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H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, President of the 70th Session of the General Assembly
H.E. Mr. Liu Jieyi, Permanent Representative of China, President of the UN Security Council
H.E. Permanent Representatives of UN member states
Mr. Ban Ki-moon, UNSG
Dr. Srgjan Kerim, Prof. Dr. sc. Vesna Pusić, Dr. Igor Lukšić, Dr. Danilo Türk, Ms. Irina Bokova, Ms. Natalia Gherman, Mr. António Guterres, Ms. Helen Clark, 2016 UNSG Candidates at April 7th 2016.

Copy: Mr. Yukio Takasu, Under-Secretary-General for Management, Ms. Atefeh Riazi CITO, Mr. François Hollande, French President, Mr. Gérard Larcher, Senate President, and Mr. Claude Bartolone, National Assembly President.

Poitiers, April 11th, 2016

Object: My letter to Mr. François Hollande dated 3-17-16 ([exh. 1](#)) asking to be nominated for the post of UN Secretary General; vision statement ([exh. 3](#)) and platform of proposals to help member states achieved their SDG and Paris Agreement objectives; and the illegality (unconstitutionality) of the French legal aid system, a key - intellectual - issue of the 2016 UNSG selection process.

Dear Mr. Lykketoft and Mr. Jieyi,
Dear Permanent Representatives of Member States,
Dear Mr. Ban Ki-moon,
Dear Candidates for the UNSG job,

1. Referring to Mr. Lykketoft's letter dated 2-26-16 ([exh. 0.1](#)) regarding the UNSG selection process and your first meeting between April 12 and 14, I take the liberty of writing you (1) to inform you that I have formally asked Mr. Hollande to be nominated for the post of UNSG on 3-17-16 [please see [exh. 1](#)], (2) to present you my application [short biography ([exh. 2](#)) and vision statement ([exh. 3](#))], and (3) to discuss some of the issues that this application raises.

A My letter addressed to Mr. Hollande asking him to nominate me for the post of UNSG and the purpose of this letter.

2. As you may know, I have **informally** applied for the UNSG post in 2006 ([exh. 5](#)) and in 2011 ([exh. 4](#)) to defend the platform of proposals to eradicate poverty I had presented in 2005 ([exh. 8](#)); at the time I was refugee in the US, see my 2004-2005 **refugee** EA card, [exh. 44](#)); and the proposals I defended at the time are even more pertinent today, I believe. For **example**, (1) the creation of a **new IO for the Internet** that would perform the Internet functions of ICANN, IANA, IAB, registries, registrars (...), and that would be responsible for the development and maintenance of specific global computer applications that can be used by various countries to resolve some specific problems, among other duties, **is even more necessary and urgent today** (to help member states achieve their SDG and climate change related objectives); and (2) the development of a **new legal aid system** that could be used by many different countries as well as the global computer (Internet) applications to support its implementation around the world **is a critical proposal** if we want to eradicate poverty (SDG 1) and to decrease the inequalities (SDG 10). So **I had to** ask M. Hollande to nominate me for the UNSG job **this time** ([exh. 1](#)) to defend my proposals formally and more efficiently in front of you.

3. Of course, I had already informed Mr. Hollande of my work for the International Community much earlier since I sent him several letters **starting in 2013** to describe him (1) the various proposals I presented you over the years [including the 1997 Inco-Copernicus program to improve the transfer and integration of statistical data ([exh. 12.1](#), [exh. 12.2](#), [exh. 12.3](#)); see my letters to Mr. Hollande dated 25-4-13 ([exh. 19](#)), 28-8-13 ([exh. 18](#)), 13-9-13 ([exh. 17](#))], and (2) to point out the dishonesty for the poor (unconstitutionality) of the French legal aid system [letters dated 20-1-16 ([exh. 10](#)), 17-11-14 ([exh. 11](#)), 30-6-14 ([exh. 14](#)), 23-4-14 ([exh. 15](#))]. He never responded to any of my letters, so he may not respond to my recent one, or perhaps he needs more time to think about the application, or he **may**

have forwarded to some of you the letter I sent him – through the Ambassador of France at the UN, Mr. François Delattre, to have your point of view on my application. **If** it is the case, this letter will bring you, I hope, additional information to help you make up your point of view; and **if not**, it will keep you informed on my efforts and, I hope it will convince you **(a)** to encourage France (or any other country, if France does not) to nominate me for the UNSG job, and **(b)** to let me defend my vision and platform **formally** during the UNSG selection process.

B The UNSG selection process, the unwritten rules, and a brief description of my platform of proposals and of my vision statement.

4. My application for the UNSG job is **unusual**, to say the least, because I did not follow the same path as the other candidates, and because, at the time I am writing you, I live with revenues that are below the poverty limit (European standard), and I have basically lived that way for more than 17 years. **Being very poor and unemployed** for so long is not – *at first sight* - the best training one could have to become UNSG, but if you remember that Mr. Mandela spent **27 years in prison** before he eventually became President of South Africa (**not so long ago**), and you think that 27 years in jail is not either the best way to prepare yourself for the presidency of any country, you may agree **(1)** that we do **not** live in a perfect world (and that rich countries are not perfect either), **(2)** that you should keep your mind open, and **(3)** that given the importance of the UNSG selection process for the world, you should give yourself a chance to study **carefully** my application and the special issues it raises.

1) Why it is important that the permanent members of the UN Security Council present a candidate and platform of proposals to resolve our global problems.

5. First, as you know there is an unwritten rule which says that permanent members of the UN Security Council should not be able to present candidates, and as I explained it to you already in my 2011 informal application ([exh. 3](#)), I believe that this is a bad rule for the UN and for the world, and, that **at least one** of these 5 countries should present a candidate and proposals to improve the situation of the world when possible. In my letter to Mr. Hollande ([exh. 1](#)), I mentioned the example of the selection processes for the Olympic Games and the Soccer World Cup during which various countries **mobilize resources and talents** to prepare and defend their candidacy, and where the selected country builds some infrastructures to host the event that will stay in place many years and benefit the people of the country (like Olympic village, stadium, etc.), and I regretted that the very advanced countries like permanent members of the UN Security Council did not take advantage of the UNSG selection process to do the same, meaning to mobilize resources and talents to prepare and defend solutions to some of our **complex global problems** (like the **complex global technical and organizational problems** I propose to resolve) and to present a candidate that would lead their effort if their proposals are found beneficial to everyone and better for the world than the ones presented by the other countries.

