In the
Court of Appeal of the State of California
Second
Appellate District
Pierre Genevier (Plaintiff
and Appellant) |
Appeal Case No.: B 191 039
|
Superior Court No: BC 340 712
VS |
|
State of California, |
Department
of Social Services (Defendant and Respondent)
Appeal
from an Order of Dismissal
of the
Superior Court, County of Los Angeles,
Honorable Judge Morris Jones
________________________________________________
Appellant’s
Opening Brief
________________________________________________
Pierre
GENEVIER
423 East
7th Street, RM 528
Los
Angeles, CA 90014
Ph.:
(213) 622-1508
Emails: p_genevier@yahoo.com,
pierre.genevier@laposte.net
Appellant
pro se
Table
of contents
Page
Introduction
5
Statement of the Case 6
A
Nature of the action and relief sought 6
B Summary of facts 6
C Judgment of the Superior Court and
Statement of Appealability 8
D Standard of review 8
Argument 9
A GC 815.6
imposes a duty on public entity independently
from any
‘eventual’ judicial immunity its employees may enjoy. 9
1)
Legal Standards concerning GC 815.6. 9
2) The statutory basis for the
claim of negligence against the State of California. 10
3) The
Superior Court grave and prejudicial errors.
18
B Mendoza,
Castello, Campbell do not enjoy the
quasi-judicial immunity because their
actions were taken outside of
all jurisdiction and were ministerial in
nature. 18
1) Legal Standards concerning the ‘character’ of the
DSS hearing process
and the
judicial immunity. 18
2)
How and why the exceptions to the judicial immunity applies in this case. 20
3) The
Superior Court grave and prejudicial errors.
28
C State of
California does not enjoy the immunity for misrepresentation
under GC 818.8
because the misrepresentations were made in the context
of delivery of
social services and involved a risk of physical harm. 28
1) The conclusions of the 2nd District Appeal Court
in Michael J. By v. Los Angeles
County Department of Adoption.
29
2)
Johnson v. State (1968) and Jopson v. Feather River.
32
3)
Defendant’s legal authorities. 33
4) The
Superior Court grave and prejudicial error. 35
Conclusion
35
CT stands for Clerk’s Transcript [CT 76
l. 46 = Clerk’s Transcript page 76 line 46]
Table
of authorities
Page
United States constitution / Federal
Statutes
11th Amendment 6,
33
18 USC 1546 8,
16, 17, 22
18 USC 1512 17, 22
18 USC 1513 17
8 CFR 207.9 22
California statutes
CC 1094.5 12, 22
CC 1714 (a) 10, 16
GC 810.6 10, 11, 12
GC 815.2
10, 16
GC 815.6
5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15,
16, 18, 35
GC 818.8
6, 9, 15, 18, 28, 30, 35
GC 821.6 14
GC 822.2 14, 15, 18, 25, 30
PC 182 16, 17
Cases
Butz
v. Economou 438 US 478, 513-514 (1978) 26, 27
Bradford v. State of California
(1975) 36 CA 3d 16, 19,
111
Cr 852. 10, 14
Cleavinger
474 US 193, 200 (1985) 27
Connelly v. State of California
(1970) 3 Cal. App. 3d 744,
84
Cal. Rptr. 257 31, 32
Crocker National Bank v. City and
county of San Francisco (1989)
49
Cal. 3d 881, 264 Cal. Rptr. 139, 782 P2d. 278 8
Grenell
v. City of Hermonsa Beach (1980) 103 Cal. App. 3d. 864 15
Harshbager
v. The City of Colton (1988) 197 Cal. App. 3d 1335 34
Haggis
c. City of LA (2000) 22 C 4th 490, 499’ 11, 16
Page
Hoff
v. Vacaville United School District (1998) 19 Cal 4th ed 925
16
Imen v. Glassford (1988) 201 Cal. App. 3d. 898,
247 Cal. Rptr. 514 19
Johnson v. State of California (1968)
69 cal. 2d 782-800 29, 32
Jopson v. Feather River Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist.,
133
Cal. Rptr. 2d 506, 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 32, 33
Law officesof Dixon R. Howel v. Vally (2005)129 Cal. App. 4th
1076,
1088, 29 Cal. Rppr. 3d 497
8
Masters v. San Bernadino County
Employees Retirement Association
(1995)
32 Cal. App. 4th 30, 42-43
34
Michael J. V. Los Angeles County,
Department of Adoption
(app.
2 Dist 1988) 247 Cal. Rptr. 28,
29, 30, 31, 32
Mireless v. Waco (1991) 502 US 9, 11-12, 112 S. Ct. 286,
116 L. Ed. 2d 9 19
New Alaska Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 896 F. 2d 1298
(9 C. 1989) 19, 25
Page v. City of Montebello, (1980),
112 Cal. App. 3d 658 34
People v. Sims
(1982) 32 Cal. 3d 468,
186 cal Rptr.
77, 651 P 2a 18, 22
Ramos v. Merced County (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 685,
94 Cal. Rptr. 421, 484 P 2d 93
25
State v. Superior Court (Perry) (1984) 150 Cal. 3d 848, 197 Cr 914 9
Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1974)
50 cal App. 3d 401,
123 Cal. Rptr. 669
34
Scott v. Los Angeles County 27 Cal page 145 11, 25
Shore v. Howard N.D. Tex. 1976 4414
F. supp 379 28
United States v. Neustadt (1961) 366 U.S. 696, 711, fn. 26 31, 32
Treatise, law review, and other references
The California Tort Liability
practice book 9, 14, 16
The California form of pleading
and practice 33
The
California Government Code 1-939 book
33
California
Manual of Policy and Procedure 7, 11,
12, 13, 16, 23, 24, 25, 31
Introduction.
In March 2003 appellant asked respondent, California
Department of Social Services (DSS), to force the Los Angeles County Department
of Public Social Services (DPSS) to comply fully with the DSS
administrative law judge decision (CT 37-42) ordering the DPSS to pay several
months of refugee (RCA) benefits to appellant.
In response to this request, the 3 DSS employees mentioned in this
complaint (Judges Mendoza and Castello, and Mr. Campbell) wrote 3 letters (CT
49-56) (a) that covered
up the DPSS effort to steal appellant RCA benefits, (b) that did not
encourage the DPSS to comply fully with the decision, (c) that
did not ask the DPSS to follow the appropriate procedure to criticize it, and (d) (not
least) that even changed the decision (including the certification
that plaintiff is a refugee and the number of months of cash benefits to be
paid,) outside the formal appeal process (rehearing, petition at the
Superior court).
As the result, appellant suffered a very serious
prejudice [since he was sent more than 16 times in the street, could not find a
job, had all the possible problems with his refugee status, and even
eventually became very sick (chest pains,, other cardiovascular problems,) (CT
28)]. He managed to file a
civil lawsuit against the DPSS, USCIS, and DSS for misrepresentation,
and after a long process, a new complaint for misrepresentation and negligence
against the DSS (CT 5-63) is now before you. This Appeal Brief explains that
the Superior Court erred when it dismissed the case on the ground that the DSS
enjoyed the judicial immunity and the immunity for misrepresentation because: first, GC 815.6 imposes a duty on the State of California
independently from any immunity his employees may enjoy; second these
DSS employees do not enjoy the quasi judicial immunity in this particular case
because their actions were taken outside of all jurisdiction and were
ministerial in nature; and finally the immunity for misrepresentation
under GC 818.8 does not apply in this case in the social services area.
