Pierre Genevier
423 E 7th
street (RM 528)
Los Angeles, CA 90014
Ph.: (213) 622-1508
Emails: p_genevier@yahoo.com,
pierre.genevier@laposte.net
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Complaint for damages – Intentional
Misrepresentations (made in the context of the delivery of social services by
public employees guilty of corruption and malice, and involving a risk of
physical harm);
and negligence.
Pierre Genevier
(Plaintiff) |
| No:______________
VS | Complaint For Damages:
|
| [Amount demanded $ 1
060 000
State of California, | Exceeds $25 000]
Department of Social Services (defendant) | Unlimited
Case
Jury Trial Demanded
MPP Stand for Manual of Policies and
Procedures.
The document contains the complaint (28
pages including the list of exhibits) and 4 exhibits (25 pages).
Causes of action.
Deceit (intentional misrepresentations),
and negligence
By Pierre Genevier (plaintiff)
Against The State of California,
Department of Social Services (CADSS).
Plaintiff alleges
1) Defendant
Defendant State of California, Department of Social Services, is,
and all times herein mentioned was, a public entity existing under the laws of
the State of California with its principal place of business in Sacramento,
California. [(CA DSS, 744 P Street, Sacramento, CA 95814) (DSS Los Angeles
office, State Hearing Division, 811 Wilshire Blvd, 11 floor Room 1118, Los
Angeles, CA 90012)]
2) Defendants’ responsibilities.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
(defendants) Judge Mendozza, Judge Castello, and Mr. Robert C. Campbell who
made the representations alleged under section 5,9,13, are the Presiding Judge
of the LA DSS Administrative Court, the Chief Administrative Law Judge of
CADSS, and the Assistant General Counsel of the CADSS, and, at all time of the
making of the representations herein alleged and all times herein mentioned
were acting within the course and scope of their employment and authority for
the defendant California Department of Social Services.
3) Background facts.
3.1_Plaintiff is a
native citizen of France who entered the United States on April 16, 2002, on
the visa waiver program, then applied for political asylum to obtain the
protection guaranteed to refugees (and to obtain indirectly a legal decision
from the US justice that could help him to obtain justice against France). On September 5, 2002, plaintiff applied for
Los Angeles County General Relief benefits, and as part of the application was
directed to the INS office to obtain a verification of his immigration
status. The ‘INS’ status verifier, Mr.
Mahoney, identified plaintiff as a ‘refugee’, which entitled
him to reside in the United States for an indefinite period of time (Exh. 1).
3.2_On September 25, 2002, plaintiff
applied for Refugee Cash Assistance benefits.
And his application was approved, effective the same day, but (1)
certain refugee benefits denied, (2) the cash benefit and Medical
protection were eventually and incorrectly terminated 2 months later on
11/30/02, and (3) the DPSS pretended that the plaintiff was not a
refugee anymore on 12/01/02! The
plaintiff contested the denial and early termination of the benefits, and the
allegations concerning his refugee status in a request for hearing at the
administrative court and obtained an administrative law judge decision mostly
in his favor confirming his refugee status (Exh. 2.2).
3.3_The DPSS refused to comply with Judge
Tolentino’s decision, so plaintiff asked defendants to force the DPSS to comply
but they refused. The plaintiff alleges
that defendants (1) misrepresented the facts, laws and procedures to avoid
asking the DPSS to comply with the administrative law judge decision and to
prevent the payment of the benefits plaintiff was entitled to receive; (2)
were negligent when they did not follow several MPP regulation articles and
procedures, and violated federal statutes (18 USC 1546,); and (3)
obstructed justice when they used an INS altered document to pretend
that plaintiff was not a refugee anymore, and refuse to force the DPSS to
present its critics at he LA Superior Court.
4) Statement of the case.
4.1_This new complaint
follows an initial complaint for money damages for intentional
misrepresentations (filed on February 4 2004) against the US Citizenship and
Immigration Services, the Los Angeles County, DPSS, and the California
Department of Social Services that was removed to the Federal Court that
dismissed with prejudice the claim against the State of California because of
the 11th amendment immunity.
4.2_The appeal court asked
the District Court to change the dismissal with prejudice to give the possibility
to plaintiff to re-file his complaint at the State Court.
Count 1.
Intentional misrepresentation (GC 815.2, 822.2).
Misrepresentations made by Judge Mendoza.
5) On or about May 2 2003 (and before) defendant, Judge Mendoza, pretended (suggested as a
fact) in his letter (exh. 4.1):
5.1_ That the plaintiff had not already contacted the
LACDPSS to discuss the problems of compliance, and that, if the plaintiff did
not agree with the LACDPSS compliance report, the appropriate procedure was to
contact the county.
5.2_ That the ‘INS’ ‘had issued a notice saying that the
plaintiff was not refugee’, and therefore that the altered document
was a reliable document to indicate that the plaintiff refugee status
had been changed; that the appropriate procedure for the county was to
criticize the decision in its compliance report; that if the plaintiff wanted
to dispute this finding (the new INS document), he should contact the ‘INS’,
and therefore that the plaintiff had not already contacted the INS appropriate
office.