6. Rich and advanced countries (including the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council) have all the resources and talents necessary to think about and to prepare complicated project proposals to resolve some of our global problems, and in particular very complex technical and organizational problems like the ones I propose to resolve [the creation of a new Internet IO, the development and implementation of the alternative to market capitalism, and the development of a new legal aid system that could be used by all the countries that want it with the necessary global computer application to implement it]. In my **1-18-15** letter ([exh. 6, no 63](#)), I underlined one of **Mr. Zinsou** statements made on **4-24-14 on behalf of LCD**, *'the outbreak of violent conflict should be seen as a collective failure of the international community, while the higher responsibility lies on the shoulders of the five permanent members of the security Council*; and if you think that there is some truth to his statement (like me), you can do something about it by encouraging these 5 countries to present **solutions** to our global problems (and a candidate to defend them) **during the UNSG selection process**. I am not asking you to accept everything these 5 countries say or propose, I am just asking that you **encourage** them to think about and then to present (when possible) solutions to our complex global problems. And I believe that supporting my application is a way to do that and to discuss formally this issue publicly and among you, in addition to being good for the world.

2) The question of the competences and the experience necessary for the UNSG post.

7. I have **noticed** the **extraordinary experience** and very serious competences of the 8 (now) candidates who were nominated; and I have read Mr. Lykketoft and Mrs. Powers letter dated **12-15-15** ([exh. 0.2](#)) that invited the presentation of candidates with *'proven leaderships and managerial abilities, extensive*

experience in international relations, and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills', this is why I have spent **several pages** of my **3-17-16** letter (*half of my letter or more,*) to address this issue of the competences and experience necessary for the job, and **to justify** that I have acquired the competences and the experience you require, **even if**, unlike the other candidates, I did not manage a large IO (UNESCO, UNDP.), and I was never a country president, prime minister or minister of foreign affairs. You can read the explanation I have given to Mr. Hollande ([exh. 1](#)), and I will come back briefly on this issue in part D, but before I would like to talk about my vision statement and my proposals to help member states achieve their various objectives.

3) *My vision statement and the strategy and platform of proposals I defend.*

8. I have written the **vision statement** requested by Mr. Lykketoft and the description of the strategy and proposals I defend on the same document ([exh. 3](#)), so that you can have a look at them at (about) the same time you review the other candidates *vision statements*, and in this section I will discuss briefly some aspects of 2 of the proposals I defend.

a) The creation of a new Internet IO.

9. In a French newspaper, the President of ICANN, Mr. Chehadé, explained that the US had accepted to give up its control over the Internet, **only if** the UN did not take up the responsibility of ICANN, and that to hand over the Internet governance to governments (meaning the UN) would be '**a disaster**'. I don't think that giving the Internet governance to the UN would be a *disaster*; on the contrary, it would present many benefits **for the US, for the Internet, and for the world** (see, [exh. 3](#)). Sadly, the UN has **never** presented **to the US** a precise proposal explaining **(1)** why it is important to hand over the Internet governance to the UN, **(2)** what the UN wants to do with the Internet, and **(3)** what would be **the many benefits for the US** (*and for the Internet*) to hand over the Internet governance to the UN. The WGIG could have done it in 2005, I believe, but it presented, instead, four different proposals if I remember correctly. There is only **one optimum** solution for the governance, and this solution **must**: **(1)** assure the US that the Internet will function **better than** it is functioning today (or than it would be functioning if the control was given to the **multistakeholder community**); **(2)** explain how the new Internet IO would be structured, and how it would perform the various tasks of the organizations involved [ICANN (...), registries, (...)]; **(3)** describe the cost benefits for everyone resulting **from the merger** of various organizations; and **(4)** of course, put forward the possibility it would bring to improve significantly our international information system and the situation of the world (and of the US as well). You probably think: '*if he is so smart, why he has not yet presented this wonderful solution?*'

10. There is on the Internet a lot of information already available to prepare this proposal. For example, if you look at the annual reports of the organizations involved, you can obtain the number of employee, the budget..., [Afnic, the French cc TLD, has 80 employees, I believe, Denic has 110...], and **probably** estimate an overall cost for running the Internet and the number of employees needed, and from these estimations derive the saving you could operate and the way the new organization should be organized to handle all its functions properly, etc. But since I returned to France **in 2011**, I had to deal with the harassment of the justice, and the refusal of the government and politicians to respond to my letters, to my proposals, and to my remarks [please see below. And before that, it was the US administration and justice that prevented me to do anything except complain in front of the justice between **2002 and 2011**]. Moreover, it would be better **(1)** if the UN and its members states (other than the US) supported (encouraged) this work, and **(2)** if ICANN (and some representatives of other organizations involved) participated in the preparation of this proposal, even if ICANN does not think very much of the UN (obviously). I could do this job for you, with the help of the UN Secretariat (...), during the next 3 months, so that **the US and 'you'** (UN, member states) can evaluate the pertinence of this proposal (the US has planned to take a decision on ICANN's proposal **in August**, I believe, so we should give them a chance to compare the two proposals). In part E, I will come back on this possibility.

[**11.** It seems that during the negotiation, France and some other countries wanted **to strengthen the role** of governments inside ICANN, but that they did not obtain what they wanted. I am not so surprise and I think that these countries had a wrong approach. What is really important **at first** is what 'we' (countries governments) want to do with the Internet and to have **a clear vision (1)** on how the Internet would work if it was controlled by the UN (members states), and **(2)** on the many benefits that the new organization would bring to the US and to the world; not trying to obtain more control at first (giving the control to the UN **should be the only pertinent solution, by far**). It is a little like a merger and acquisition, we need to convince the US and the other parties involved that our project **is better** and would bring many benefits to them, instead of asking them for the control without giving very much detail of why we want the control or part of the control. It should not be a hostile takeover either].

b) The development of the alternative to market capitalism.

12. In 2005 (exh. 8) and 2006 (exh. 5), I had already discussed the problem of disproportionate salaries and urge you to design a *'new economic (remuneration) system'* that is more compatible with *'our'* political system, democracy, and that remunerates the people (more) in accordance to *their relative contribution to society's progress*, but apart from your effort to create a SD goal dedicated to the decrease of inequalities (no 10), not very much was done during the past 10 years, and the problem is still obvious and grave today [the recent global corruption scandals (FIFA, ...) and even the recent corruption affair at the UN **should encourage you to act in this area**]. I think that some of the reasons why not much was done, are : **first because** finding the alternative to market capitalism is a very **complex** technical problem (**before being a political problem also**); **second because only the UN** can resolve this complex technical problem, with the participation of all the UN members states, **a little like you did to come up with the SDG**; and **third because** to be able to develop this alternative to market capitalism, *'we'* (the UN and its member states) need to improve significantly **our international information system**, and this is possible, only if we create a new Internet IO dedicated (1) to the Internet governance, (2) to the development of global computer applications that will allow us to improve our information system and (3) to the transfer of ICT in poor countries [and of course, the President of ICANN and the persons who want to maintain the *multistakeholder model* for the Internet governance do not even think about that].