Statement of the case.
A Nature of the action and relief
sought.
This is a complaint for
money damages [total $1.060 000 = general damages ( wages loss $660 000
increasing by $20 00 every month) + special damages ($400 000 loss of years of life
expectancy and psychological damages,) (CT 28-29)] for intentional misrepresentations
and negligence against the
California Department of Social Services.
It follows an initial complaint for misrepresentation (only, filed on
February 4 2004) against the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, the
Los Angeles County, DPSS, and the California Department of Social Services that
was removed to the Federal Court and dismissed with prejudice for the claim
against the State of California because of the 11th amendment
immunity (CT 8). The 9 Circ. Appeal
Court eventually asked the District Court to change the dismissal with
prejudice to give appellant the possibility to re-file his complaint at the
State Court (CT 8). This new State
Court complaint was dismissed recently and is now before you.
B Summary of facts.
Appellant is a native citizen of France who
entered the United States on April 16, 2002, on the visa waiver program, then
applied for political asylum to obtain the protection guaranteed to refugees
(and to obtain indirectly a legal decision from the US justice that could help
him to obtain justice against France).
On September 5, 2002, appellant applied for Los Angeles County General
Relief benefits, and as part of the application was directed to the INS office
to obtain a verification of his immigration status (CT 6-7). The ‘INS’ status verifier, Mr. Mahoney,
identified appellant as a ‘refugee’, which entitled him to
reside in the United States for an indefinite period of time (CT 33-34).
On
September 25, 2002, appellant applied for Refugee Cash Assistance benefits, and
his application was approved effective the same day, but: (1)
certain refugee benefits were denied, (2) the cash benefit and Medical
protection were eventually and incorrectly terminated 2 months later on
11/30/02 (CT 7), and (3) the DPSS pretended that appellant was not a
refugee anymore on 12/01/02 (CT 36)!
Appellant contested the denial and early termination of the benefits,
and the allegations concerning his refugee status in a request for
hearing at the administrative court and obtained an administrative law judge
decision mostly in his favor confirming his refugee status (CT37).
The
DPSS refused to comply fully with Judge Tolentino’s decision (see notices of
action, CT 44-46), so appellant asked defendant DSS to force the DPSS to comply
fully, but it refused and
instead its 3 employees mentioned here sent 3 letters (CT 49-56) that changed Judge Tolentino’s
decision outside the formal appeal process.
Appellant alleges that defendants (Mendoza, Castello, Campbell) (1) misrepresented
the facts, laws and procedures to avoid asking the DPSS to comply fully with
the administrative law judge decision and to prevent the payment of the
benefits appellant was entitled to receive (CT 7, 8-27); (2) were
negligent when they did not follow several MPP regulation articles and
procedures, and violated federal statutes (18 USC 1546,) (CT 7, 30-32); and (3)
obstructed justice when they used an INS altered document (CT 47-48) to pretend that appellant was not a
refugee anymore, and when they refused to force the DPSS to present its critics
and the altered verification of status they used to the LA Superior Court (CT
7).
C Judgment of the Superior Court and Statement
of Appealability.
The
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, by the Honorable Judge
Morris Jones, rendered its final order dismissing the complaint with prejudice
on March 3 2006 (CT 185-196); and the notice of ruling was entered on March 7
2006. A motion to set aside the order
of dismissal and to enter another and different order was filed on March 17
2006 (CT 166-199), and denied on April 26 2006 (CT 235). A timely (notice of) appeal was filed on
May 4 2006 (CT 237). The appeal is from a judgment (order) that finally
disposes of all issues between the parties.
D Standard of review.
The standard of review used in this appeal
is ‘independent review’ (or De novo) because:
‘when the facts are undisputed and the only
issues in appeal is the proper interpretation of a statute, the appellate Court
independently review it. [Law Offices of Dixon R. Howell v. Vally (2005) 129
Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1088, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 497 whether statue
requires dismissal of action is questions of statutory interpretation
independently reviewed by appellate court)]’.
Moreover, the question of duty to care in a
negligence case is also reviewed independently [Crocker National Bank v. City and county of San Francisco (1989)
49 Cal. 3d 881, 264 Cal. Rptr. 139, 782 P2d. 278].
Argument.
In its
dismissal order (CT 185-196), the court recognized that (a) the
complaint was timely (CT 190 line
24-27) , and that (b) GC 815.6 imposed liability on a public entity where it may be otherwise immune when 3 conditions are met: (a) existence of an enactment imposing
a mandatory duty; (b) this enactment
intent to protect against the risk of the kind of injury suffered by the
plaintiff; (c) the breach of the
mandatory duty resulted in plaintiff’s injury (CT 193 l. 12-20), but it did not apply the provisions of this
statute (GC 815.6), and instead concluded that defendant, State of California,
enjoyed the judicial immunity of its employees (CT 192 l. 24-27); and (indirectly) was entitled to the immunity
for misrepresentation pursuant GC 818.8 (CT 193). The Superior Court made 3 grave and prejudicial errors since it
ended an otherwise perfectly legitimate complaint as the court will see below,
and maintained appellant in difficult living conditions.
A GC 815.6 imposes a duty on public
entity independently from any ‘eventual’ judicial immunity its employees may
enjoy.
1) Legal Standards concerning GC 815.6.
The California Tort
Liability Practice book states:
‘Government code 815.6
provides that “ Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an
enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of
injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately
caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity
establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.” The three-prong test must be satisfied to
establish a basis for public entities liability under G. C. 815.6 (see State v.
Superior Court (Perry) (1984) 150 Cal. 3d 848, 854, 197 Cr 914);
·
an enactment must impose a mandatory, not discretionary, duty;
·
The enactment must intend to protect
against the risk of the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff;
·
The breach of the mandatory duty must be a
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.”
‘Under the GC 815.6, the
mandatory duty liability of public entity is not predicated on
the theory of vicarious liability under GC 815.2 for the tort of its
employees. Rather, GC 815.6 provides a
basis of direct liability entirely independent of the derivative
liability created in GC 815.2 (see Bradford v. State of California (1975) 36 CA
3d 16, 19, 111 Cr 852.). Moreover,
public entity liability under GC 815.6 is not subject to the
general rule that a public entity is entitled to the benefits of applicable
employee immunity .
It follows that mandatory duty
liability of a public entity under GC 815.6 is not dependent on proof of
liability of employees, whose acts or omissions constituted the alleged non
compliance with the entity’s statutory duty (on a showing of specific employee
negligence). Because the tort
liabilities of public entities under the tort claim act are cumulative in nature, the absence of a
basis for derivative liability under GC 815.2 does not affect the availability
of direct liability under the mandatory duty theory of GC 815.6.’. ‘Under GC 815.6 for mandatory duty
liability to exist, the mandatory duty must be imposed by an enactment,
‘enactment is defined as ‘constitutional provision, statute, charter
provision, ordinance or regulation” GC 810.6’
2) The statutory
basis for the claim of negligence against the State of California.
