (particularly) important in such a situation because, among others, the only way to identify the large number of victims is to make a public announcement asking the victims of the LA system to come forward and to describe the injustices they were victim of because of the LA system.

45. Moreover the study of France's LA problems (at no 11-20) allows the Security Council (1) **to analyze** (a) the well-founded of the proposals I made to improve the LA systems around the world [including the development (i) of a **new LA system** more efficient and less costly (based on the creation of a group of specialized in-the-judgment-of-LA-requests judges, and of a group of specialized-in-LA-missions lawyers), (ii) of a **classification and codification** of all types of the cases judged every year around the world; and (iii) of **2 global (Internet) applications** necessary to implement this new system everywhere around the world], and (b) the many indirect advantages they bring to fight *organized and transnational crime* and *terrorism*, to decrease unsolicited immigration, and to resolve **the grave migratory crisis** that we experience at this time and since many years now; and (2) to understand better the import of the other proposals I made, and of the *strategy* that the 1997 proposal put forward to resolve certain of our global problems.

46. Indeed, the *situation* presented here allows (or more exactly *forces*) the Security Council **to look – with a new perspective** – at **(1) the proposal** I made in 1997 to improve the transfer and integration of statistical indicators at the worldwide level and **the strategy** to defeat poverty **faster it put forward** (and that, I believe, is more efficient than the one that the 3 economists, who won the Nobel prize in 2019, presented at about the same time, no 28-29), and **(2) the arguments** I presented [in 2005 (Exh. 33, p. 6-8), 2016 (Exh. 31.2, no 12-24)...] to support the creation of a new International Organization to govern the Internet, and that were not discussed **formally** and publicly (or taken into consideration) by the UN member states, and the US Congress in their decision to transfer the Internet governance to *ICANN* (...) in 2016. The proposals made to improve the LA system worldwide gives a good example of the many benefits that we can gain with the *strategy I presented in 1997* [and more explicitly in 2005 (Exh. 33, p. 6-8)], and the considerable impact such a strategy would have to maintain international peace and security (...), and to achieve the SDG.

47. Above at no 21- 41, I presented several arguments confirming **(1)** that the *situation* presented here **constitutes** a threat to peace, and **(2)** the competency of the UN Security Council according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including (a) the link between human rights and maintaining international peace and security (no 23-24), (b) the possibilities of the new LA system to fight *organized and transnational crime*, and terrorism, and to decrease unsolicited immigration (no 25), (c) the persecutions I was victim of and that prevented the detailed and formal study of my proposals (from 1997 and 2016) and of my arguments on Internet governance presented to the international community (no 26-33), (d) the generalized corruption in France and the dishonest behavior of the *Crédit Agricole* leaders (no 34-39), (e) the silence of the UN Secretariat, of the OHCHR and of the CEDH on the LA problems described here (no 40-41). It is important to note that the evaluation of my different proposals puts forward billions of indirect victims of the *crime against humanity* linked to the LA problems, allows a more precise estimate of the prejudice's gravity caused by *this crime*, and confirms the ICC competency.

48. Finally, as seen above, (a) **4 billions people** around the world do not live under the protection of the law (no 42), (b) at least two of the richest countries in the world (France and the US, no 11-11.1) have serious problems with their LA systems, and (c) **refusing to use the technologies and the knowledge** we have acquired to improve the lives of billions of people around the world constitutes **a crime against humanity**, so the subjects discussed here [(a) the dishonesty of the French LA system, (b) the commission of the *crime against humanity*

by some French high officials, and (c) the possibilities (and the solutions) to improve the LA systems around the world] are of a critical importance for the world, and justify that Mr. Putin, Mr. Johnson, Mrs. Merkel, Mrs. Wilmès, and Mr. Ratas (and their foreign ministers) (1) **study personally the situation** presented here, and (2) **demand** to the other heads of states or of governments whose countries are members of the UN Security Council (a) **to vote the transfer** of this *situation* to the ICC, and (b) **to make recommendations** to improve the LA systems around the world (a French *вето* is always possible, but it would be contrary to the general rule in France that commands judges to withdraw from a case in which they cannot have an impartial position).