13. You have, I believe, a *unique opportunity* to discuss these 3 reasons **during the UNSG selection process** and to decide **to do something** about these disproportionate revenues that cause various serious problems, including corruption [and the many important corruption scandals we have heard about recently]. The creation of **a new Internet IO** and the development and implementation of the **alternative to market capitalism** are **long term projects**, and the *long term visions* (of the candidates) and **the best way to achieve the SDG** are two important subjects that you will discuss with the UNSG candidates between April 12 and 14, and during the first high level event that Mr. Lykketoft has organized the week after, I believe. It is obvious that you want that all the member states can participate in the UNSG selection process and have a chance to discuss with the candidates before the Security Council starts its vote to select the candidate that will be presented to the UNGA, and this is an important step that should also give you a chance, at the same time, **to agree on the various actions** that should be started in 2016 to achieve your various objectives. These actions should include also the proposal linked to the illegality of the French legal aid system, which is, I believe, a **critical intellectual issue** of the 2016 UNSG selection process as we are going to see it now.

C The illegality (unconstitutionality) of the French legal aid system.

14. The issue of the illegality (**unconstitutionality**) of the legal aid system in France is an important **intellectual** issue of the 2016 UNSG selection process **because** : (1) it points out certain grave problems in France [one of the richest countries in the world and **a permanent member of the UN Security Council**] that affect (or may affect) the integrity of the positions France takes in the international arena and that give a bad example to other countries, (2) we cannot achieve our **first goal** (the eradication of poverty) if we do not have an efficient legal aid system [in fact we cannot **either** achieve **goal 16** and **goal 10**, and several other goals, *if we do not have an efficient legal aid system*], and (3) you need to study the pertinence of my critics of the French legal aid system and the well-founded of my related proposal if you want to honestly evaluate the pertinence of my UNSG application and (properly) analyze a **possible** refusal to nominate me from France. But, **first**, you must keep in mind that in France we have laws that force everyone to have a lawyer, even in **most of civil matters**, and the law books state (or admit) that the obligation to have a lawyer is conformed to the Constitution (human rights standard) because we have a legal aid system (LAS), which means implicitly that these obligations to have a lawyer are **not** conformed to the Constitution and that our entire justice system is a fraud **if the LAS is illegal (!)**.

15. Second, you should also remember (1) that the **detailed** critics of the French legal aid system that I have presented you in my **1-18-15** letter (**exh. 6, no 4-23**) and that I have presented to the French politicians and judges (**exh. 11, exh. 23**) are supported by several official reports (from the senate, the députés, ...) during the past 15 years, and by the statistics on poverty that saw the number of poor increase by 1,4 million between 2000 and 2010 (+20% about) while at the same time the 3 richest French men and women have seen their important fortune double about, so they are well-founded; and (2) that France is not the only country to have this type of problem [for example, the US, the richest country in the world also has a very bad legal aid system]. **Finally**, if the UK can spend about **2,5 billion euros** a year for its legal aid system, France, that has about the same

population size, should be able to spend as much as the UK, instead of spending 1/5 as much, or about **400 million euros a year** [I have also described several organizational problems that affect the quality of the lawyers and legal aid offices work], so the problem is not just a matter of money or budget, it is necessarily a serious human problem that necessarily affects the way France act at the International level, and therefore that concerns you.

1) *The 2 decisions of the 'Conseil constitutionnel' on my petition against the legal aid system.*

a) The weak position of the Prime Minister representative and his dishonest change of strategy.

16. As explained in [exh. 6](#), I believe that the legal aid system in France is illegal and very dishonest for the poor for several reasons including the fact that it pays only a fraction of what the lawyer usually asks to his normal clients; and I criticized it in various courts **during the past 18 years** or so [first during my administrative proceeding between 1998 and 2001 in France, and then **at the ECHR in 2001**; and more recently, between 2012 and the end of 2015 at the ECHR again, and in various French courts]. Recently, the Conseil Constitutionnel rendered **2 very dishonest decisions** [[exh. 22](#), [exh. 20](#)] in which it cheated to refuse to rule **on the merits** of my petition, proving at the same time that **the law is illegal**, I believe [my letter dated 1-20-16 ([exh. 10](#)) addressed to M. Hollande (...) and **to the lawyer associations' representatives**, explains in detail why these 2 decisions are very dishonest, but I must come back briefly on this issue]. In front of the constitutional court, the Prime Minister defends the government's positions, **but** the President of France, the Minister concerned by the law (here, the justice minister), and the Presidents of the two Assemblies **can also** give their positions, and, I believe, that, in this case, they **should have** given their positions on this legal aid law **(1)** because the law concerns directly more than 14 million French poor, **(2)** because the illegality of the law has an impact on the integrity of our entire justice system, and **(3)** because, for several years now, the lawyers have been going in the street to complain about the law (the low budget mostly) and several official reports pointed out the problems.

17. In response to my petition (QPC, [exh. 23](#)), the representative of the Prime Minister first argued **on 10-8-15** that the law was conformed to the constitution ([exh. 27](#)) because the 3 articles I criticized did **not determine** the amount of money that is paid to the lawyer who makes the legal aid mission, but this was not true because these 3 articles either give a formula using **two constants** (defined in other decree or law) to compute the amount paid to the lawyer, or they point out directly at a **constant** described in a related decree to give the amount paid in certain proceeding (like a proceeding in front of the supreme courts), so these 3 articles '**determine**' **precisely** the amount paid to the lawyers (!). After I presented my opposition paper on **8-20-15** ([exh. 28](#)), and it appeared obvious that his position was **very weak**, to say the least, he changed his strategy (2 days before the hearing) and asked the '*Conseil*' to judge my petition inadmissible ([exh. 30](#)), which was **very dishonest**, again because the law **concerns 14 million people**, so if it is illegal, **it is better to know it** (!) to avoid continuing to rob millions of poor. The Conseil constitutional also **cheated** to judge the petition inadmissible ([exh. 10.1](#)), when on **10-2-15**, it argued that my petition could be judged inadmissible ([exh. 29](#)) on an **erroneous** ground [it argued that I presented the QPC **after** the Conseil d'Etat had handed a final judgment of my case, but I presented my petition **on 6-9-15** ([exh. 24](#)), **more than 38 days before** the Conseil d'Etat ruled incorrectly on my case ([exh. 34](#))].

b) The treacheries (fraud) of the Conseil Constitutionnel and of the 2 Supreme Courts to prevent a ruling on the merits of my petition (QPC).