6) The representations made by defendant, Judge Mendoza, were in fact false. The true facts were:
6.1_ The plaintiff had already contacted the LACDPSS several
times to complain about their dishonest compliance with the administrative decision
(exh. 2.2). And after these different
contacts with the LACDPSS, the plaintiff had contacted Mr. Ceja from the
compliance unit at the Administrative Court.
Mr. Ceja had inquired about the issues raised by the plaintiff and
presented the documents to Judge Mendoza who had decided to handle the matter
personally.
The regulation does not say that the
victim must contact the county several times to discuss the compliance
problems. In fact, the regulation says
that the county must explain on its compliance report that the plaintiff can
contact the Department if he/she does not agree with the compliance (art
22.078.22 of the MPP), which the LACDPSS did not do of course (see exh. 3.1,
3.2). The regulation also stipulates
that the Department (CADSS) should evaluate the compliance report and produce a
notice or notification explaining, if the compliance is appropriate or not, and
if it is not appropriate what are the appropriate steps that must be taken to
comply fully (art. 22.078.3, 22-078.6 .61, .62 of the MPP).
6.2_ The ‘INS’ did not issue a notice saying that plaintiff did not
have the refugee status [or never terminated the plaintiff refugee status with
8 CFR 209 as required by law]. The status
verifier issued an altered verification of status (same initial
verification of status where the word refugee had been erased and the date of
the plaintiff’s employment authorization had been added exh. 3.3), which is a
crime (the INS Director never terminated plaintiff refugee status with 8 CFR
207.9). Moreover, the LA County should
have presented its new evidence in a rehearing request or in a petition at the
superior court. And the plaintiff had
already contacted the ‘INS’ office of Internal Audit to denounce the employees
misconduct and the fraud on this pretended change of status.
7) When defendant, Judge Mendoza, made these representations, he knew them to be false, because:
7.1_ The plaintiff had explained him and Mr. Ceja that the LACDPSS
refused to comply and even refused to give him the altered document sent
by the ‘INS’; and as Presiding judge, he could not ignore that the regulation
says that the plaintiff can contact the ‘Department’, if he does not agree with
the compliance and that the ‘Department’ must evaluate the compliance and
establish a notice or notification about the compliance to say, if it is or not
appropriate! Especially after
plaintiff reminded him these regulation articles verbally and in writing. He could not ignore also that time is an
important factor (for claimants and) in the regulation since the regulation
gives time limits to counties to perform certain actions (30 day to produce the
compliance report, delay that they did not respect, art.
22.078.2 of MPP,).
7.2_ The defendant could not ignore that the altered verification of
status issued by the same status verifier was not a reliable document on a
matter as important as the change of a refugee status, a matter of life and
death, and was not different than a phone call that his colleague, the Deputy
Presiding Judge, Mr. Tolentino, had judged not trustworthy. He also could not ignore that his deputy,
Judge Tolentino, had confirmed the validity of the initial verification of
status and had ‘certified’, in some way, that the plaintiff had the refugee
status (when he wrote in his decision that the LACDPSS should help the
plaintiff to ‘get the date his asylum was granted’). And he could not ignore that the LA County
should present its new evidence at the superior court.
Finally Judge Mendoza perfectly knew that
the plaintiff had followed the appropriate procedure at the ‘INS’ to denounce
the employees misconduct and the misrepresentation made on his status, because
the plaintiff presented him a copy of the complaint sent to the ‘INS’ office of
internal audit, which proved also that plaintiff had given exactly the same
information about the fraud to the administrative judge and to the ‘INS’ office
of internal audit.
8) Judge Mendoza made these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud
plaintiff and to induce plaintiff (and of course the LAC DPSS) to act in
reliance on these representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the
expectation that plaintiff (and LAC PDSS) would so act. He did not want
plaintiff to obtain the benefits granted by Judge Tolentino, and he wanted that
plaintiff presents a new complaint (on this same issue, the validity of the
initial verification of status listing the plaintiff as a refugee) to win time
and to change Judge Tolentino’s decision without having to follow the appropriate
procedure to cover the errors made by the LACDPSS.
He wanted to hurt the plaintiff as much as
possible by pretending he had not been granted the refugee status (in a
previous meeting he had told the plaintiff:
‘we are going to send you back to France’), and by keeping him in
the street. He also did not want to
write the appropriate notice on the compliance, because he knew he was wrong
and did not want to give a written proof of his dishonesty that plaintiff could
have used in a
court of law.
Misrepresentations made by Judge Castello.
9) On May 28 2003, defendant, Judge Castello made the following representations
(exh. 4.2) to plaintiff:
9.1_ ‘It appears from the information contained in your file, Los
Angeles (LA) has now decided to challenge the designation of your
refugee status as the result of the INS informing them of their initial
mistake.’ and ‘Judge Tolentino initial
determination that you were a refugee,
is not binding on LA County subsequent actions as they relate to
the federal governments re-determination of your refugee status’.
9.2_ ‘A new notice of action (NOA) dated April 2, 2003 mailed to
you confirms that the county has substantially complied with
judge Tolentino’s decision Order…’, and
‘since the NOA states that you are not eligible for the last month of
RCA benefits because of the new INS re-determination of your immigration status
and that you are not eligible for housing assistance, you have the right to
request a new hearing to challenge the county’s representation that the federal
government did indeed change your immigration to a non refugee status, the
judge at the hearing has no authority to modify a federal government
determination.’