As seen above there are two possible statutory
basis for a negligence cause of action against a public entity: first, GC 815.2
that imposes a vicarious liability
for the tort of its employees, combined with CC 1714 (a) that imposes a duty to
care on everyone including public employees; and second GC 815.6 that imposes a
direct liability for negligence when
the 3 conditions described above in paragraph 1) are met. Defendant has contended that its employees
should be entitled to the quasi-judicial immunity (CT 129-131), and that
according to GC 815.2 b) this immunity confers an immunity on the public employer
– the State of California. Sadly the
Superior Court erroneously agreed with defendant (CT 192) although the
necessary 3 conditions for GC 815.6 to apply are met, and there are allegations
of criminals statutes violations for which there cannot be any immunity.
a) MPP
is an enactment that imposes a mandatory duty on defendants.
First, the fact that MPP is an enactment as defined
in GC 810.6 that imposes a mandatory
duty on defendant DSS (and on counties) was stressed in Scott v. Los Angeles County 27
Cal. App. 4th page 145:
‘Welfare and institutions code section 16501 requires the DSS to
establish regulation for the … The
regulation formerly found in division 30 of the DSS manual… were regulation
established by the DSS pursuant to section 16501. These regulations, as are their successors regulations.. were
duly adopted pursuant to administrative procedure act (GC 11340 et seq) and
filed with the Secretary of State (se. Cal. Regs. tit 22, div 2 pt 1,
“Department of social services – Manual of policies and procedures (MPP)’). The
regulation thus have the force of law and are matter…’.
On the next page, it is explained that these MPP
articles are mandatory requirements ‘.. not the court by way of excusing
violation of mandatory requirements’, or impose a mandatory duty. [see also ‘Social worker
was not immune from liability under discretionary acts immunity
for alleged negligent supervision of foster placement; social worker’s
failure to comply with regulations regarding supervision of foster care was
ministerial and not discretionary because regulation (MPP)
afforded social worker no discretion to visit foster child less frequently
than monthly to determine adequacy of placement’. (Scott v. County of Los
Angeles (1994) 27 cal. App. 4th 125, 141 –142, 32 Cal. Rpt. 2d
643)].
And this is also ‘confirmed’ in the California Tort liability
Practice book page 465 ‘a mandatory duty is often held to
arise when a duty is explicitly phrased in the enactment using language such as
‘shall’ or must’ Haggis c. City of LA (2000) 22 C 4th 490, 499’, which is the case here (CT
222).
b)_The
three-prong test establishing liability under GC 815.6 .
Then in
the present case, it is obvious that appellant damages resulted not only from the DPSS refusal to pay
the refugee (RCA) benefits as described in the Manual of Policy and Procedure
(MPP), but also from the
DSS refusal to follow the procedures and articles related to the state hearing
process described in the MPP (CT 31 l. 730-735). The three-prong test establishes therefore without any doubt the
liability of the DSS because:
1_As mentioned in p. 2) a), the
Manual of Policy and Procedure (MPP) that is the basis of administrative law
judge decision (and ‘regulates’ the work of both the LA County DPSS and of DSS
administrative law judges) [and CC 1094.5] is [are] an enactment [s] as
defined in GC 810.6 that imposes a mandatory duty on defendant State of
California (and LAC DPSS).
2_This
enactment –MPP-
intends to protect against the risk of the kind of injury suffered by appellant
since it regulates the issuance of the refugee benefits, and the hearing
process in case of problems with the County DPSS. The MPP articles and procedures and civil code (1094.5) (a)
determine client eligibility for RCA and the amount of benefit to be paid; (b)
require dissatisfied parties (during the DSS hearing process) to appeal the
decision in a rehearing (art. 22-065.1) or a petition at the Superior Court (CC
1094.5); (c)
require the DSS to evaluate the compliance and issue a notice or notification
accordingly (CT 222); and (d) give the Superior Court (an impartial ‘hearing
officer’ after the review of the issues of the case by the DSS) the chance (if
no rehearing resolved the problems) to review the critics to administrative law
judge decisions (here Judge Tolentino’s decision); they are therefore designed
to prevent the loss of RCA benefits (basic social benefits necessary
to survive) due
to (i) critics of an administrative decision outside the formal appeal; due to
(ii) the refusal to follow the procedure to criticize administrative law judge
decision; and due to (iii) the lack of review of the critics by impartial
officers, a presiding judge covering the wrongdoings of a county; and the
change of the certification of a refugee status by unauthorized officers.
3_And the breach of the
mandatory duty [the refusal to issue a notice about the compliance encouraging
the LA County DPSS to follow the appropriate procedure to criticize the administrative
law judge decision or forcing the DPSS to comply fully with judge Tolentino’s
decision, and the change of the decision outside the formal appeal process (CT
31)] prevented appellant from receiving the refugee benefits granted in judge
Tolentino’s decision (and sent him in the street many times,); they prevented a
judge of the Superior Court from exposing the wrongdoings at the INS and at the
DPSS (and CA DSS), and from confirming the refugee status. And therefore lead
to appellant damages and injury (CT 28-29).
Defendant incorrectly stated (CT
209) that MMP art. 22.078.6-.61-.62-.4 (CT 222) used by appellant did not
impose a duty on the State of California, but rather concerned mainly the DPSS.
This is not true of course as the Appeal Court can see since 22.078.6-61-62 ask
(or order) the DSS to
evaluate the DPSS compliance report to issue either a notice or notification on
the compliance. [Moreover,
according to 22-000
.1 ‘The responsibility for providing a full and impartial hearing to the
claimant rests jointly with the county
and the state department’; and to 22-000.11 ‘The state
department is responsible for the overall administration of the hearing process and the conduct of each
hearing’.].
And the other articles describe the
responsibilities of the DPSS and therefore are used by the DSS to determine if
the county has assumed these responsibilities properly. It is also clear that (a) the overall
objective of the MPP regulation is to make sure that the poor get the benefits
they are entitled to receive, even if a county tries to steal them, and that
(b) the DSS has for duty to design the MPP and to make sure it is applied
properly. Finally, defendants argued
that ‘plaintiff had failed to
specifically plead the particular enactment relied on that creates the
mandatory duty’ (CT 207), which is wrong see CT
147, CT 229-230, CT 5-32.
c) The cumulative nature of statutes imposing liability and the
case Bradford v. State of California.
The cumulative nature of statutes
imposing liability is stressed in the California Tort
Liability Practice book and of course in the case Bradford v. State of
California, which is very similar to this case since it refers to a case
involving the judicial immunity. The
court in Bradford v. State of California (1973) 36 Cal. 3d 16 states:
‘In a nutshell the state’s erroneous concept is that
plaintiff is out of court because any state employee for whose omission the
state could be vicariously liable under 815.2, has immunity by virtue of the
employee immunity provided for GC 821.6 (judicial immunity); Therefore
direct liability imposed by section 815.6 may be discharged. This arguments completely overlooks the
legislation committee comments to section 815: ‘ In general, the statutes
imposing liability are cumulative in nature, ie, if liability cannot be
established under the requirements of one section, liability will nevertheless
exist if liability can be established under the provision of another
section’. ‘If statutes imposing liability are
cumulative, the fact that the derivative liability under section GC 815.2 may
be nullified by an employee immunity in no way affects direct liability based on
section GC 815.6. Such liability could only be negativated by
a statutory entity [GC 815 (b) we know of none]’.
[Government Code section
821.6. provides: "A public employee is not liable for injury caused by his
instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the
scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable
cause."].