18. There is a note from the justice ministry (*circulaire N° CIV/04/10 du 24-2-10*, [exh. 46](#)) saying that when a QPC addresses a **procedural** question, it **must** be ruled on by the courts **before** addressing any other issues on the merits [see no 2.2.2.2 '*l'ordre d'examen des questions*', '1° S'il appartient en principe à la juridiction de respecter l'ordre normal d'examen des questions qui lui sont soumises, il ne doit toutefois pas en résulter un retard dans la transmission de la QPC. **Lorsque la QPC se rapporte à un incident d'instance, une exception de procédure, ou une fin de non-recevoir, elle devra très logiquement être examinée avant le fond de l'affaire**'], so since my QPC was on the unconstitutionality of the legal aid system, which is a **procedural issue** that affects the fairness of the entire proceeding, it **should** have been addressed **first**, but the Conseil d'Etat (and the Court de Cassation before it, as explained in [exh. 6](#) no 37) **cheated** to refuse to rule on the merits of my QPC. After the mandatory 3 months period had passed **on 6-3-15** (without a response on the QPC from the CE), I presented my QPC **directly** to the Conseil constitutionnel ([exh. 24](#)), and, even though they also had **only 3 months** to rule on this kind of petition, they waited **38 days**, the **7-17-15**, to register it ([exh. 25](#)) [just **one day** after, the **7-16-15** when the Conseil d'Etat incorrectly ruled on my primary petition without addressing the QPC issue (!), [exh. 34](#)] and to start the process. And then after the representative of the prime minister ([exh. 27](#)) and me [[exh. 26](#), [exh. 28](#)] presented our observations, the constitutional judges realized that they would have to rule the law unconstitutional, so they decided to cheat and to use the Conseil d'Etat illegal decision [in fact they may even have asked the Conseil d'Etat to render its incorrect

decision, so that they can use it to reject the petition if the prime minister arguments were not sufficient to rule it conform to the constitution !].

19. Moreover, they addressed this inadmissibility issue just 2 days before the hearing ([exh. 29](#)) [I received their letter on Friday evening at 6 PM and was ordered to render my position on Monday before 12 AM ([exh. 31](#)), so if I had gone on weekend I would have lost my chance to respond] and they forbade me to speak at the hearing [because I did not have a lawyer although the QPC was precisely about the fact that the legal aid system was unconstitutional], only the representative of the Prime minister spoke (!). Finally, they ruled on **10-14-15** that the petition was inadmissible with a lie ([exh. 22](#)). By doing so they did not just rob me of my chance to obtain justice against the French administration, and perhaps against the Credit Agricole in my criminal complaint, they also **put the responsibility - on me - (a)** for not judging the legality of this law on the merits and **(b)** for robbing millions of poor (including me), although I have suffered from the dishonesty of this law and I have denounced it since 1999 (!). Again this was possible **only** because the Prime Minister (and its colleagues), the French President, the Justice Minister, and the 2 Presidents of the 2 assemblies let them cheat to continue to rob the millions of poor concerned and me. And I gave the Constitutional court a chance to correct its mistake ([exh. 21](#)) and explained in detail to M. Hollande and the other persons concerned why this **10-14-15** decision was very dishonest ([exh. 10.2](#)), so they had a chance to correct the problem **before** the Constitutional court rendered its 2nd decision ([exh. 20](#)) and also after since I wrote to them again ([exh. 10.1](#)), but they did not.

2) *The dishonest behavior of the French politicians, lawyers, and judges on this issue.*

a) The resignation of Mrs. Taubira, Justice Minister, on 1-28-16.

20. The French politicians, lawyers, and judges have **deliberately** maintained a very **dishonest** legal aid system **during the past 25 years about**, and (several) millions of poor have been victims of this dishonest system over the years [the statistic from the ministry of justice have confirmed that **the poor almost never win in court**, only 0,01 % of the case ruled on lead to a reimbursement of the lawyer's fee by the losing party, so it almost never happens]. In such a context, it is not surprising that the politicians and judges do **not** want to admit **(a)** their mistake and **(b)** the fact that they have knowingly robbed millions of poor **during the past 25 years**, but it is still very dishonest and bad for everyone (and me in particular). The behavior of the politicians is even more dishonest when you know **(1)** that I have written to them **several times** since 2013 to remind them of this problem and of the grave consequences it has on the French poor, on the integrity of our justice system, on the International community, and on my various lawsuits; and **(2)** they never responded, not even the Justice Minister (until 1-28-16, Ms. Taubira). But this situation is **not** unheard of, in my **29-10-15** petition for reconsideration ([exh. 21](#), see no 28), I cited a speech of M. Mazeaud, a former President of the Conseil Constitutionnel, in which he explains that sometimes the politicians (...) know very well that a law is unconstitutional, and that they make sure not to present it to the Constitutional court to avoid the risk that it be ruled unconstitutional and to make sure that the law continues to serve its dishonest purpose.

[20.1 M. Mazeaud states : 'Au demeurant, nul n'ignore que, parfois, c'est précisément parce qu'elles ne sont pas conformes à la constitution que certaines lois ne sont pas déférées au Conseil. En particulier, tel est le cas lorsque l'inconstitutionnalité repose sur un consensus et qu'aucun de ceux qui, en l'état des textes, peuvent saisir le Conseil ne se hasarderait à prendre le risque d'une censure. L'amour du pur droit pèse parfois peu face aux réalités politiques, surtout quand la paix sociale est en cause. Qui voudrait juger l'injure faite à la constitution, lorsque chacun s'en accommode'. ([exh. 21](#), see no 28)]

21. Immediately after I sent my **1-20-16** letter ([exh. 10.1](#)) in which I stressed the particular responsibility of Ms. Taubira, the French Justice Minister, in keeping such dishonest system working, **Mrs. Taubira resigned**. But, the ground she used for her resignation [a disagreement with the Prime Minister and President on the law for the deprivation of nationality for terrorists] **was questionable** because about 2 weeks before her resignation she had stressed **again** publicly (TV,) that she would not resign over this disagreement (!, moreover recently the President abandoned this law, 4 months of debate were lost, and it was predictable !); so I believe that the **main** reason she resigned was because she knew she had committed criminal wrongdoings when she deliberately maintained the legal aid law while knowing it was dishonest for the poor. She let one of her employee (the head of the ministry legal aid office) respond to my **11-17-14** letter ([exh. 11](#)) on **7-10-15** and explain that Mrs. Taubira has no power to declare a law unconstitutional (!, see [exh. 33](#)); this is true, **but she should have** a precise point of view on the subject, especially when someone (a poor) reminds her that the system is unconstitutional and rob

the poor almost all the time, and that it helps cover up the criminal wrongdoings of several parties against who he is complaining [as I did several times when I wrote to her between 2013 and 2015 !)].

b) The responsibility of the other government members and of the President.