9.3_ ‘The county has the burden of proof to submit evidence
to support their determination of your immigration status and the appropriate
regulations and laws that determine your ineligibility for housing assistance
and /or other social services benefits’.
9.4_ ‘The regulations and the order cited by judge Tolentino
correctly state that recipients of RCA benefits are not entitled to homeless
assistance.’
10) The
representations made by defendant, Judge Castello, were in fact false. The true facts were:
10.1_ The LACDPSS had already decided to challenge the
designation of plaintiff refugee status as the result of the ‘INS’ status
verifier informing them over the phone (on December 1 2002) of their
‘pretended’ initial mistake during the first hearing, because the
LACDPSS had presented a note from Mr. Lemons (exh. 2.1) saying that he had
called the INS status verifier who had acknowledged that the refugee status had
been ‘imputed incorrectly’ (meaning the error, if there were really an
error, was not made by the status verifier).
And Judge Tolentino initial determination
that the plaintiff was a refugee, is binding on
LACDPSS ‘subsequent actions as they relate to the federal governments
re-determination of the plaintiff refugee status’, because the LACDPSS had
already made reference to this re-determination of the plaintiff refugee status
during the first hearing (the validity of the initial verification of status
was a compliance issue), because Judge Tolentino (who has the authority to
evaluate the existing documents to determine the status of an alien) had not
given any credit to the phone call made by Mr. Lemons to the status verifier
office, and because the decision states that if the parties want to present new
evidences, they must present them to the rehearing unit or the superior court,
and explain why these evidences were not presented earlier and how they can
change the decision.
Moreover the procedure is not to call ten
times or hundred times the status verifier office to know, if the verification
of status is valid or not, there is a special procedure which allows the
counties to submit a G845S or supplement form to obtain a confirmation of the
validity of the document and additional information like the date a status is
granted, the LACDPSS did not follow this procedure on purpose to steal
plaintiff several months of RCA benefits as we have seen already.
10.2_ The notice of action does not confirm anything, it
only gives a report of the compliance by the county, it is the job of
the Department to confirm or not if the compliance is appropriate. The regulation does not say that it
is OK to comply ‘substantially’, especially when ‘substantially’
incorrectly means not paying 8 months of RCA benefits, and not giving a room
and medical protection to a homeless! In the regulation either the compliance is appropriate or it is
not appropriate.
There has been no re-determination of
plaintiff’s immigration status by the ‘INS’ (see exh. 1.2 plaintiff recent
refugee employment authorization), the ‘INS’ management never gave any response
to the plaintiff’s complaint at the office of Internal Audit and has never
given any document saying that the initial verification was in fact incorrect
(although they had the tool 8 CFR 207.9).
There were only misrepresentations of actual facts that plaintiff
denounced to Judge Tolentino during the first hearing and the Judge has
determined that based on the document he had the initial verification of status
is valid!
If the County does not agree with the
order, it must file a complaint either at the rehearing unit or the superior
court, particularly if it thinks it has as new ‘proof’ (not presented at the
hearing), an altered document.
And the plaintiff has no right for a new hearing on a compliance
issue as the regulation stipulates it art. 22.078.31 of the MPP. The issue of the pretended INS error on the
plaintiff’s status had been discussed during the first hearing and therefore
was a compliance issue.
10.3_ The LACDPSS had the burden of proof to submit
evidences to support their determination of plaintiff immigration status and
the appropriate regulations and laws that determine his ineligibility for
housing assistance and /or other social services benefits. Based on the proofs it presented, the Judge
explained that plaintiff had the refugee status and that the evidences showed
that he was eligible for permanent housing assistance.
10.4_ The decision of Judge Tolentino says on one page that the
plaintiff is not eligible for homeless assistance and the additional 400 $ it
requested, but it also says on the last page that the plaintiff is eligible for
this 400$, so the order does not just state that the plaintiff is not eligible
for this homeless assistance, there is an apparent ‘contradiction’, which is
explainable. The regulation, which says
that a refugee is not eligible for homeless assistance, also says that if the
volag or sponsor is unable or unwilling to provide the refugee benefits, cash
benefit can be granted according to the Calwork standard (art. 69-203.27, 28 of
MPP). Moreover the issue was not just
about the homeless assistance, but also about the permanent housing
assistance.
11) When the defendant, Judge Castello, made these representations (and immediately
after), he knew them to be false, because these issues were precisely the
issues that plaintiff had raised in his complaint about judge Mendoza’s
appreciation of his case and had underlined again in his letter of complaint
dated July 11 2003. Moreover he could
not ignore that the altered document presented by the INS was a fraud
and did not prove anything about the reality of plaintiff refugee status or an
eventual re-determination of plaintiff refugee status (especially after
plaintiff had sent a complaint to the ‘INS’ office of internal audit).
He could not ignore that plaintiff had
followed the appropriate procedure at the ‘INS’, since he had and used (for his
letter, see page 1) a copy of the complaint sent to the ‘INS’ office of
internal audit. If the initial
verification of status had been a mistake, the ‘INS’ office of internal audit
would have mentioned it immediately.