The law
books and the legal authorities on this issue of the cumulative nature of
statute imposing liability are therefore unequivocal, the ‘eventual’ (or very questionable see section B) judicial immunity
of defendants in no way affects direct liability based on section GC 815.6. And therefore the court drew an incorrect
legal conclusion when it stated that judicial immunity was an ‘incurable defect’ (CT 192, l. 25) and
incorrectly dismissed the case.
d) The inapplicable overriding effect of GC 818.8
and GC 822.2 on GC 815.6.
In its
opposition to the motion to vacate defendant also argued that ‘GC 818.8’ ‘overrides
the public entity liability under GC 815.6’ (CT202), which appellant does
not deny - for the cases based solely
on misrepresentation and for which GC
818.8 and 822.2 apply, but here first (a) defendant
lawyer, Mrs. Shin, forgets that the negligence cause of action is not
solely based on defendants’ misrepresentations, but also on violations
of various statutes (28 USC 1546, PC 182,) and of MPP articles (MPP art.
22.078.6-61, 62; 22.078.31,) (CT 31 l. 730-738). Moreover, in this case, and unlike in the case used by defendant
[Grenell v. City of Hermonsa Beach (1980)
103 Cal. App. 3d. 864], there are allegations of corruption and
malice (CT 29 l.656-673),
and therefore GC 822.2 does not ‘protect’ (or immunize) the defendants
individually (CT 29 l. 661-662), and the misrepresentations or violations of GC
822.2 (enactment) contribute also to establish the negligence under both GC
815.6 and 815.2.
And second
(b) as we will see below, and again, the immunity under GC 818.8 does not apply
in this case because the misrepresentations took place in the social services
area, and because according to the Michael J By v. LOS Angeles County case
discussion, GC 818.8 and GC 822,2 do not ‘immunize’ a public entity in the
social services area ‘designed to serve the interest of society’
(see explanation on section C ). So
defendant remarks concerning the overriding effect of GC 818.8 and GC 822.2 on
GC815.6 are not appropriate here.
e) The criminal statutes violations as
additional proof of negligence.
The
impact of the criminal statutes violations in establishing the
negligence is slightly
different (even though for appellant these criminal
statues are also enactments
that impose a mandatory duty, and they are designed to protect against the
injury appellant suffered, and their violations resulted in appellant injury
and damages, and therefore they contribute to make respondent liable under GC
815.6) because even if defendants ‘may’ be immune for not following the
MPP regulation, there is no way they
could enjoy any immunity for violating criminal statutes like 18 USC 1546, PC
182 etc.; and therefore the vicarious liability imposed by GC 815.2 and the negligence
of the DSS employees as defined in CC 1714 (a) that is also established by
these criminal statutes violations, would lead to the liability of the DSS and
not be subject to immunity.
Defendant
argued that the criminal statutes ‘are not only inapplicable,
but also do not create private right of action’ (see opp. Motion to vacate,
CT 208 l. 18-19). It is wrong
to write that they are inapplicable, in fact one of defendant’s cases
(CT 207 l. 23-24) explains precisely the opposite [see Hoff 19 Cal 4th ed page 929, ‘a duty of care, and attendant standard of conduct required of a
reasonable person, may be found in a legislative enactment that does not
provide for civil liability’, which is also the case here]. Or in the California Tort Liability Practice
book page 465 ‘Liability under GC 815.6
does not require ‘that the enactment establishing a mandatory duty itself
manifest an intent to create a private right of action” Haggis v. City of La…’. And concerning the private right of action,
PC 182 defines the wrongdoings ‘conspiracy’, and there is a private right of
civil action for conspiracy (in fact the difference between civil and criminal
conspiracy is very thin since the criminal conspiracy focuses on the agreement
while the civil conspiracy focuses on the damages), so this statute refers to a
wrongdoing for which there is a private right of action.
The criminal statutes mentioned here
imposes a mandatory duty on defendants in the sense that defendants are not
allowed to violate these criminal statutes while performing their duty; and
they are intended to protect against the kind of injury plaintiff
suffered, because (a) for example 18 USC 1546 objective is to discourage people from using altered immigration documents (when knowing them to be altered) to protect, among others, the aliens who have valid
immigration documents and to protect against people using altered document for
fraud purposes, and 18 USC 1512 c) objective is to prevent the corrupt use of
altered documents in legal proceeding like
in this case (see CT 215); because (b) one of PC 182 objectives is
to prevent individuals from conspiring to obstruct justice (CT 218-219) or to
falsely maintain legal proceeding like in this case; and finally because (c) 18
USC 1512, 1513 objective is to prevent individuals from retaliating against,
tampering with or from harassing a victim during a legal proceeding (see CT 215 bottom page 18 USC 1512 d)), which is the kind of treatment appellant
suffered during his various legal proceeding.
The facts of the
case also show clearly that the breach of this duty or violations of criminal
statutes, even if it was never judged in an criminal court, also
resulted in appellant damages and injury since (a) defendants used the altered verification of
status to justify their conclusion that plaintiff refuge status had been
re-determined (which also created appellant problems even if it was
not the only reason for the damages), since (b) the obstruction to
justice due to the refusal to follow MPP and CC procedures resulted in the
impossibility for the Superior Court to review the LA County critics to judge
Tolentino’s decision. And since (c)
defendants were retaliating against and harassing appellant for denouncing the
unfair behavior of DSS and DPSS employees.
3) The Superior Court grave and prejudicial
errors.
The
Superior Court ignored appellant
arguments on GC 815.6 imposing a liability independently from employees
eventual immunity (CT 146-148; CT
169-172) and erred gravely because (a) the MPP is an enactment that imposes a mandatory duty, and the facts of the
case prove that the MPP (and CC1094.5) was designed to prevent against the kind
of injury plaintiff suffered (loss of RCA resulting in damages,) and that the
breach of the mandatory duty resulted in plaintiff injury; because (b) the
judicial immunity, if any (as seen below defendant should not be entitled to
immunity), does not affect the liability under GC 815.6, and in this particular
case the overriding effect of GC 818.8 and GC 822.2 do not apply (GC 822.2
contribute to establish the negligence under GC 815.6 and 815.2); and finally because
(c) the violations of criminal statutes simply establish even more clearly the
well funded of the negligence cause of action.
Defendant DSS is therefore liable for the negligence claim described in
the complaint, and the dismissal should be reversed.
B
Mendoza, Castello, Campbell do
not enjoy the quasi-judicial immunity because their actions were taken outside
of all jurisdiction and were ministerial in nature.
1) Legal Standard concerning the
‘character’ of the DSS hearing process and the judicial immunity.
Few cases address the issue
of the ‘character’ of the DSS administrative proceeding. For example in People
v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal. 3d
468, 186 cal Rptr. 77, 651 P 2a, the court wrote:
‘The fact that state wide and local administrative agencies are
prohibited from exercising “judicial power” by the California constitution does
not mean that agency proceeding determination may never be judicial in nature,
so as to preclude them from having collateral estoppels effect in subsequent
proceeding [overruling
Empire Star Mines Co. Cal. Emp. Co. (1946) 28 Cal. 2d. 33 (168 P2.2d 686)]’
And in Imen v. Glassford, the Court
found that for an administrative proceedings to be judicial in nature certain
factors must be present:
‘In determining whether an agency acted in a judicial capacity, the
court must consider the presence of factors indicating that administrative
proceedings and determination possessed a judicial character [Imen v. Glassford
(1988) 201 Cal. App. 3d. 898, 906-907, 247 Cal. Rptr. 514]. The factors include the following :
·
Whether
the administrative hearing was conducted in a judicial-like adversary
proceeding;
·
Whether
the proceeding required witness to testify under oath;
·
Whether the agency determination involved the
adjudicatory application of rules to a single set of facts;
·
Whether
the proceeding were conducted before an impartial hearing officer;
·
Whether
the parties had the right to subpoena witness and present documentary evidence;
·
Whether
the administrative agency maintained a verbatim record of the proceeding.’