22. Moreover, Mrs. Taubira should have given her point of view in writing (informally, and later formally in front of the Conseil constitutionnel) and **never** have let the Prime Minister office and the various highest courts **cheat** to prevent a judgment on the merits of the QPC filed to address this problem as she did [again (a) 14 million poor are directly concerned; (b) the lawyers have been regularly on strike these past few years (and before) to complain about the low LAS budget (...); and (c) the illegality of the law makes her a criminal (!)]. Of course, even if she had a central role in the treachery to prevent a judgment on the merits of the QPC, Mrs. Taubira was **not** the only member of the government responsible. The **Prime Minister**, Mr. Valls, also played a very important role **(1)** because his colleagues presented the government's position on his name, **(2)** because I wrote to him several time also to discuss this problem in 2014, and **(3)** because he and his colleagues knew perfectly well what they were doing (they knew that they were robbing millions of poor, including me). The secretary general of the government, who works directly under the Prime Minister's responsibility, is **the highest rank civil servant** in France (I believe), and the one in post now and since 2014, was, before that, the secretary general of the Constitutional court during 7 years, so he knows how this court works and what it does, and he knew about the importance of the LA law and about the consequences of its unconstitutionality for the justice and for the poor.

23. If France (or any other country) nominates me for the UNSG post, **the press and media** (in France and elsewhere) will **necessarily** discuss this issue of the legal aid law unconstitutionality, and talk about the dishonest behavior of the Prime Minister and his office to prevent a judgment on the merits of this issue, and **there is a chance** that the Prime Minister will **be forced** to resign too. This type of deception and treacheries is a little bit like the recent Volkswagen scandal about the fraud on gazes emissions, so **if it is discussed publicly**, the press and media and others will try to determine who was responsible (or **the most responsible**) for the fraud. Here it is obvious that many people were informed and said nothing [including judges and lawyers....., who did everything to prevent a judgment on the merits on this issue by the Conseil Constitutionnel !], but the government members are necessarily the first persons responsible here. Finally, **in 2013**, when I first wrote to Mr. Hollande (see the **25-4-13 letter**, [exh. 19](#)), I explained to him that if he remained silent on this legal aid issue, he would deceive the French people and rob millions of poor [and also he would not help the world and the other countries who have a similar problem, like the US], but he ignored my letter and the subject, so a public discussion on this issue would probably put Mr. Hollande in a **difficult** situation also because he (and his former Prime minister, Mr. Ayrault, now Foreign affairs minister) has (have) been **formally warned** on the subject and **did nothing** to continue to rob millions of poor, and this **may** also force his resignation or prevent him from running again in 2017.

24. You must also take into consideration the political situation in France, including the fact that Mr. Hollande (and his Prime Minister) has (have) a **low approval rating** (the worst for a president for a long time as explained in [exh. 6](#)), and that he did not resolve the unemployment problem during his 4 years in office, [and even that the situation has worsened in this area] because this situation will not help him if the press and media discuss this legal aid law issue publicly. This special situation **may** or **may not** explain why Mr. Hollande has not responded to my letter and did not nominate me yet, but he and/or his colleagues certainly have thought about it, and **you must also think about it and make sure (1)** that my application for the UNSG is not affected by the fact that I criticized the legal aid law in France and presented a proposal on this subject that is important to help the UN member states achieve their SD goals and **(2)** that France admits the unconstitutionality of its legal aid law and the dishonest behavior of French politicians judges, and lawyers over 25 years, and in particular recently when they cheated to prevent a judgment of my QPC on the merits.

D Why the illegality of the legal aid system is a critical - intellectual - issue of the 2016 UNSG selection process.

1) Having an efficient legal aid system in each country is critical to reach several of our SD goals.

25. Given the role of the UNSG [*The Secretary-General is a symbol of United Nations ideals and a spokesperson for the interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among them' (...)*], you **cannot ignore** – during the UNSG selection process - **(1)** this issue of the illegality of the legal aid system in France, **(2)** the dishonest behavior of French politicians and judges to prevent a judgment on the merits of my

petition (QPC) on this subject by to the Constitutional Court, and (3) the proposal I made to improve the legal aid system everywhere around the world, because the dishonest legal aid system hurts millions of poor in France and many other countries have similar problems. The UN is trying to *eradicate poverty* (objective number 1) and to *build efficient and accessible institutions* including justice systems that work for everyone and in particular for the poor (objective number 16), and many countries need to improve their legal aid system or simply to develop one, so an honest evaluation of the illegality of the French legal aid system and of my proposal to develop a new more efficient system with its supporting computer applications that could be used by all the countries that want it **is a critical – intellectual - issue if we want to** achieve several of our SD goals and to improve the lives of billions of poor around the world.

26. Moreover, '*You*' (the UNSG candidates, potentially the next UNSG, and Mr. Ban Ki-moon) **must** '*speak in the interest of the poor and vulnerable among them*' and therefore you must point out the dishonest behavior of the French politicians and high level judges that hurts millions of poor in France, **unless**, of course, **you have (strong) arguments** that prove that the French LAS is conformed to the human rights standard and that the politicians and judges in France did not behave badly when they prevented a judgment of my QPC on the merits. And if you do have these arguments opposing my critics, you must defend your position publicly so (1) that all the UN member states can evaluate their pertinence properly and also evaluate my competences and my proposals to determine if my UNSG application is pertinent, and (2) that I can comment them also because I know the problem well. When I discuss these subjects with you, I am '*a spokesperson for the interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among them ...*', and I '*also ... speak and act for peace, even at the risk, from time to time, of challenging or disagreeing with those same Member States*', because we all perfectly know the relation between poverty and conflict, and violation of human rights and conflict, and can understand the consequences of the dishonest behavior of France (a permanent member of the UNSC) on these LAS issues for the poor in France and around the world and indirectly for peace.

2) *The evaluation of my critics on the French LA system is critical to evaluate properly my competences and experience for the UNSG job.*

27. To evaluate the pertinence of my critics on the legal aid system in France and of French politicians and judges' behavior on this issue is also important to evaluate my competences and experience for the UNSG job because as soon as I have learned how the legal aid system works in 1999, I denounced its illegality in court and in front of politicians (including the president and prime minister), and they have done **nothing** to change it, although they knew that, in maintaining the system, they would rob millions of poor. In denouncing the dishonesty of the system I have demonstrated a high level of integrity and competences that obviously, the highest rank politicians in France did not have, and still don't have, and that is necessary to be the UNSG. Moreover, the dishonesty of our legal aid system has (had) an impact on my life (has caused some of the difficulties I encountered) and has played an important role in the preparation of some part of **my platform** of proposals to help UN member states achieve their various goals, so if you want to understand my special situation and the well-founded of the reasoning that led me to make you the proposals I defend, and determine the pertinence of my work to help member states achieve their various goals, you need to address this issue in detail.