Finally Judge Castello can be considered as an expert in administrative
law and cannot pretend that he does not know the difference between a
compliance issue and a compliance related issue. The plaintiff had stressed this particular point in his letter of
complaint. And he cannot pretend either
that he does not know the appropriate procedure to criticize administrative
decisions since he reminded plaintiff of it at the beginning of his letter
(see exh. 4.2).
12) Judge Castello made these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud
plaintiff and to induce plaintiff (and LAC DPSS) to act in reliance on these
representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the expectation that
plaintiff (LAC DPSS) would so act. He
wanted to use his status of expert in administrative law to try to discourage
plaintiff from denouncing again the outrageous behavior of the LACDPSS and of
Judge Mendoza. He wanted to encourage
plaintiff to present a new complaint at the state hearing division to make him
loose both time and the benefits granted by Judge Tolentino, and to put the
burden of a new complaint on plaintiff who he knew was living in extremely
difficult conditions and could not do it easily.
He used the term ‘substantially’ to try
minimize the fact that the LACDPSS deliberately refused to ‘credit’ the (7)
months of RCA that had been paid already as judge Tolentino had ordered it, and
to pay any permanent housing assistance, which was critical for plaintiff, and to
try to minimize judge Mendoza mistake.
And he promoted the system, which consists (for counties) in criticizing
the decision in the notice of action, compliance report, instead of with the
appropriate procedure, and with the help of the presiding judge and the time,
in having the decision of justice unfairly changed. This system is very dishonest, but seems to be widely used to rob
the poor from the benefits they obtain through the state hearing process, and
to cover the grave errors (or frauds) of counties.
Misrepresentations made by Mr. Campbell.
13) On October 2 2003, defendant, Mr. Campbell, intentionally misrepresented the
important issues raised by plaintiff, intentionally misrepresented the order of
the decision, and intentionally misrepresented the facts. He writes in exh. 4.3:
The facts:
13.1_ ‘In this case though the county apparently did not disagree
with the decision (a) as it understood it and took steps to comply with
it. The Department had no reason to review the county compliance statement in
detail until you first complained. The
process the Department then followed was appropriate (b). The Department did not ignore or change the
decision of the administrative law judge.
The department reviewed the decision to determine if the county
correctly complied with it and its initial determination was that the county
had complied with the provisions of the decision (c). After much effort on your part, the
Department ultimately agreed with your complaint on the issue of whether the
county should have provided Refugee Cash assistance benefits for April
2003. Unfortunately, it took time for
the department to make the correct determination on that issue.’ (exh. 4.3 page
1)
The order of the decision:
13.2_ The number
of RCA months to be paid (d). ’ It appears from your statement
that you believe your are entitled to 8 months of payment in addition to any
aid paid pending that you received prior to the decision. That is not how the
Department interprets the order of the administrative judge. …’, ‘... The county could ‘credit’
meaning subtract, that amount from the eight months in determining how
much you were still to be paid…’ (exh. 4.3 page 2, 3).
13.3_ The permanent
housing assistance and homeless assistance (e). ‘The second
issue concerns your illegibility for homeless assistance…’, ‘the judge is clear
that you are not eligible for homeless assistance…’ (page 3), ‘In
you letter of September 8 you assert that the judge did not state that you were
not eligible for housing assistance. In support …’ ‘ You then quote the order from page 6 of the decision which
state that ‘Los Angeles county shall reevaluate the claimant’s eligibility fro
permanent housing assistance, effective November 21, 2002, and issue such
benefits , as otherwise eligible. You
assert that the judge would not have made such an order if had thought that you
were not eligible for housing assistance…’. (exh. 4.3 page 3)
The issues raised by plaintiff:
13.4_ ‘ You (the plaintiff)
contend that the administrative law judge in his decision determined your
correct immigration status and appear to assert that it can only be changed by
order of the superior court even if the INS has subsequently re-determined your
status (f). The Department views
this issue somewhat differently.’,
‘ it appears that the administrative law judge appropriately refused
to consider testimony from the county at the hearing to show that he INS had
re-determined your refugee status. The testimony was not supported by any
documentary evidence from the INS. However,
that does not mean that the county would be precluded in the future from acting
on reliable documentation (g) from the INS that your status has
changed’. ‘Judge Castello is
correct (h) that only the INS can make the determination concerning the
immigration status…’ (exh. 4.3 page 4).
14) The representations made by defendants, Mr. Campbell, were in fact false. The true facts were:
14.1_The LACDPSS did not agree with the decision (a),
because its first action was to ask plaintiff to present a new verification of
status, although there is a G845S form that allows the county to inquire about
the validity of a document and about the date a status has been granted. Moreover, plaintiff had explained in writing
and at the hearing that the status verifier had told him on November 13 2002
that they could not give him the date his asylum was granted, because the
LACDPSS had to ask for it in writing.
‘The process the Department then
followed’ was not appropriate (b), because plaintiff
first complaint was at the end of March 03 when he contacted Mr. Ceja of
the compliance unit at the administrative court, and because after this first
complaint the Department, the presiding judge (on May 2, exh. 4.1), did not
determine if the compliance was appropriate as the law requires him to do, and
to do rapidly. The ‘time’ is an
important element of the regulation, which is perfectly understandable when one
knows the very difficult condition in which the (poor) victims of administrative
errors may live in. The regulation says
‘upon receipt of the compliance report the Department
must determine if the compliance is appropriate or not’, but it does not
say that the Department must send again the claimant to talk to the county, as
Judge Mendoza did.