And few cases
address the exception to the judicial immunity of judges. For example in Mireless v. Waco, the court
found that this judicial immunity of judges had two exceptions: ‘(1)
non judicial actions, and (2) actions that, though judicial in nature, are
taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction [Mireless v. Waco (1991) 502 US
9, 11-12, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9]’. Or ‘in New Alaska
Development Corp. v. Guetschow, 896 F. 2d 1298 (9 Circ. 1989), the ninth
Circuit identified the following factors as relevant in determining whether a
particular act is judicial in nature:
‘(1) whether the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2)
whether the event occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy
centered around a case pending before the judge; and (4) whether the events at
issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the judge in his
official capacity.’
2) How and why the
exceptions to the judicial immunity applies in this case.
Although (it appears
that) no case really addresses directly this issue of the judicial
immunity of DSS administrative law judges (and despite the fact that the
California constitution prohibits administrative agencies from exercising
judicial power), the above cases and determinations show that during
the administrative hearing process, the administrative law judges are
performing judicial acts in nature [and therefore that they could be entitled
to the quasi judicial immunity]. But
here defendants actions were not part of the hearing process since both the
hearing and the rehearing had taken
place already (CT 43). The
letters were written as part of the compliance process, a process for which we
do not have the determining factors mentioned above in Imen. Moreover as you will see below defendants
took decisions they were not entitled to take.
A The lack of jurisdiction or action taken
outside of all jurisdiction.
The Superior Court wrote (CT 192 l.
16-21) that:
‘Where a judge determine a debatable jurisdictional issue, even though erroneously the
judge is not liable even though it develops that the issue was incorrectly
decided, usually , the court has subject matter jurisdiction and the departure
is merely an exercise of that jurisdiction
…’.
But, this conclusion is
completely inconsistent with
defendant own statement on this jurisdiction issue, since Judge Castello himself wrote in
his letter (CT 51 bottom of the page):
‘If
the parties do not agree with the determination of a judge, the only avenue to challenge the determination is to file a formal appeal to the Department’s legal Division
and to the courts. The
Law does not provide administrators, or the chief administrative law judge the legal authority
(jurisdiction) to change a final decision , even if it is erroneous.’
There were/are therefore no
‘jurisdictional’ doubt (no ‘debatable jurisdictional issue’ as the court wrote it), Judge
Catello agreed that he (or administrators) cannot change a decision
outside the established formal procedure
(rehearing or petition at the superior court), and therefore no doubt that
neither he nor the other defendants (Mendoza, Campbell) had authority (or jurisdiction) to
change the decision certifying plaintiff refugee status by writing for example
that appellant refugee status had been re-determined (CT 8, CT 12, CT 19), and to
lower the number of months of RCA benefits (including housing assistance) to be paid
by writing for example that the county had ‘substantially complied’ or that
‘credit meant subtract’ instead of add as they did (CT 12, CT
18) during the compliance process (and after the 30 days limit
to file a rehearing).
The compliance procedure is
not a formal appeal to challenge an administrative law judge decision,
and moreover the compliance reports or
notices of action (CT 44-46) were not
even written within the 30 days period to file this formal appeal (a
rehearing request) at the legal division of the DSS, so defendants did not have jurisdiction to address appellant refugee status issue as a
rehearing issue, or to reconsider the RCA benefits to be paid, and therefore do
not enjoy the quasi-judicial
immunity for pretending that appellant
was not a refugee (CT 8, 19) to steal
him the refugee benefits granted by judge Tolentino or for lowering the number
of months of RCA to be paid (CT 12, 18) [there is no debate, this is not
a debatable jurisdiction issue, judge Castello statements are uncontroverted
facts of the case, and therefore the court legal conclusion is inconsistent
with these facts, and it should be overturned].
b) No honest and valid basis to write that
the INS had re-determined the refugee status.
Moreover, the only way to
terminate a refugee status is by using 8 CFR 207.9; and only the
‘INS’ (USCIS) District Director can do so after following a special procedure,
- in this case the INS District Director never terminated the refuge status. Defendants are legal experts and perfectly
knew that using an altered
verification of status (knowing it to be altered) to
support their claim that appellant refugee status had been re-determinated by
the INS as they did (see CT 49) was criminal [criminal
statutes 18 USC 1546 and 1512 c), prevent the use of altered immigration
documents or evidence in legal proceeding]. Defendants had no right to use this altered verification of
status especially after Judge Tolentino had certified the refugee status and
there were allegations of fraud at the INS [they are not part of the FBI or the
US attorney office or the INS (DHS) to say or even to give an opinion that a
verification of immigration status was issued by error or for criminal reason, or
even judge at the Superior court that can review administrative law judge
decision, and Mr. Campbell had already decided on the rehearing (that the
decision was conformed to the law including the certification of the refugee
status), so he had not this rehearing jurisdiction any more].
Their decision turned out
to be wrong, the refugee status was obviously not re-determined [but
confirmed with a refugee employment authorization card CT 35, and this makes
sense also because Judge Tolentino had the authority to certify the refugee
status based on document review according to an INS legal department
information note on the SAVE verification status system and because according
to the res juridicata principle that applies to DSS administrative law judge
decisions (see People V. Sims (1982) 32 cal. 3d. 468), the
issue of appellant refugee status that was addressed in Judge Tolentino
decision can not be re-argued in a court of law after the DPSS did not appeal
properly the decision]. And even if the
DPSS had presented a valid document (not an altered verification of
status), defendants still should have asked the LA County DPSS to
file it with a petition at the Superior Court because CC 1094.5 require them to
do so [see Judge Tolentino’s decision (CT p. 37) which stipulate that if the
parties have any new document that may affect the decision they must present it
through the rehearing process or through a petition at the Superior
Court]. It seems to be a normal
practice at the DPSS not to ask for
rehearing which is an obvious deprivation of civil rights (several
DPSS managers confirmed to appellant that they never asked for rehearing). The case People v. Sims also confirms that
this appears to be usual practice at other counties too!
c) Defendants’ actions were ministerial in nature
and defendants had no discretion.
The letters (and included
‘decisions’) were written as part of the compliance evaluation duty or process
of the California DSS and the review of Judge Mendoza’s work on this process,
for which we do not have the various factors described above as factors determining
the ‘judicial character’ of the action or process:
(a) the so
called ‘letters or compliance hearing’ were not conducted in a judicial-like
adversary proceeding;
(b) they did not require witness to
testify under oath;
(c) defendants’ determination did not
involve the adjudicatory application of rules to a single set of facts;
(d) these hearings were not conducted
before an impartial hearing officers (Mr. Castello and Campbell are not
impartial officers to judge Mr. Mendoza work); and
(e) the parties (plaintiff,) had
no right to subpoena witness.