49. Of course, all the new elements I brought in this letter confirm the well-founded of the conclusions of my 15-5-20 letter (Exh. 0.1), so I hope that the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers members will take them into consideration in their analysis of *the situation* I had started to describe on 15-5-20, and that they will discuss them with their colleagues from the governments and parliaments of countries they represent, and publicly; and that they will encourage also the countries part of the UN Security Council (a) **to vote** the transfer of the *situation* to the ICC, and (b) **to make the recommendations** to improve the LA system around the world that I propose. The *European Commission and the European Council* have both been created to, among others, encourage cooperation between countries and, through this cooperation, to facilitate the resolution of complex problems, so they both could show the example to other countries in supporting the use of the solutions I proposed here.

50. I noticed that most of the Parliamentary Assembly members preferred to work (and to read) in English, so I have translated the French version of my letter in English; and I will send the English version to those who prefer reading in English. I would be grateful to you if you could forward either version of the letter to your colleagues (members of the Committee of Ministers and of the Parliamentary Assembly) that I could not contact because of their large number. Thanking you in advance for the interest you will show to this letter, I remain

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Geneviev

PS.: If you have some difficulties to access some of the exhibits through the Internet links, please let me know, and I will forward you the PDF version of the document by email. I had very little time to translate the letter in English, so I hope you will forgive me for the many imperfections of my translation, and that you will be able to refer to the French version of the letter in case of serious errors.

Exhibits (Internet links only).

- Exh. 0.1 : Lettre du 15-5-20, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/let-Co-EU-CEDH-reqvsFR-15-5-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 0.2 : Lettre au greffier du 23-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/let-gref-CEDH-scanned-23-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 0.3 : Formulaire de requête (14 p.) du 23-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/reqno2-art-17-cedh-vsFR-23-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 0.4 : Annexe du formulaire (20 p.) du 23-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/Annex-reqno2-art17-CEDH-23-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 1 : Requête envoyé le 19-3-20, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/req-cedh-vs-france-18-3-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 2 : Annexe à la requête du 19-3-20, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/annex-formulaire-CEDH-18-3-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 3 : Observations sur la recevabilité et le fond du 30-4-20, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/obs-rec-fond-reqno1-CEDH-30-4-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 4 : Lettre envoyant les observations 30-4-20, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/let-fax-receva-CEDH-30-4-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 5 : Requête de 2016, plus décision, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/req-cedh-vs-fra-et-dec-8-6-16.pdf>].
- Exh. 6 : Requête de 2012, plus décision, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/req-cedh-vs-fra-et-dec-2012.pdf>].
- Exh. 7 : Requête de 2001, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/requeteCEDH-30-3-01.pdf>].
- Exh. 8 : Réponse au greffier de 2001, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/Rep1-gref-CEDH-9-5-01.pdf>].
- Exh. 9 : 2ème Réponse au greffier de 2001, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/Rep2-gref-CEDH-29-5-01.pdf>].
- Exh. 10 : Lettre à l'ONU (...) du 12-8-17, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/let-ung-unga-usa-uni-8-12-17.pdf>].
- Exh. 11 : Lettre du 30-3-19 à M. Macron (...); [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/let-pres-parl-bachelet-30-3-19.pdf>].
- Exh. 12 : Application for the ASG for HR position, 16-8-19, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/asn-HCHR-appli-8-16-19.pdf>].
- Exh. 13 : Lettre au President de Clemson University, 2-7-20, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/let-dr-Clements-7-2-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 14 : Brouillon de mes remarques sur rapport Moutchou, 8-11-19, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rem-23-7-19-rap-AJ-8-11-19-draft.pdf>].
- Exh. 15 : Rapport de Mme Moutchou et M. Gosselin, 7-23-19, [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rap-AJ-Moutchou-23-7-19.pdf>].
- Exh. 16 : Rapport du Député Le Bouillonnet 2014; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rapport-AJ-lebouillonnet-9-2014.pdf>].
- Exh. 17 : Rapport des Sénateurs Joissains et Mézard 2014; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rapport-AJ-joissains-7-2014.pdf>].
- Exh. 18 : Rapport de la mission MAP 2013; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rapport-AJ-MAP-11-2013.pdf>].
- Exh. 19 : Rapport des députés Gosselin et Pau-Langevin 2011; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rapport-AJ-gosselin-4-2011.pdf>].
- Exh. 20 : Rapport Darrois 2009; [<http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/rapport-AJ-darrois-3-2009.pdf>].