The Department’s initial determination was
not that the Department thought the county had complied with the
provisions of the decision (c), because Judge Mendoza never clearly
wrote it (and neither did Judge Castello), au contraire he asked plaintiff to
go back and talk to the county, which means that he knew they were wrong,
so he should have explained the county the appropriate steps to follow to
comply fully with the decision. The
Presiding Judge wrote that the county had sent a report saying that it had
complied with the decision, but this does not means that the Department thinks
that the compliance is appropriate.
Then Judge
Castello, did exactly the same thing, he mentioned that a new notice of action
confirm that the county has ‘substantially’ complied with the judge’s
order. The regulation does not say that
the county must comply ‘substantially’ (especially when the difference
between ‘substantially’ and ‘fully’ or ‘honestly’ is 8 or 7 months of
RCA, a room and medical protection for a homeless), it say that
the county must comply with the decision, and if this compliance is not
correct or complete the Department must explain the county what steps must be
taken to comply (fully). And again the
regulation does not say that the victim must present a new complaint on exactly
the same issue, au contraire, the regulation says exactly the opposite as
already mentioned (art. 22.078.31 of MPP).
So it is obvious that the Presiding judge and the Chief Administrative
Law judge have lied, have used imprecise language, have not done their
compliance evaluation job properly, and have recommended improper steps to be
taken on purpose ‘or intentionally’.
On the order of the
decision.
14. 2_ The
number of RCA months to be paid (d), the true fact is that ‘credit’
does not mean ‘substract’, as Mr. Campbell explains it,
but add. According to the Random House
Dictionary ‘credit’ means: ’10. a sum of money due to a person,
anything valuable standing on the credit side of an account, 13. a deposit or
sum of money against which a person may draw’. And this is very understandable too. The RCA cash assistance of 330$ is
significant, if all the other benefits of the RCA program (like housing
assistance, medical assistance) are given at the same time. If the refugee does not get the housing
assistance, he must pay for a room somewhere, and in LA the cheapest room one
can find is 135$/week, so after paying the hotel for two weeks, he is
again in the street, and has no stability, security, etc. to start his
resettlement in the US (the plaintiff has applied everywhere for
a low cost room, SRO, housing authority, etc., but all his applications were
denied).
Judge Tolentino knew that perfectly, and
he knew that the regulation cannot possibly accept that a refugee be left in
the street when he just has been granted his refugee status (refugees most of the time have to go
through extremely difficult living condition like plaintiff had for years. Moreover a refugee should not have to
complain several times or every two months to the justice to obtain his 8
months of RCA, because while the refugee writes the complaint, he cannot look
for a job, especially if he has to live in the street and carry his bags all
around. And finally these 8 months should
give some perspective to organize the resettlement, it is not ok to give 2 then
5 months, while waiting for the result of a complaint and one month several
months later!
14.3_ The
housing assistance (e). The
second issue is not (or not just) about the homeless assistance, but about permanent
housing assistance. No, Judge
Tolentiono is not clear that ‘you (the plaintiff) are not eligible for
homeless assistance’ (see below).
Yes, the judge would never have written the decision as he did, if he
did not think that plaintiff was not eligible for permanent housing assistance
and for the additional $400 of once in a life time homeless assistance (the LA
County even agrees with plaintiff on this point, because it wrote in its first
notice of action, exh. 2.2, ‘since your permanent status has not been
established, LA county is not able to approve permanent housing
assistance payments…’, meaning a refugee is eligible as Judge Tolentino
suggested it).
Mr. Campbell never mentioned, for example,
that if the judge did write on page 2 and 5 that refugee were not eligible for
homeless assistance (and the remaining 400$ of the once in a lifetime
assistance), he also wrote at the end of the decision on page 6 exactly the
opposite, since he wrote that the plaintiff was eligible to get this
remaining 400 $ homeless assistance.
What should we think? Should we
think that Judge Tolentino, the deputy presiding judge, has a disturb mind, and
this is why on page 2 and 5 he writes something and on page 6 he writes exactly
the opposite? Or should we think that he
has a certain expertise in administrative law, and he is trying to explain a
detail of the regulation to the LA County, and the plaintiff?
The plaintiff explained in his rehearing request that this
apparent ‘contradiction’ can be explained.
At first, plaintiff was not eligible because the initial housing
assistance is usually the responsibility of the volag under the
RCA program (art. 69.203.01). Now if
the volag cannot (or does not want to) help the refugee with housing, he should
not be left in the street, an honest regulation would not allow that, and as
the plaintiff mentioned in his rehearing request, there is an article of the
regulation (art. 69.203.27, 28) that plans for this eventuality and that allows
the counties to pay certain cash assistance to the refugee (the volag did not
pay) according to Calwork standard. So
at first the plaintiff was not eligible for housing assistance, but after the
volag had refused to give him this housing assistance, he became eligible for
the Calwork permanent housing assistance and homeless assistance benefits on
November 21 02 when the problem was addressed.
(This is at least a logical explanation to Judge Tolentino’ decision,
certainly a more honest one than saying it ok to let a refugee sleep in the
street).
