GC 815.6. Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by
an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a
particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury
of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty
unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable
diligence to discharge the duty.

CC 1709. One who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him
to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage
which he thereby suffers.
 
 
CC 1710. A deceit, within the meaning of the last section, is either:
 
 1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one
who does not believe it to be true;
 2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who
has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true;
 3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it,
or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead
for want of communication of that fact; or,
 4. A promise, made without any intention of performing it.
 
 
CC 1714.  (a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by
his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or
her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or
herself. The design, distribution, or marketing of firearms and
ammunition is not exempt from the duty to use ordinary care and skill
that is required by this section. The extent of liability in these
cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory Relief.
 (b) It is the intent of the Legislature to abrogate the holdings
in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313, and Coulter v. Superior Court
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 144 and to reinstate the prior judicial
interpretation of this section as it relates to proximate cause for
injuries incurred as a result of furnishing alcoholic beverages to an
intoxicated person, namely that the furnishing of alcoholic
beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries resulting from
intoxication, but rather the consumption of alcoholic beverages is
the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an
intoxicated person.
 (c) No social host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any person
may be held legally accountable for damages suffered by that person,
or for injury to the person or property of, or death of, any third
person, resulting from the consumption of those beverages.