On the contrary, we have
all the characteristics of ‘ministerial actions’ and of mandatory duty allowing
no discretion. The regulation states ‘upon receipt of the
compliance report … the Department (CADSS) shall make a determination
regarding the appropriateness of the compliance…. (art. 22-078.6 .61, .62 of the MPP) (CT 222)’, and this action (to issue a notice or notification)
imposed by the MPP articles has all the characteristic of a ministerial action:
‘acts done
after ascertaining the existence of a specified state of facts in obedience to
a legal order (Judge Tolentino’s order) without exercising of personal
discretion’.
Mendoza, Castello, Campbell had no discretion to change the order or
to deny the benefits granted by judge Tolentino and ‘no discretion’ to evaluate
the validity of a new verification of status (certainly not an altered one)
during the compliance process [Mr. Campbell would have had jurisdiction
(during a rehearing) if the LA County had presented the altered
verification of status through a rehearing request, but it did not,
it simply presented it as explanation for its compliance report]. They only had to ‘ascertain the existence
of a specified state of facts in obedience to a legal order’:
(a) Did the County agree with Judge
Tolentino’s order dated February 5 2003? (it obviously did not);
(b) Did it pay the benefits granted by the
judge? (it obviously did not);
(c) Did it help plaintiff to find the date his
asylum was granted? (it obviously did not);
(d) Was it trying to present a new document
that may affect the decision instead of filing it and a petition at the
superior court? (it obviously was);
The answers to these questions were
obvious, and the solution was to ask the County to file a petition at the
Superior court, so they
were only performing ministerial actions and the immunity does not apply.
Judges Mendoza and Castello did not even
assume this mandatory duty (to write a notice or notification about the
compliance) imposed by MPP 22-078.6 .61, .62, since Judge Mendoza
wrote that plaintiff should contact the LA County DPSS to resolve the problems
(although he knew plaintiff had already contacted them several times) (CT 49);
and Judge Castello - who agreed that the LA County DPSS had not fully complied
(when he wrote that he thought that the DPSS had ‘substantially complied’),
did not ask the DPSS to fully comply as the regulation ask him to, and instead
he asked appellant to request a new hearing on a compliance issue (refugee
status issue, which is forbidden by art. 22.078.31(CT50-51). This tends to confirm that this work is not
part of their normal or usual work as seen below.
d)
Defendants actions are not judicial according to the 9 Circ. Court standard either.
It appears also that the compliance work is
usually not handled by the LA Presiding Judge, but by Mr. Ceja who is not an
administrative law judge, which tends to confirm that this compliance work or
action is very much like the work of social workers who have no discretion and
perform ministerial act in nature:
[‘Social worker was not exercising discretion so as to be
entitled to immunity when applying radically different standards for
eligibility for welfare that allowed by statue and regulation. see (Ramos v.
Merced County (1971) 4 cal. 3d 685, 692-694, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421, 484 P 2d 93). Or ‘Social worker was not immune from liability
under discretionary acts immunity for alleged negligent supervision of
foster placement; social worker’s failure to comply with regulations regarding
supervision of foster care was ministerial and discretionary because regulation
afforded social worker no discretion to visit foster child less frequently than
monthly to determine adequacy of placement’. (Scott v. County of Los Angeles
(1994) 27 cal. App. 4th 125, 141 –142, 32 Cal. Rpt. 2d 643)].
We therefore see that we do not find either
in this process the factors ‘determining whether a particular act is
judicial in nature’ described in New Alaska Development Corp. v.
Guetschow, 896 F. 2d 1298 (9 Circ.
1989), [(1) whether the precise act is a normal
judicial function; (2) whether the event occurred in the judge’s chambers; (3)
whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the judge; and
(4) whether the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a
confrontation with the judge in his official capacity.’] because the actions in question were not normal judicial
function of defendants (it certainly not the usual work or function of Judge
Castello and Mr. Campbell to deal with compliance problems for Los Angeles
decision or to review Mendoza’s work on this process. It is not even the usual
work of Judge Mendoza since it is Mr. Ceja that usually does this work as seen
above); the controversy did not center around a case pending before the judge
(the case had been judged by Judge Tolentino, not by the other defendants); and
the events at issues did not arose directly and immediately out of a
confrontation with the judge in his official capacity (the issue did not arose
directly out of a confrontation with Judge Tolentino). This confirms, if need be, that defendants’
actions were not judicial in nature.
e) Other elements
justifying the denial of the immunity.
The conclusions (above)
were confirmed in some way by the ‘Commission on Judicial
Performance’ when it refused to review these judges wrongdoings and said that
it did not have jurisdiction, implying that these actions were not ‘judicial’ in
nature [they suggested that plaintiff contacts their director, the Governor or
a court of justice, CT 28]. And
according to the Butz case, the quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to
criminal wrongdoings or behavior, or when defendants are guilty of malice to
deliberately deprive a victim from his constitutional right like in this
case (due process, right to life,):
‘A school board member would lose his
immunity from 1983 suit only if ‘he knew or reasonably should have known that
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with
the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury to the student” 420 US, at 322.
in Butz et al. v. Economou et
al. decision.
Defendants are legal
experts who knew about the importance of procedures, and about the fact that
the DPSS could never have justified the re-determination of the refugee status
in front of the Superior court with an altered verification of status
(again it is a crime to issue and use an altered immigration document when
knowing it to be altered, viol. 18 USC 1546), and therefore that because of the
collateral estoppel (principle of res juridicata) associated with
administrative decisions, the certification of the initial verification of
status by Judge Tolentino simply certified plaintiff refugee status (for good,
see People v. Sims referenced above).
They also knew that the only way to deprive appellant of his benefits
was to deprive him from his right to a due process by forcing him to complain
over and over on the same issue (to try to issue a new decision contradicting
the first one). They deliberately
deprived appellant of his constitutional rights (due process, freedom from
discrimination, right to life,) and therefore do not deserve the quasi judicial
immunity.
The cases law used by
defendants (CT 130-131) do not apply to this case or support appellant point of
view as seen above. For example, in Cleavinger, the case refers to:
‘Members
of federal prison discipline committee responsible for hearing cases involving
inmates charged with rules infractions held entitled to qualified immunity from
suits alleging violation of inmates' constitutional rights.’ which is a very
different context and again different nature of action; and in
Butz, the ‘federal hearing examiners or administrative law
judges, agency officials responsible for initiating or continuing a
proceeding subject to agency adjudication, and agency attorneys who
arranged for the presentation of evidence on the record were absolutely immune
from suits’;
Here,
defendants did not initiate or continue the proceeding - the administrative
proceeding was initiated by appellant and the DSS was just supposed to verify
that the benefits had (or not) been given according to the administrative law
judge order.
3) The
Superior Court grave and prejudicial errors.
The Superior Court erroneously granted this judicial
immunity to defendant employees (CT 192 l 24-27). Defendants do not enjoy the quasi-judicial immunity because first
they had (and even admitted that they had) no jurisdiction
to change the decision outside the formal appeal process (as they did), and
second they were not performing judicial action, but ministerial
action [‘acts done after ascertaining the existence of a
specified state of facts in obedience to a legal order without exercising of
personal discretion’] in nature, [see also Judicial officer
is not immune from civil action that complains of acts that are properly
characterized as ministerial or administrative as opposed to
judicial. Shore v. Howard. N. D. Tex. 1976 4414 F. Supp 379]. And of course they should be entitled to no
immunity for violating criminal statutes or for deliberately depriving
appellant from his constitutional rights like the due process, right to life
(the refugee status is a matter of life and death, as well as receiving the
basic benefits stolen) and his refugee privileges. This very prejudicial Court conclusion on this issue should also be overturned.