On
the issue raised by the plaintiff:
14.4_ It is not just plaintiff who asserts that
only the superior court or the rehearing unit can change the order of the
decision (f), it is also the Chief Administrative Law Judge, Mr.
Castello, in his letter dated May 28 2003.
Moreover, plaintiff does not say that the pretended
re-determination took place after the decision of Judge
Tolentino, since he repeated over and over that the validity of the initial
verification of status was an issue raised in the first hearing, and was
therefore a compliance issue. And again
the ‘INS’ never re-determined the refugee status of plaintiff (with 8 CFR207.9
and instead issued a refugee employment authorization, exh. 1.2). The status verifier presented an altered
document that is all. Mr. Campbell also
knew that asking for social benefits should not affect the alien immigration
status.
‘Acting on reliable
document’ or the reliability of the altered verification of status,
(g), was one of the first issues raised by plaintiff with the authority
to say that an error was made in the July 11 2003 letter (but Mr. Campbell omit to talk about
that). An altered document
presented by the same person who is accused to have done a mistake and did not
recognize his mistake, cannot be considered as a reliable document, and
it is a crime to issue and use an altered immigration (viol. 18 USC 1546,
1512). And this document does not say
that plaintiff’s status has changed, it only says that plaintiff has an
employment authorization, which is true like many or all the refugees have
before they get their permanent resident card.
Judge Castello is not correct that only INS can make a
determination on the plaintiff immigration status (h), because the
plaintiff presented the ‘INS’ internet page on this subject which says ‘what
can states do to verify status before the BCIS issues a final new regulation on
the new verification system’, Answer: The law does not address this issue;
states can decide whether to rely on self certification, document review, or
contacting the BCIS…’.
15) When the defendants made these representations, he knew them to be false, because
plaintiff had underlined all these important points in his letter dated July 11
2003, that Mr. Campbell, Mr. Bolton, and Mrs. Saenz received. Moreover, Mr. Campbell knows he is lying
when he writes: ‘the county apparently did not disagree with the decision as
it understood it…’ (a). If
the order says, help plaintiff get the date his asylum was granted, and the
county asks plaintiff to present a new verification of status, it obviously
disagrees with the order, particularly if it writes on its notice of action
that it is not the county that determines the date the asylum is granted.
The decision never said that it was the
county that determines the date the asylum is granted, it only said that the
county should help the plaintiff get the date his asylum was granted with the
G845 form for example, or with a letter to the ‘INS’ management to have some
clarification about the contradictory information sent by the status verifier
or finally with a petition to the superior court to ask which verification of
status is valid and when the refugee status was granted! Mr. Campbell perfectly knew that the
Department did not follow the appropriate procedure (b), because the
plaintiff had described precisely the article of law referring to the
compliance process, and it was obvious that neither Judge Mendoza nor judge
Castello had written that the county had properly complied since one sent back
the plaintiff toward the county and the other talked about ‘substantial’
compliance (c).
‘Credit’ never means ‘subtract’, Mr.
Campbell perfectly knows that (d), just as he knows that the refugee
should not have to sent a complaint every two months to get his RCA
benefits. And the refugee resettlement
program gives refugees housing assistance (e), cash benefits, and
medical protection, Mr. Cambpell knows that also. Plaintiff had also explained the detail of the housing assistance
issue and of the difficulties he had with the volag in his rehearing request,
so Mr. Campbell who studied the rehearing request could not ignore this point
either and the fact that Judge Tolentino is not ‘clear’ on the
homeless assistance issue.
Mr. Campbell also knew that an altered
verification of status was not a reliable document (g)
(especially when a formal complaint for employee misconduct has been sent to
the appropriate ‘INS’ office), that the pretended re-determination of the
plaintiff refugee status had been discussed during the first hearing and that
Judge Tolentino had not given any credit to this pretended change of status,
and that the LA County should present its new evidence to the superior court or
the rehearing unit (f). And Mr.
Campbell could not ignore the INS directive on the SAVE verification system,
because plaintiff had presented the ‘INS’ internet page on this issue in his
letter dated July 11 2003; he knew that Judge Castello was not correct on this
issue (h).
16) The defendant, Mr. Campbell, made these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud
plaintiff and to induce plaintiff (and LAC DPSS) to act in reliance on these
representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the expectation that
plaintiff (and LAC DPSS) would so act.
Mr. Campbell wanted to cover the dishonest appreciation of the case made
by his two colleagues, Judge Castello, and judge Mendoza, and to cover the many
grave errors made by the LACDPSS. He
says that ‘credit’ means ‘subtract’ to minimize the error made on
plaintiff status (if ‘credit’ means ‘add’, as it does, the CADSS is
stealing 8 months of RCA to plaintiff, a homeless!). He even recommends to plaintiff to present a
petition for judicial review at the superior court, because he knows that this
procedure cannot lead to any compensatory damage and any punitive damage, and
therefore that even if the superior court did give reason to plaintiff, he and
his colleagues would not risk anything or any punition for their dishonest
behavior.