[28. The **23 years long** work I have done to present you my platform shows you also that I have '*demonstrated commitment over time to the objectives and purposes of the UN*', a necessary quality for the UNSG job for some of you surely, and **justifies your acknowledgment** of the effort that I have done in the interest of the UN (and its member states), in the form of a public discussion of the arguments and proposals I presented to you and, I hope also, **in the form of a nomination to allow me to defend my proposals** properly and publicly. Of course, the evaluation of my vision statement ([exh. 3](#)) and of the rest of my proposals is also important to evaluate my UNSG application and the coherence of the strategy I defend.]

3) *The lack of integrity of French politicians on this LAS issue affects (or may affect) the well-founded of their positions on other international subjects, and Mr. Ban Ki-moon and Mr. Hollande 'zero tolerance' doctrine.*

29. Finally, if the French legal aid law is illegal and my critics on the behavior of politicians and judges to prevent a judgment on the merits of my QPC on this subject are well-founded, then the French politicians have been dishonest on this important (**human rights**) issue, and this should be a problem for 'you' (UN official, members states representatives) because France is a permanent member of the UN security Council with veto power, and because its position on certain international subjects may be affected by the behavior it had on the LA law issue. For example, **someone** who knows that France maintains a dishonest legal aid system to

rob millions of poor and that its government members cheat to prevent a ruling on the merits on this issue from the Constitutional court, **can rightfully question** the position France took in the Ukrainian crisis and the sanctions it imposed on Russia and some Ukrainian officials; and **can easily see** that France could be much more useful to Ukraine (for example to fight corruption,) **(1)** if it explained publicly why its legal aid system is dishonest and how it could improve it and also develop a new system that could be used by many other countries in the world; and **(2)** if it encouraged the countries that have similar problems in this area to embrace the solution it propose or to help design the best solution possible. Sanctions are not necessarily the best way to fight corruption or to encourage countries to respect human rights, especially when those who impose them also violate human rights.

30. Also recently, Mr. Ban Ki-moon and Mr. Hollande talked about '**no impunity**' and '**zero tolerance**' in reference to the allegations of sexual abuses from French troops and UN peacekeepers in Central African Republic; and **it is important of course**, but if, at the same time, France and Mr. Hollande cheat to maintain a law that violates the human rights of millions of poor, then everybody knows that his comment **has no value**, and that he does not apply to himself the critical rules he imposes on others, and it gives a very bad example to other countries. Finally, France has **veto power** on the Security Council, so it can prevent a UNSG candidate from being elected simply because he/she dares to denounce its dishonest behavior on a human rights issue, and some candidates may be tempted not to criticize France on this issue, to avoid a possible veto, although it is a critical issue obviously if we want to eradicate poverty. It is therefore in the interest of all the member states to address this issue during the UNSG selection process to avoid any possible form of pressure or any manipulation of the UNSG selection process. Remember also that there is no good poor and bad poor, the poor in France are not bad poor that we must not help; and the poor in Africa are not good poor that we must help, we must help all the poor. The illegality of the French LAS is therefore without any doubt a **critical - intellectual - issue** of the **2016** UNSG selection process.

D The Financing of my UNSG application, my ongoing legal proceeding, my competence and experience for the UNSG job, and my application for the Director of Information System job.

31. Before I conclude this letter, I would like to talk **(1)** about the financing of my UNSG application because it is particularly important in my situation, **(2)** about my ongoing lawsuits because they will help you understand better the situation I am in now and the money I could receive to finance my application, and **(3)** about my job application **dated 12-17-15** ([exh. 13](#)) for the position of *Director, Information System and Technology* at the UN because, if the UN wants it, **I could be** defending my UNSG application as a UN employee, as Ms. Bokova and Ms. Clark (at least) do.

1) My administrative complaint against the French administration (1998 to 2001, 2011 to 2015).

32. As soon as I arrived in France **in February 2011**, I was forced to complain again against the administration because they refused to pay me the minimum revenue paid by the unemployment agency. The administrative court ruled in my favor ([exh. 45](#)), and recognized that **I was granted refugee status in the US**, but it granted me **only** the right to receive the minimum revenue starting in 2-2011, and **refused** to order the administration to pay me the (minimum) compensation I had asked for [for the trouble I had in France between 1993 and 2001 and that were evidenced by the grant of the refugee status I had obtained in the US], **because I did not have a lawyer**. I could not find one [the lawyer designated to help me withdrew from the case after she was appointed !], so the legal aid law illegality is (one of) **the main issues** of my case against the administration (old one from 1998 to 2001, and new one from 2011 to 2015), and when the Constitutional court refused to study the merits of my petition (QPC, see part C), it deprived me of my chance to obtain justice and the compensation I deserve from the French administration. This is why **if** France recognizes that the legal aid system is unconstitutional **or if you recognize it**, I should be entitled to a significant compensation for the difficulties I encountered in France and, of course, **this money would help me to finance my application for the UNSG post**.

2) My criminal complaint against the Credit Agricole, among other defendants.

a) Description of the proceeding.

33. My criminal complaint against a French bank, Credit Agricole (CA), is also still going on after 4 years of proceeding already; and here also the CA has taken advantage of the dishonest legal aid law since

2011, I believe, so an admission of the illegality of the legal aid law would also help me to obtain justice. Moreover, here the first result of the investigations that I received mainly **on 2-8-16**, have confirmed that the bank committed the criminal statutes violations I alleged, I believe. So, **on 3-1-16**, I have written to the Bank CEO and board's members ([exh. 34](#)) to ask them to admit the commissions of several criminal wrongdoings and to compensate me for the grave prejudice I suffered over a 25 years period, but they have not responded yet. I have already mentioned this lawsuit in my **1-18-15** letter ([exh. 6](#), no 31-38.2), but I still must summarize here the situation and give you some of the new evidences gathered to confirm my good faith and the wrongdoings of the bank. In short, few weeks after I returned from the US **on 2-4-11**, a CA subsidiary sent me a letter ([exh. 40](#)) ordering me to pay the rest of a debt that **they pretend** I did **in 1987** and then refused to pay several times starting **in 1990** (!), so I immediately explained that I had never heard of this bank, and never received any service from it, and that they should send me urgently all the details so that can prove it.

34. It took several months before they finally sent me some details about this debt, and, **on 9-5-11**, I learned that **the contract (a)** was signed on **5-11-87** when I was in the US finishing my master degree (I obtained my degree **on 8-8-87**) and **(b)** contained **obvious lies** since it said that I was living and working in Poitiers when I was obviously living and working in the US at the time; so I explained to the bank top managers **(1)** that a fraud had **necessarily** taken place [and that it **necessarily involved some employees** of the bank who did not verify the veracity of the information they had and who never sent me any demand to pay back the debt **from 1990 to 2001** when I was living in France mostly] and **(2)** that they should admit their wrongdoings and send me all the documents related to this debt including **the contract**, so that I can help them determine exactly what happened, but they did not do it. After they refused to send me the contract, I filed the criminal complaint **on 1-13-12**, but the prosecutor and the police did not do any investigation, and they did not either dismiss my complaint, so I filed a new criminal complaint (PACPC) in front of the investigative judge **on 12-1-12** who has the possibility to force the prosecutor to render a decision, which he did, but only **on 1-5-15** (with more than 3 years delay).

b) The recent results of the investigation and the new proofs of criminal wrongdoings.