C State of
California does not enjoy the immunity for misrepresentation under GC 818.8
because the misrepresentations were made in the context of delivery of social
services and involved a risk of physical harm.
The
conclusions of the various Courts of Appeal that have addressed the issue of
the immunity for misrepresentation of public entity under GC 818.8 are
unequivocal. And even though appellant
had based his initial complaint almost
solely on the conclusions of the Second District Appeal Court decision in
the Michael J. By… v. Los Angles County case … (and of the law-books that
refers to this case) that fits perfectly the facts of this present case
(concerning the loss of social benefits), the Appeal Court will see below that
several other cases confirmed these conclusions and the fact that the immunity
should not hold here.
1) The
conclusions of the 2nd District Appeal Court in Michael J. By v. Los
Angeles County Department of Adoption.
The 2nd
District Appeal Court was clear when it stated for example (a) that the
immunity is not ‘absolute’, (b) that a critical issue in determining if the
immunity for misrepresentation applies, is
the context in which the misrepresentation took place, and not
the fact that there were financial loss (in fact a civil lawsuit is always for
some kind of financial loss), and finally (c) that the immunity does not apply in the social services area.
a) The
immunity is not ‘absolute’, but ‘limited’.
Like
the Los Angele County in Michael J. By, defendant lawyer, Shin, argued (CT 131
l. 13, 162 l. 4) that the immunity for misrepresentation was ‘absolute’ (meaning that it had no
exception), which is wrong. On the contrary in the Michael J By case, the
court found that the immunity was ‘limited’:
‘Contrary to the County's
contention that the immunity provided by these sections is "absolute" and covers the misrepresentations and
concealment of information alleged by appellants, the scope of the immunity
for misrepresentation is limited. As the California Supreme Court stated in
Johnson v. State (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 800 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352],
the Legislature employed the term "misrepresentation" in a narrow,
rather than expansive sense: "'[Misrepresentation],' as a tort distinct
from the general milieu of negligent and intentional wrongs, applies to
interferences with financial or commercial interest. The Legislature designed
section 818.8 to exempt the governmental entity from this type of liability."
b) The
financial loss did not result from a commercial transaction with the DSS.
The
Superior Court did not address the fact that the misrepresentations took place in
the social services area, context in which the immunity does not hold and
should not hold because social services are ‘designed to serve the interest
of society’, as stated in Michael J. By:
‘(5a) The immunity provided
to governmental entities public employees by section 818.8 and 822.2 does
not shield the County from liability for misrepresentation and deceit in the
social service area, designed to serve the interest of society
...; (5b) Although appellant suffers a financial loss in the sense that they
have incurred, and will continue to incur, substantial medical expenses. Their
loss did not result from a commercial transaction with the county nor from the
county’s interference with a commercial transaction’.
Denying the immunity in the social services area is very
understandable and reasonable, it does not make sense to vote laws giving poor
people right to basic social benefits while at the same time allowing civil
servants to rob these benefits with lies - this is why the 2nd
Appellate Court wrote ‘in the
social service area, designed to serve the interest of society’
. Appellant case is very similar to the
Michael J. By case in the sense that the RCA benefits are given to
refugee to serve the interest of society, to help them to resettle
rapidly instead of forcing them to live in the street after being victim of
persecutions in their home country. It
is not just a humanitarian concern, but also an organizational and
financial concern because a lot of money is invested in the asylum
process (to decide who should and who should not be entitled to the refugee
status). If only very few asylum
seekers are granted refugee status, it is not to send them in the street
afterward and to hurt them physically as much as possible (by making them sick
or worse).
Moreover,
like in Michael J. By case, appellant damages and injury did not result from
a commercial transaction with the DSS, nor did it result from the DSS’s interference with a commercial transaction. Appellant damages, wages loss, loss of year
life expectancy (including future health care cost due to, among other,
his cardiovascular problems that will only worsen with time), psychological
damages, and appellant injury, his serious health problems, etc., resulted from
the misrepresentations of appellant immigration status, of facts and of MPP
articles and procedures, and for the refusal to follow the appropriate
procedure and regulation to prevent the issuance of social benefits (which is
not commercial transaction).
c) United States v. Neustadt
(1961) and
Connelly v. State of California (1970)
Defendant
stated that a loss of social benefit ‘is
an interference with a financial interest’ of the poor (CT 203, 207 l.
10-11), to suggest that the immunity should hold. It used the Michael J. By case comments referring to Johnson v.
State of California case, but both of these cases simply underlined a previous
conclusion of the US Supreme Court in United States v. Neustadt
(1961). And in Neustadt, the words ‘financial
or commercial interest’ referred to
business interest rather than social benefits losses. See comments in Michael
J. By case:
‘but "[so] far as
misrepresentation has been treated as giving rise in and of itself to a
distinct cause of action in tort, it has been identified with the common law
action of deceit," and has been confined "very largely to the
invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings."'
(United States v. Neustadt (1961) 366 U.S. 696, 711, fn. 26.)’
The meaning of the word ‘interference with the financial or commercial interest’ is
therefore unequivocal, and it was even defined more precisely in Michael J. By
case discussion when it cited the case Connelly v. State of California (1970) 3
Cal.App.3d 744 [84 Cal. Rptr. 257], in which:
‘the court held that the
state was not immune from liability for negligently providing the owner
of a marina with inaccurate information as to the anticipated rise in the river
during a period of heavy rains. After citing the Supreme Court's interpretation
of "misrepresentation" in section 818.8 as articulated in Johnson,
the court said, "Applying the foregoing criteria to the facts of this
case, we find that although appellant suffered a commercial loss in the sense
that his business installations were damaged, the loss did not result from a
commercial transaction between him and the state, nor from the state's
interference with his commercial transactions.’
These 3 cases (Neustadt,
Michael J. By, Connelly) are precise, and leave no doubt that in the present
case in the social services area the immunity does not hold.
2) Johnson v. State (1968) and Jopson v. Feather River.
The
present case is also similar to Johnson [Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal. 2 d. 782, and Garcia v.
Superior court (1990) citing Johnson] in the sense that it involved a risk
of physical harm - depriving a refugee from the most basic social benefits
necessary to survive is necessarily physically hurting the refugee by putting
him under extremely difficult living condition, including the lack of shelter,
of place to cook and to store food (and therefore bad diet), and the great risk
of getting hurt by ‘3rd parties’ in the street, etc.. . In fact most misrepresentation cases in the
social services area will necessarily lead to some kind of physical harm, and
will involve public employees guilty of corruption and malice (such as a
conscious effort to vex, annoy and to harm injured party in his business..)
because the social benefits given to the poor are usually an absolutely
necessary help that would not be given otherwise, and also because one of
the definitions of corruption is ‘robbing
from the poor the little they have’
(or are entitled to have).
The
case Jopson v. Feather River confirmed this point in some way when it clearly
classified the ‘social services area’
as type of case of misrepresentation, and even classified Johnson as being one
in the social services area in addition to being one involving a risk of
physical harm. The Appeal Court in
Jopson [Jopson v.