He also knew that plaintiff was in such a
difficult situation that the probability that he presents any complaint for
compensatory damages at the justice was very low, because no lawyer or legal
help association would help anyone that does not have any money on this kind of
case (to prepare this complaint required the plaintiff more than 7 weeks of
work without counting the necessary research time spent on the previous
complaint). Mr. Campbell like his
colleagues wanted to hurt plaintiff as much as they could (and to keep him in
the street with nothing) for having denounced their outrageous behavior toward
him and the poor in general. The
different defendants demonstrated that they absolutely don’t care about what
the regulation says (even when someone brings the exact article that refers to
his case). And if a poor dares to
complain, they steal him/her his/her benefits, and force him/her to complain
over and over, because they know that the time is on their side and that the
claimants don’t have the money or the living condition to complain properly,
and that if they do succeed, they do not risk anything under the normal
complaint process (rehearing and judicial review)!
17) Actual and justifiable actions taken by plaintiff and LACDPSS.
Plaintiff, at the time of the misrepresentations,
had to rely on the CADSS management or governor office capacity to resolve the
problems and therefore he had to send new complaints to the DSS director and to
the governor to try to stop this nonsense.
The governor office ‘recommended’ to plaintiff to present a complaint at
the Commission on Judicial Performance, which he did, but this office refused
to study the complain saying that it did not have the jurisdiction to study the
case. Plaintiff wrote again to the
governor, but no appropriate response was made, so this complaint at the civil
court becomes the only way to obtain justice.
The LAC DPSS
followed the compliance instruction given by the defendant, CA DSS, which
caused plaintiff damages.
18) Damages
18.1 As a proximate result of the
fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged, plaintiff was sent in the
street or forced to change shelters more than 16 times since September 5 2002,
he was forced to sleep in the street several nights, and to live in homeless
shelters for several months with a great risk of catching the tuberculosis or
other serious diseases, of being robed or even being killed (the plaintiff was
threatened to be killed by another homeless for refusing to buy a small bottle
of water for 25 cents!).
18.2 He also was not able to cook or to
store food since 09/2002, and therefore could not nourish himself properly and
suffered health problems on a regular basis; he became sick every month or more
[chronicle
bronchitis, stomach aches, heart problems (chest pain and frequent severe
headaches since 10/04) due to the high stress, etc., a recent blood test
confirmed plaintiff obvious cardiovascular problems and high risk of heart
attack]. And he was forced to complain constantly to
defend his rights and to spend a lot of time writing the complaints and finding
the article of law that referred to his case, and never received a document
confirming that he suffered a grave prejudice in France, by reason of which
plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $1 060 000. Subdivided as follow:
1_ Wage
loss, estimated at $660 000 (from November 02 to now, 33 months) and increasing
by $20 000 (- any salary or benefits
plaintiff may receive) every month until the dispute is resolved.
2_ Loss
of years of life expectancy. Plaintiff
was put in extremely difficult living condition that caused him health problems
and great stress, which means that his life expectancy will be reduced
significantly (according to different statistics the life expectancy of people
who are exposed to great stress, difficult living condition and long
unemployment is greatly lowered). The
damage is $380 000.
3_
‘Psychological’ damage. The damage is
estimated at $20 000.
19) Other elements (malice, oppression, corruption,), liability.
19.1
The aforementioned conduct of the defendant was an intentional
misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to
the defendants with the intention on the part of the defendant or thereby
depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury,
and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust
hardship in conscious disregard of plaintiff’s right and safety.
19.2
Defendants were guilty of corruption and malice, and therefore do not enjoy the
immunity given by GC 822.2 [Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1974) 50 cal App. 3d
401, 404 411, 123 Cal. Rptr. 669], and the CADSS is liable pursuant to 815.2,
and do not enjoy the immunity given by GC 818.8 because the misrepresentation
were made in the context of the delivery of social services [Michael J. V. Los
Angeles County, Dept. Of adoption (app. 2 Dist 1988) 247 Cal. Rptr.. ‘Jopson
v. Feather River Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., [133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506, 507 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003)], and they involved a risk of physical harm [Johnson v. State of
California (1968) 69 cal. 2d 782.., Garcia v. Superior Court (1990) (citing
Johnson; case remanded to permit plaintiff leave to amend complaint to state
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation involving risk of physical
harm…].
19.3 And
because defendants were legal experts they are liable for misrepresentation of
laws [Exceptions. The
rule precluding liability for misrepresentation of law has several
exceptions. An exception also exists
when the party expressing the opinion purports to have (or is reasonably
believe by the other party to have) expert knowledge concerning the matter.’
CAC. of pleading practice].
Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1)
For general damages in the sum of $ 660
000 increasing by $20 000 (- any possible salary or benefit plaintiff may
receive) every month until the dispute is resolved.
2)
For special damages for loss of years of
life expectancy, and psychological damage in the sum of $ 400 000; For Cost of
suits incurred herein; and For such other and further relief as the court may
deem proper.
Count 2. Negligence.
20. Plaintiff repeats and realleges and incorporates by references
the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 19 above with the same force and effect
as if herein set forth.
21. Defendant (State for California, DSS) owed a duty to review
administrative wrongdoings honestly and promptly, and to encourage
social services to comply with administrative decisions, it was created for
this purpose (helping the poor).
22. Defendant (State of California, DSS) owed a duty to act
according to the standard of ordinary care [civ. Code 1714 (a)], and DSS management to supervise and
control the work of its employees. Defendants
must follow and respect the various regulations, procedures, and statutes (MPP,
California Manual of Policies and Procedures, civil and criminal statutes).