35. In his 2015 decision ([exh. 41](#)), the prosecutor asked the judge to investigate **only 2** of the 10 criminal offences I had described in my complaint (he forgot some, and **lied about** some proofs I brought, and ignored some of the legal authorities I presented to reject the others !), so the investigation started in September 2015, and the first results that arrived **in 11-2015 and 2-2016**, confirmed the commission of **criminal wrongdoings**, I believe. For example, the bank admitted to the police that they had the contract **on 9-5-11** when they gave me the details about the debt, and that they **'lost it'** ('not destroyed it') soon after I explained that I could not have done this debt and I filed my criminal complaint, it seems [the bank employee who responded to my letter in June 2013 had told me that they **had destroyed** the contract and other documents – **in accordance to the law** - 10 years after the account was closed **which was necessarily a lie**, and **his lie was confirmed**]. The loss (or destruction) of the contract (and other documents related to the debt) **is a standard proof** of 3 different criminal wrongdoings: **(1) obstruction to justice** [the contract was an obvious proof that I did not do the debt and **sign** the contract]; **(2) concealment** [they could have easily found me between **1990 and 2001** when the debt remained unpaid, but instead they dissimulated their wrongdoings and committed several criminal wrongdoings, and now they take advantages of these criminal wrongdoings against me **to cause me even more trouble**, and this is a criminal wrongdoings, **concealment**], and **(3)** the use of data to cause someone trouble and to attack his honor is also a recent criminal offence described in CP 226-4-11 (see [exh. 34](#), and [exh. 35](#)).

36. It was already obvious in 2011 that the bank employees had behaved badly, and later that they lied in their responses to my letters asking for documents and information, so, **in 2011 and 2012**, I explained to the CEO of the bank and the CEO of its subsidiary **(1)** that their employees who responded in their name and the name of the bank were lying and obstructing justice (among other offences), and **(2)** that **'they'** were criminally liable for the dishonest responses of their colleagues, but they refused to respond personally to me. I finally explained also that the prejudice I was suffering should be calculated on a basis of their salaries (**1,3 million euros for the CEO...**) because they were using their positions to cause me prejudice [and I also eventually wrote to the board of the bank because they still refused to respond], so now the damage I have suffered over the 26 years period is **about 26 million euros**. Here again if the bank admits the wrongdoings and compensate me for the prejudice I suffered, **I will have enough money to finance my UNSG application** and even to pay for some help to prepare in detail some of the proposals I defend, like the creation of a new Internet IO. But if the French government does not recognize that the French legal aid law is illegal, then the bank will know that even with the obvious proofs of wrongdoings I have, it will be difficult for me to obtain justice.

[36.1 Joseph Stiglitz describes in his 2011 book exactly the same types of frauds that I was victim of (loans made without verifying the accuracy of the information on the contract, destruction of archives after the frauds are discovered ...), and he explains that the big US banks know that the poor cannot defend themselves in court against them without the help of the government (!), so I am not exaggerating the difficult situation I am in if the government (the justice) does not help me; and my case is a perfect example of what he describes so far. The proceeding has been going on **for more than 4 years** although there were obvious proofs that I was victim of grave criminal offences from the start, and the case could have been resolved fairly rapidly by **the bank** or by **the prosecutor in 2011-2012**. And the proceeding became even a tool to harass me, to hurt me and to prevent me from finding a job (please see the unmotivated or badly motivated decision from the highest courts presented in the previous paragraph; and see also my recent appeal ([exh. 35](#)) of a very unfair decision rejecting my demand for investigations ([exh. 36.2](#)), and the request for a change of venue [exh. 38](#) and the unmotivated decisions of the Supreme court on this request [exh. 39](#)].

3) *My 12-17-15 application for the post of Director, Information system and technology, at the UN.*

37. Since my platform of proposals puts a **great emphasis** on using the Internet more efficiently, I applied **on 12-17-15** ([exh. 13](#)) for the position of *Director, Information System and Technology* that was (and still is) advertised on the UN site. So if Mr. Yukio Takasu, Under-Secretary-General for Management, Ms. Atefeh Riazi, CITO, and Mr. Ban Ki-moon want it, I could defend my proposals and my UNSG application in front of the UNGA **while being employed at the UN in this position**, as early as May 2016. If the French government refuse (1) to admit that the legal aid system in France is very dishonest for the poor and (2) to compensate me, and at the same time, the Crédit Agricole refuse (3) to admit its faults and to compensate me also, giving me this job would be a way to finance my application for the UNSG post. As seen above, as part of my responsibility in this position, I could (1) prepare the detailed proposal to create a new Internet IO that could be presented (a) to the US while it is studying ICANN proposal, and (b) to you to evaluate its pertinence, and (2) prepare into more detail my other proposal to develop a new and more efficient legal aid system with the necessary computer applications to implement it in every country that wants it, so that you have more precise information to take your decision.

[37.1 Those of you who have read my 2011 informal UNSG application ([exh. 4](#)) (if any) may remember that I was very much in the same position in the US **in 2011** as I am now, because, at the time, I also had several proceedings ongoing, including one in which the LA County had put itself in a default position twice during the proceeding, a situation that entitled me to a about **3 million dollars** compensation, but instead of giving me justice, the US has deported few days after I wrote to you **with a deportation order** full of lies ([exh. 42](#)) stating that I never applied for asylum and never had any permission to remain in the US although I applied for asylum in the US ([exh. 43](#)), and in Switzerland and Belgium before that; these two countries can confirm it, I believe), and I always had an authorization to remain in the US (including refugee EA cards, [exh. 44](#)). So I know from experience that the justice in rich countries, like the US and France, can lie and cheat (and even commit criminal offenses) to hurt a poor and prevent him from finding a job and from obtaining justice; and I hope that you will recognize (1) that I have brought you enough proofs of France wrongdoings, (2) that I have pointed out a grave wrongdoing that affects more than 14 million French poor and many other around world also, and (3) that it is justified that you act to correct the injustice I was victim of, if it becomes necessary (because France refuses to compensate me ...).]