- Exh. 21 : Rapport du Sénateur du Luart 2007; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/rapportduluart.pdf>].
- Exh. 22 : Rapport Bouchet 2001; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/rapport-AJ-bouchet-5-2001.pdf>].
- Exh. 23 : INCO Copernicus program proposal 1997 (31 p., 23.1), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/incoproposal7-1-11.pdf>].
EU commission evaluation and letters of interest (20 p., 23.2) , [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/incoproandletsup1.pdf>]
and (23.3) [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/incoletsup2.pdf>].
- Exh. 24 : Article sur les 80 M. de personnes déplacées du 20-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/un-80-M-refugee-20-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 25 : Art. sur les poursuites contre le Président du Kosovo 25-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/CPI-crim-uma-c-pre-kosovo-25-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 26 : Lettre envoyée à M. Chirac le 30-4-98 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-a-chirac-30-4-98.pdf>]. ,
- Exh. 27 : Réponse de M. Chirac du 18-5-98 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/pdf/letChirac.pdf>] , ,
- Exh. 28 : Réponse de M. Strauss-kahn du 24-7-98 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/pdf/letmineco-7-24-98.pdf>] , ,
- Exh. 29 : Article de recherche UNSC-CPI de 2011 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/interact-CPI-UNSC-resea-art-2011.pdf>].
- Exh. 30 : UNSG application dated 4-11-16, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/UN-cand-UNSG-11-4-16.pdf>].
Vision statement (3.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/vision-8-4-16.pdf>].
- Exh. 31 : Letter addressed to the UN, 23-8-16 (31), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/UN-cand-UNSG-3-23-8-16.pdf>].
Letter addressed to the US congress, 25-8-16 (31.2): [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-us-congress-23-8-16.pdf>].
- Exh. 32 : 1st UNSG application du 6-14-06 . [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf/ungeneralassemb.pdf>].
- Exh. 33 : Lettre envoyée à l'ONU du 11-29-05 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf/uscongress10-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 34 : Lettre envoyée à l'ONU du 1-18-15 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/letunga-7-1-18-15.pdf>].
- Exh. 35 : Article du New York Times 9-12-14 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/art-nytimes-AJ-9-25-14.pdf>].
- Exh. 36 : Lettre de la CEDH envoyant le no de requête, 26-5-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/AR-reqno1-cedh-28-5-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 37 : Accusé réception du cabinet du SG du CO, 25-5-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/rep-cabinet-SG-COE-25-5-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 38 : Email au Commissaire au DH du 25-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/courriel-a-Dunja-Mijatovic-25-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 39 : Suivi Internet de la poste, reqno 2, du 29-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/suivi-int-laposte-reqno2-29-6-20-OK.pdf>].
- Exh. 40 : Suivi Internet de la procédure CEDH, reqno1, 30-6-20 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/suivi-proc-cedh-reqno1-au-30-6-20.pdf>].
- Exh. 41 : Réponse de l'ONU, 27-2-03 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf/repun2-27-03.pdf>].
- Exh. 42 : Réponse de l'ONU, 14-9-16 ; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/rep-UN-14-9-16.pdf>].