23_ The California Supreme Court identified a number of factors
that courts should consider in determining whether or not an exception to the
general duty to exercise ordinary care [Civ. Code 1714(a)] should be made, and
here the facts described in the complaint clearly confirmed that this case is
not an exception. They confirm the
existence of defendants duty (1).
(1)
1_The forseability of harm to plaintiff was obvious; not only the refugee is
matter of life and death, but it is associated with the most basic social
benefits necessary to survive, so it was obvious that by depriving
plaintiff of these basics benefits he would be (physically) hurt and put in
extremely difficult situation even life threatening situation after the many
years of persecution he suffered.
2_The
degree of certainty that plaintiff has been injured is also obvious; plaintiff
has been sent in the street more than 16 times, was forced to sleep in the
street or in indecent shelters for months and could not find an appropriate job
as the result of the negligence.
3_The
connection between the defendants conduct and the injury suffered is also
obvious since the lies on plaintiff status, the violation of the regulation and
state and federal statute resulted in the immediate termination of plaintiff
benefits and created all plaintiff difficulties;
4_The
moral blame attached to defendants conduct is also obvious since it is there
responsibility to prevent such problem the regulation were made precisely to
prevent these problems. And here there
was an obvious intent to deceive plaintiff and to harm injured him in his
business, their conduct was despicable and must be discourage.
5_It
is important to try to prevent future similar harm by pointing out defendants
obvious violations of laws and regulation.
6_The
extend of the burden on the defendants caused by the imposition of a duty to
exercise care is insignificant because again the regulation was made to prevent
these problems and it is the role of the CADSS to review the compliance with
administrative decision.
24. Defendants’ presumption of negligence arises mostly out from
violations of statutes (violation of the regulations, procedures and state and
federal statues). Moreover the harm
resulted from type of occurrences these statutes were designed to prevent, and
plaintiff was a member of class (poor, asylum seekers, refugees) these statutes
were designed to protect.
25. Defendants (Mendoza, Castello, Campbell) were negligent when:
(a)
they misrepresented the facts, the MPP
regulation and procedures, and plaintiff immigration status (viol. GC 822.2),
(b)
they did not follow the MPP regulation,
and refused to force the DPSS to comply with
administrative
law judge Tolentino’s decision or to write a notice stating why the compliance
was correct (MPP art.22.078.3, 22.078.6 –61, 62) and they asked plaintiff to
file a new complaint on a compliance issue, which is forbidden by the MPP
regulation art. 22.078.31;
(c)
they ‘accepted’ and ‘used’
an altered document (altered verification of status) ‘knowing it to be
altered’ to justify that plaintiff refugee status had been
re-determined (viol. 18 USC 1546)
(d)
they interfered in an immigration
proceeding and obstructed justice when they refused to force the DPSS to
criticize administrative law judge Tolentino’s decision in the superior court
as required by civil code 1094.5 (viol. Pc 182, 18 USC 1512).
26._ Defendant management (Bolton, Governor,) were negligent when they refused to addressed
plaintiff case issues, they had the responsibility to encourage their employees
and the DPSS to follow the procedure; and when they referred him to the wrong
authority (commission on judicial performance).
27. As the result of those breaches and negligence from defendants, which were the
proximate causes of Pierre Genevier harm and damages see no. 18.
28. This claim and complaint for negligence are timely for several reasons: (a) According to the
discovery rule the 2 years statue of limitation accrues when plaintiff is aware
of the critical facts; here the critical facts is the issuance by the INS
Nebraska refugee center of plaintiff refugee employment authorization card in
December 15 2004, and for some wrongdoings, the final status of Judge
Tolentino’s decision in February 2004 (less than 2 years from today).
Wherefore, plaintiff prays judgment as follows:
1)
For general damages in the sum of $ 660
000 increasing by $20 000 (- any possible salary or benefit received by
plaintiff every month until the dispute is resolved.
2)
For special damages for loss of years of
life expectancy, and psychological damage in the sum of $ 400 000; for Cost of
suits incurred herein; and for such other and further relief as the court may
deem proper.
By:______________
Pierre Genevier
Verification
I, Pierre Genevier, am the plaintiff in
this action. I have read the foregoing complaint and know the contents
thereof. The same is true of my own
knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information
and belief, and as to those matters, I believe to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the
laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
September 30, 2005.
Exhibits.
Exh. 1: Verification of status listing the plaintiff as a refugee
(1 page double sided), valid refugee employment authorization (1.2, 1 p.).
Exh. 2: Note from Mr.
Lemons (2.1, 1 page), decision of Judge Tolentino dated February 5 2003 (2.2, 6
pages), letter sent by the rehearing unit to confirm the validity of the
decision of Judge Tolentino (2.3, 1 page).
Exh. 3: Notice of action
dated 03/13/03 (3.1, 1 page), notices of action dated 04/02/03 and terminating
GR (3.2, 2 page), altered verification of status sent at the end of March (3.3,
3 pages).
Exh. 4: Letter sent by
Judge Mendoza (4.1, 1 page), letter sent by Judge Castello (4.2, 2 pages), and
letter sent by Mr. Campbell (4.3, 5 pages).