F. Conclusion.

38. After sending you two informal applications for the UNSG job **in 2006 and 2011** while I was refugee in the US, I have **formally** asked Mr. Hollande to nominate me for the UNSG job **on 3-17-16** ([exh. 1](#)), but so far he has not responded to my letter. It may be because he needs more time to decide or it may be for other reasons, I don't know, but I believe it is my duty (1) to inform you of my request to be nominated for the UNSG job, (2) to present you my (possible) application so that you can review it **at about at the same time** you meet for the first time with the other candidates who have already been officially nominated at this date; and (3) to discuss certain issues linked to my application so that, I hope, you encourage France to nominate me for the UNSG job (or another country if France did not want to nominate me for some reasons) to make sure that I can defend my proposals **formally** during the UNSG selection process.

39. I am well aware of the competences and experience requirements for the post, so I have spent several pages of my letter to Mr. Hollande ([exh. 1](#)) to justify the fact that I have acquired the competences and experience you require, and I came back briefly on this issue here also. You will note also that the preparation and presentation of my UNSG application and platform of proposals represent a **23 years long work** (1) that was done sometimes in difficult living conditions since, like many of the 56 million displaced people, I have applied for refugee status and have been bounced back from one country to the other while trying to explain the injustice I had been victim of, before eventually getting the refugee status in the US and

encountering new types of problems there (!); and **(2)** that has '*demonstrated*' my '*commitment over time to the objectives and purposes of the UN*', a necessary quality for the UNSG job for some of you surely.

40. You may also agree that our world is **not yet** perfect and may remember our recent history that saw a man be elected president of a country after spending 27 years in jail, and therefore decide that my special situation (being poor and unemployed for so long) should not stop you from studying carefully my UNSG application and from giving me a chance to defend it formally in front of you and to respond to your questions as the other candidates. In the meantime, I have prepared a *vision statement* ([exh.3](#)) with the information that Mr. Lykketoft wanted, and I have also added the **brief** description of my platform of proposals because I believe that member states should use the opportunity of the UNSG selection process to adopt a general strategy and a set of actions to help them achieve their various goals, and above I have discussed certain subjects that you may find useful to understand the context of my application.

41. The 3 main proposals that I discuss in my vision statement [the creation of a new Internet IO, the development of the alternative to market capitalism, and the development of a new legal aid system that could be implemented in many different countries] would have a significant impact on member states efforts to reach their SDG and Paris Agreement objectives. And the issue of illegality of the French legal aid system I discussed above in part C and D in detail **is a critical - intellectual - issue of the 2016 UNSG selection process** for several reasons : **(1)** the proposal I made to improve the **legal aid systems** everywhere around the world was based on the illegality and flaws of the French legal aid system and the implementation of a more efficient legal aid system in all countries that want it, would have a direct impact on our efforts to achieve **SD goals 1, 10 and 16** (and several other goals).

42. (2) The evaluation of my competences and experience for the UNSG job is dependent of the appreciation you will make of my critics against the LA law and of the behavior of French politicians and judges who maintained the dishonest system to rob the poor during 25 years about, and who recently cheated to prevent a ruling on the merits of my QPC on this subject from the highest French courts. And, finally, **(3)** the role of the UNSG [*The Secretary-General is a symbol of United Nations ideals and a spokesperson for the interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among them* (...)] should encourage 'you' (Mr. Ban Ki-moon, UNSG candidates, and members states) to have a clear point of view on the subject of the illegality of the legal aid system and to discuss publicly this matter to make sure the sad French experience serve the international community and help improving the situation of the poor around the world.

43. In part E, I have addressed the issue of the financing of my UNSG application and the possibility that I defend my UNSG application and my platform of proposals while working as *Director, Information System and Technology*, for the UN if Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Mr. Yukio Takasu, and Ms. Atefeh Riazi want it. For example, I could, as part of my duty in this position, prepare a detailed proposal to create a new Internet IO with the help of the UN Secretariat (and other organizations concerned) and also a more precise proposal to develop a new and more efficient legal aid system between May and July, so that '*you*' (UN members states) can evaluate the pertinence of these two proposals based on precise information and the US can evaluate the Internet proposal before it takes its decision on ICANN recent proposal.

44. As you know it is difficult for me to send a copy of my letter to every one of the UN member states representatives, so I would be grateful to Mr. Lykketoft and Mr. Jieyi if they could make sure that this letter and my *vision statement* is received by every representatives of member states. And, of course, I would be happy to meet you to have a chance to defend my proposals verbally and to respond to your questions.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Geneviev

PS. The PDF version of this letter is at <http://www.pierregeneviev.eu/npdf2/UN-cand-UNSG-11-4-16.pdf>. Please let me know if you cannot access certain documents (with the Internet links), and I will send you a PDF copy by email.

Exhibits.

- Exh. 0.1: Letter from M. Lykketoft dated 2-26-16, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pres-AGNU-25-2-16.pdf>].
Exh. 0.2: Letter from M. Lykketoft and Mrs. Power dated 12-15-16, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pres-AGNU-SC-12-15-16.pdf>].
Exh. 1: Letter to M. Hollande dated 3-17-16, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-Hollande-cand-UN-17-3-16.pdf>].
Exh. 2: Brief biography, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/bio-SG-can-17-3-16.pdf>].
Exh. 3: Vision statement, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/vision-8-4-16.pdf>].
Exh. 4: 2nd UNSG application dated 1-12-11; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/letungaBP-Pre1-12-11-4.pdf>].
Exh. 5: 1st UNSG application dated 6-14-06, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf/ungeneralassemb.pdf>].

Letter to the UNGA and to Mr. Hollande.

- Exh. 6: Letter to the UNGA dated 1-18-15; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/letunga-7-1-18-15.pdf>].
Exh. 7: Letter to the UNGA dated 6-5-14; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/letunga-5-6-14.pdf>].
Exh. 8: Letter to the UNGA dated 11-29-05; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf/uscongress10-20.pdf>].
Exh. 9: Letter to M. Hollande (...) dated 20-1-16; [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pres-pm-err-mat-OPC-2-20-1-16.pdf>].
Exh. 10: Letter to M. Hollande (...) dated 20-1-16 (10.1); [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pres-pm-err-mat-OPC-2-20-1-16.pdf>];
Ma lettre précédente du 23-10-15 (1 p.) (10.2), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pres-pm-rec-err-mat-OPC-23-10-15.pdf>].
Exh. 11: Letter to M. Hollande (...) dated 17-11-14, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/let-pres-pm-etc-7-17-11-14.pdf>].
Exh. 12: Inco-Copernicus Program Proposal 1997 (31 p., 4.1), [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/incoproposal7-1-11.pdf>],
EU Commission evaluation, and letters of interest for the project (20 p.) (4.2) [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/incopropandletsup1.pdf>],
4.3) [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/incoletsup2.pdf>].
Exh. 13: Job application at the UN dated **17-12-15**, [<http://www.pierregenevier.eu/npdf2/UN-cand-Dist-16-12-15.pdf>].
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