Feather River Air Quality Management District (2003) 108 Cal. App. 4th
492, 502, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d. , 506-513]
differentiated the category ‘in the context of the delivery of social services’ like appellant case from the category of
cases having an ‘interference with commercial and financial interest’
and indirectly stated that the immunity did not apply to cases in the social services area, when it
stated: ‘in Johnson, the (California) Supreme Court distinguished misrepresentations
made in the context of the delivery of social services from the
representations that interfere with the financial or commercial interests’.
[Finally, the California law
books also make this difference or draw this line. California Forms of pleading and practice vol. 23 on page 269.27
[1] section 269-26- refers to Michael J. By to point this out. And California Government Code 1-939 book
also uses the social services area has one of its category of case see page 239
note 6. So there is a wide agreement,
and in fact defendant that had started to use the same arguments in the first
lawsuit withdrew them after appellant gave his explanation on the Michael J. By
case, and started to use the 11th amendment at the Federal
Court. It was therefore not fair at all
to start using them again after appellant had to wait almost 2 years because of
an error of defendant and of the District Court, especially after it
disqualified a judge, and filed 4 demurrers on this same complaint and when it
ignored the obvious arguments presented above.]
3)
Defendant’s legal authorities.
Defendant
used several legal authorities or cases (Masters, Harshbarger, Page, cases also mentioned in the Michael j. By
case discussion) that are fundamentally
different from this case (CT 131-132, CT 203-206). In Masters for example, the public employee
misrepresented the length of time to make a decision on a disability retirement
pension, which is very different than misrepresenting a refugee status that is
a matter of life and death and misrepresenting facts, laws, and procedures to
steal basic social benefits necessary to survive. Moreover, in Masters there
was no allegation that the public employees were guilty of corruption and
malice, whereas in this present case, there are allegations of
corruption and malice (CT 29 l 666-673) [‘such as a conscience to vex,
annoy, harm injured a party in his ‘business’ (Shonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1974)
50 cal App. 3d 401, 404 411)’. Defendants knew they would repeatedly send
appellant in the street, and create him a great prejudice with lies on his
refugee status. Moreover, robbing the poor from the little they have or the
little they are entitled to have is even a definition of corruption as seen
above].
Then, in Harshbarger v. City of Colton, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 1335, ‘homeowners who had to reconstruct their home
to bring it up to city code standards sued the city alleging city building
inspectors, who periodically inspected the residence, intentionally
misrepresented and suppressed the fact that the residence did not meet the
various standards. The court held that the alleged interference with the
Harshbargers' financial interest fell within the immunity provisions of section
818.8’;
Or in Page v. City of Montebello, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d 658, ‘the court held that a count of the complaint
of a widow and minor daughter of a narcotics informant seeking death benefits
from the city and its police department on the basis of an oral promise
allegedly made to the decedent and his spouse by a police officer employed by
the city, was in actuality an effort to hold the city responsible for the tort
of its employee and that section 818.8 constituted a complete defense’, the
contexts are very different form the present case since the misrepresentations
did not take place in the social services area, and here it is not just the errors of few employees,
but also of the management that appellant contacted (CT 28).
4) The
Superior Court grave and prejudicial error.
The Superior Court ignored all the
arguments appellant presented on the Michael J. By, Johnson or Jopson cases (CT 148-149 ),
and only stated the provision of GC 818.8 and GC 822.2 (CT 194), it therefore
made a very grave and prejudicial error because these cases clearly demonstrate
that the immunity should not hold in the social services area, when the damages
do not result from a commercial transaction with the respondent or from the
interference with a commercial transaction, and when the misrepresentations
involve a risk of physical harm like in this present case.
This appeal is therefore justified and gives an
opportunity to the 2nd District Appeal court to confirm its earlier
conclusions on the immunity for misrepresentation in the social services area
that are everyday more and more important because in an information society, it
is absolutely critical to encourage civil servants to tell the truth or not to
lie in general and more particularly, in the social services area ‘designed to serve the interest of society’.
Conclusion.
In conclusion defendants employees
are not entitled to the judicial (or quasi judicial) immunity because their
actions were taken outside of all jurisdiction and were not judicial in nature,
so respondent, State of California, does not enjoy the judicial immunity
either. Moreover, even if the Court of
Appeal found that defendants were entitled to the judicial immunity, GC 815.6
imposes a duty independently from any employee judicial immunity, and the
immunity for misrepresentation pursuant to GC 818.8 does not apply in the
social services area (and in case involving a risk of physical harm), so the
State of California is liable for both causes of action and for the wrongdoings
described in the complaint.
The Superior Court made 3 grave and very prejudicial
errors on these 3 legal issues, maintained appellant in extremely difficult
living conditions despite his health problems, and incorrectly dismissed the
case. Appellant respectfully asks this Court
not only to reverse the decision of dismissal, to vacate the order of
dismissal, and to remand the case for further proceeding, but also to confirm
the conclusion presented above on these 3 different important issues.
Los
Angeles, July 2006
Pierre Genevier
Certificate
of compliance pursuant to Fed. R. App. 32 (a) (7) (C), Circuit rule, rule 32-1 and
Cal. rule 14 for case no: B 191 039
Pursuant
to Fed. R. App. O. 32 (a) (7) (C) and Ninth circuit Rule 32-1, I certify that
the attached brief is proportionally spaced, has a type face of 13 points and
contains 11 293 words (1156 lines).
Dated July , 2006
By
:______________
Pierre
Genevier
Comments on legal aid:
On July 11, Public Counsel
contacted me and said that the Appeal Court had asked them for their assistance
to find ‘volunteer Attorneys for certain
in proper cases’. I, of course,
accepted to receive legal aid if possible, and send a rough draft of this brief
to describe briefly the case. Public Counsel said that it would study the case
and contact me again shortly to give me an answer. At this day, Public Counsel did not contact me and did not
respond to my email asking for some information about the program and their response
time. If Public Counsel eventually
finds an attorney willing to help on this case, a supplemental brief may be
filed, but I could not wait any longer without any response to my email from
the Public Counsel because I must try to file a motion to expedite and a motion
for preliminary injunction, and I have also difficulties to make copies of the
brief. In this brief, I made every
effort to refer to precise legal authorities and to refer to the facts and
arguments contained in the Clerk’s transcript.
Pierre Genevier
423 E 7th street (RM 528)
Los Angeles, CA 90014
Ph.: (213) 622-1508
Emails: p_genevier@yahoo.com,
pierre.genevier@laposte.net
Court
of Appeal of the State of California
Second Appellate
District
Proof of
Service
I, the undersigned, certify and
declare that, on July 2006, I served
a true copy of Appellant’s Opening Brief by hand delivery and by mail to:
Mrs. Jung D. Shin,
Deputy Attorney General, attorney for the State of California Department of Social Services (defendant),
300 South Spring, Suite 5212, Los Angeles, CA 90013. (By hand delivery 1 copy).
Judge Morris Jones, Superior Court, 111 N. Hill
street, 90012 Los Angeles CA 90014. (By
hand delivery 1 copy).
California Supreme Court, 350 McAllister Street, San
Francisco, CA 94002. (By mail 4 copies)
I
hereby certify under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct. I also certify that I don’t
know anybody who can do the service for me, and that I do not have any money to
pay someone to do the service for me.
Pierre
Genevier